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CHAIRMAN JACK R. FENTON: Today's hearing is on AB 3172. 
AB 3172 would make significant changes in the award of attorneys' fees 
in certain public interest lawsuits. 
Existing law provides that a court may award attorneys' fees 
to a successful party to any action which has resulted in the enforce-
ment of an important right affecting the public interest if a signifi-
cant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class 
of persons . 
AB 3172 would change both the procedures involved in the re-
questing and granting of such fee awards as well as the formula used 
to compute the size of the awards. 
Testimony will focus on what the practical effects of the 
various provisions of AB 3172 will be. We will try to determine whe-
ther the bill is necessary to preclude excessive fee awards as well 
as what impact the bill will have on the policy of encouraging compe-
tent counsel to bring public interest litigation to enforce important 
rights. 
Our first witness is Assemblyman Pat Nolan, Author of AB 3172. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PATRICK J. NOLAN: The whole issue of public in-
terest attorneys' fees has been one, up to now, which been handled 
merely in the domain of the courts. The Legislature has not spoken in 
in this area, and I think it's important that we do. The Legislature 
has said that we want to encourage these lawsuits, but the courts have 
taken it from there and have come up with a procedure for awarding fees 
which I think is, Ln light of the testimony that the Committee will be 
hearing soon, unfortunate. The Legislature, of course, a much bet-
ter forum in which to weigh the various interests and decide on a scheme 
of compensating attorneys for bringing these lawsuits, and that is the 
purpose for which I introduced this bill. To allow us to come up with 
a method which will take into account all the interests of society and 
the competing parties rather than looking merely at the interest of the 
two parties at the bar in a court case. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: To balance the equities, as we learned in 
law school. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Right. The court is not the proper forum 
to decide the distribution of the fees. The Legislature is. That's 
why I've introduced this bill. I'll turn it back to you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you. The next witness is Fred A. 
Bennett, Deputy Counsel, County of Los Angeles, who's the son of an 
old friend of mine, one of our great jurists from Los Angeles County, 
retired Superior Court Judge Ray Bennett. I believe Judge Bennett 
is here with his wife. He was a predecessor of mine in the Assembly. 
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Go ahead, Fred. 
MR. FREDERICK A. BENNETT: Last time that we were here, 
most of the opposition dealt with the fact that apparently we were 
making public entities able to obtain fees under the statute. That 
was never our intent. we didn't think that the statute, even as amend-
ed, accomplished that goal. But to make sure that it doesn't, and 
to convince those who are strongly opposed in that regard, we have 
proposed an amendment, some copies of which I will leave with the 
committee, which reinstates that portion that prohibits public enti-
ties from receiving the fees. I think we have also filed, already, 
a rather detailed memorandum setting forth the points and the reason-
ing behind those amendments we have made to the bill. I would like 
to direct my attention to one aspect of it, which I think is ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, if I close my eyes I think I hear 
your father speaking. 
MR. BENNETT: That's the finest compliment I can have. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Right. That's correct. 
MR. BENNETT: The one aspect that I think is the most crucial 
is the methodology of calculating the fees. We have indicated 
throughout, we're not against the salutary purpose of this legislation 
which is to encourage competent attorneys to bring necessary public 
interest litigation. We are not against awarding reasonable fees to 
them to encourage these awards. What we are against is the award of 
unreasonable fees and windfall profits. And I have prepared a couple 
of charts just to show how the two methodologies work. 
Now, I have taken some hypothetical facts which may not be 
too hypothet We start with your basic $50,000-a-year attorney. 
The calculations work just as well if we take a $25,000-a-year attorney 
or we take a $100,000-a-year attorney. But I took this figure because 
it's convenient. We're assuming that he spends 1000 hours on success-
ful public interest litigation. Now this is roughly six months of work. 
The figure that we used, this 2164, is the traditional accounting method-
ology of dividing into a yearly salary to come up with an hourly rate, 
but for those who have been in practice and think in terms of 2000 bill-
able hours or eighteen hundred billable -- the figure is not far off of 
what about six months' effort would be. Normal overhead expenses are 
generally 50 percent of salaries. This is the average that you will 
find in the law office economic books. It also happens to be the fig-
ure, roughly, that was found in the Los Angeles County Bar Association 
Survey of salaries and office expenses for the year 1977. I don't have 
the more current one, I don't think that figure has changed a great 
deal. So, $50,000-a-year attorneys, spending roughly six months or 
1000 hours on public interest litigation, in which he's successful, 
and with overhead expenses of about 50 percent of his salary. We then 
take the current methodology of calculating fees, the so-called lode-
star or touchstone approach. Now, as you can tell from the materials 
and from some of the cases that have dealt with this, in the current 
method you have to arrive at what's called the touchstone or the lode-
star, which is the number of hours times a reasonable market rate. Now 
what court have done on th market rate is they have looked to other 
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so-called complex litigation, antitrust lit ion and the like, 
have taken hourly rates rang from $100 to $20 and in some cases 
more than that. For instance, one of the main fees in the Serrano v. 
Priest case, which is somewhat dated even now, was $150 
used that The ca 
through on us other amounts as well with similar 
we have the 1000 hours times $150 per hour, or $150, 
lodestar or the touchstone. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Fred, when the 
an hour, does the firm consider that part of 
So, 
is the 
charges $150 
overhead? 
MR. BENNETT: Certainly. In fact, if you were to start in 
reverse what you'd do is you'd say, "I want to earn $50,000-a-year and 
in order to earn $50,000-a-year I'm going to to 11 $75-an-hour." 
That's at our 50 overhead, $75,000-a-year d how every 
many billable hours you want to have -- 2,000 would you your bill 
of rate. As we go on the calculation you wil see that that is 
included. Then the courts looking at a number of factors, the quality 
of the work, the difficulty of the issues, the cont nature of the 
action, and other factors which were listed in analysis, 
apply what's called a multiplier. And this, , can be a 
number less than one, although it never is, to a number -- as 
high as five in some cases. Two is roughly the f was used 
in Serrano v. Priest. It's a figure that's often many agen-
cies seeking fees. And one that is often ier of 
two then results in a total award of $300,000. 
Now we go back to see how well this How much 
of an incentive there was for him to bring th We go back 
to the cost of services and we know that one of costs was his 
six months of his salary because that's about that he put 
in, or $25,000. Fifty percent of salaries is the normal and 
that's $12,500. Resul a total cost of some $37,500 in order to 
produce this court award of $300,000, or a net it or as we call it, 
"a windfall" of $262,500 or some 700 percent profit~ Now 's one 
heck of an incentive. And we look at that an annual basis, I'm 
sure all of us would like to be making some $600 00 a Partic-
ularly if we can do so and be held in h esteem sion for 
doing pro bono work for the benefit of the ic. that we 
propose ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let me ask you a I you were to 
take an attorney who makes $150 an hour, works all the time he's in his 
office, forget the multiplier for the moment, what's wrong with the 
first part of the formula? That's what he would earn if he was in the 
office whether he makes $50,000 hemself or helps to pay other salaries 
of other people. What is wrong with the f half of the formula? 
MR. BENNETT: Our method can arrive at 
appropriate methodology which will result in the 
bursed for his expenses and a reasonable and 
eluding the recognition that he is not doing work 
this amount of profit to his office. That would be a 
priate calculation under the methodology that we are 
amendment. That could result in an award of $150,000. 
thing, for the fellow who doesn't charge $150 an hour, 
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reim-
, in-
bring in 
perfectly appro-
in this 
But here is the 
we say it is 
wrong to pay him at that rate, when the business that he is giving up, 
the lost profit for bringing the pro bono work, is a much smaller loss 
than that. And using this rate results in him getting a very substan-
tial and unwarranted windfall. And, if I can just briefly give an 
analogy to this, you know the public interest law firms say that this 
treats them unfairly, makes them a second class citizen. Well, it 
doesn't. And this is the very same type of analogy which we have done 
in tort and civil rights litigation for years. Here's the example. A 
fellow was falsely arrested. One of the measures of the damages for 
him being falsely arrested is his lost income while he is in jail. If 
we assume he is in jail for one day, one of the measures of his damages 
is what he lost in wages for eight hours a day. If he is a factory 
worker earning $5 per hour, he lost $40, among other damages that he 
must have. And if he happens to be a plumber earning $20 an hour, he 
has lost $80. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Have you got a plumber who will work for 
$20 an hour? Send h1m around. 
MR. BENNETT: Now we don't say that because we award $80 to 
the plumber and $40 to the factory worker that one's rights were more 
important than the other one's. Or that one was a better person than 
the other one. Or that somehow we hold the plumber in more esteem 
than we hold the factory worker. What we're saying is that we want 
to fully compensate both of them for what they lost. And to do so we 
pay $80 to one and $40 to the other. Now we could say, as the public 
interest law firms would have us do, that we should establish a rate 
to pay everybody. That for that false arrest, we should set a stand-
ard cost for the violation of your rights at $100 per hour. And pay 
everybody at that rate. That's going to be a windfall for the factory 
worker and maybe a for the guy who earns more than $100 an hour. 
But the courts haven't done that and we shouldn't do that here. 
Instead, what we propose is a cost-plus methodology which 
works within the same framework as the current method but results in 
a much more reasonable We take the same basic $50,000-a-year 
attorney. We pay him the cost of that six month effort. We add in 
his 50 percent overhead, that's this $37,500, the same figure that we 
talked about over here. And we come up with the total cost of those 
services. Now the incentive now comes through this reasonable and con-
trollable margin for it We have argued in every case in which we 
have raised this issue that 50 percent is an appropriate figure to use. 
This has been in all of the jail cases that I've handled and 
in others. If we add that incentive of some $18,750, which is a pretty 
good incentive, we come up with an award of $56,000-plus dollars. Now 
even if we found that because this was a particularly difficult case, 
one in which the fee was contingent, one in which the attorney did an 
excellent job, and one in ich the issues were complex, and we applied 
the same multiplier, we come up with an award of almost $113,000. If 
you weigh the cost still have a 200 percent profit. You know, 
this is hardly your attorney going out and giving up of 
his time on these lie sues just for the good of society. 
You're still well on this fee. And this is what we 
say is a to attorney's fees. 
Now, these same calculations could be worked out at a wide 
range of salary ranges and costs, but as long as you still leave into 
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the system the ability of the court to put in the incentive throug-h 
profit, which our bill contemplates, we can still add as much as we 
want to. This bill does not say what the amount of that incentive is. 
The court, if it wants to, could make that 100 percent, 200 percent, 
or 300 percent, but the key difference is that when it does so, the 
court is going to do it knowingly. He is going to know exactly the 
profit or windfall that he is giving to that agency, or the firm, for 
bringing this business. It is not all hidden in a calculation where 
we talk about some artificial market rate that has no relationship to 
necessarily what he charges or earns and the court feels very comfort-
able in making it an award of 700 percent profit. What we do here is 
that we see exactly what we're doing. The public sees, the court sees, 
the litigants see. It can result in some similar figures. Why is 
this a good way to do it? What is the best measure of what the reason-
able value of services are? That's what a willing buyer and a willing 
seller are willing to pay and sell for the marketplace. And that's 
what we have in salaries. What is this person willing to sell his 
services to, to who he is working for? Or, if it is a sole proprietor, 
what is he willing to sell it to the public for in billing his services? 
We start with what that firm was willing to pay for them and what he 
was willing to receive for his services. That is the best measure of 
the market value of those services. Not this artificial market rate 
that nobody really knows what it means. We don't really know how it 
relates to the attorney. In fact, in cases where we have tried to es-
tablish through evidence what that market rate is, it's been most dif-
ficult. You have county bar association surveys. You have published 
ordinances of the salaries of Attorney Generals, Public Defenders, but 
when you get down to trying to argue what the market rate is, I repre-
sent to you that most judges don't really know. They pick a figure out 
of a hat. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Fred, let's say I'm a sole practitioner and 
I take one of these cases. Under either formula, it doesn't make any 
difference, I lose. Six months of my time I've devoted to a .case and 
I lose. It's a heck of a gamble I've taken. 
MR. BENNETT: Certainly it is. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I can tell you, it's a heck of a gamble 
for a sole pract1t1oner to take these cases. Although I do not 
necessarily agree with the percentage of the contingency incentive 
that trial lawyers may take~ as you know, it stimulates people to take 
these cases even though they may lose. 
MR. BENNETT: That's what this is supposed to do under either 
formula. You know, under the lodestar or touchstone formula, our 
Supreme Court says that we have to start with this figure, which is 
the actual cost of the services, in their view, the number of hours 
times the fee. It is when we get to the multiplier that we start 
thinking about the contingency factor. We look at your case as a 
private practioner and we say that your case was a sure winner, so 
we're not going to give you a multiplier; or, you had a case that was 
most difficult, it's unusual that you won, your expectation of winning 
was very remote and you took a great risk. It's in this that the court 
contemplates that contingency. In our formula as well, this is where 
the court contemplates that contingency. And since we've put no limit 
on it, the court can make that as high or as small as they want. 
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CHAIRMAN FENTON: They don't have a limit? But, under your 
formula, there are a lot of cases that as a single practioner I 
couldn't afford to take if I had to use six months to gamble on not 
getting any money. Now, if I knew that for the six months that I 
would be working on that case, I could make $150 an hour, if I win 
the case, it might be worth it. That's the crux of this situation. 
Whether you're in a one-man firm or a large firm, if you can sit in 
that off for six months and bring in $150 an hour, why shouldn't 
that be the base, forgetting profit, forgetting anything else. Be-
cause if you sit in the office, you bring that in and if you spend 
six months on the public interest case, they usually don't bring some 
other lawyer in to you place for those six months. In my firm, 
a one-man firm, I'd never he able to and I don't know about the big 
ones, but I ine have a certain amount and they can only do 
so much ... 
MR. BENNETT: Six months is a summary. This may be spread 
over several years. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Oh, I understand, but it doesn't matter, 
however you do it -- all together, or spread over several years. 
MR. BENNETT: The court, under our proposed methodology 
could do exactly that you because you are a sole practioner and 
your overhead costs are h , your risks are lower -- I mean your 
risks are higher as well in what you can afford to do. They can come 
up and pay you $150 per hour. But they do it knowingly. Instead, we 
now compare you another agency that has a lot more attorneys and 
a lot more overhead. They would be much better off, even if they were 
at the same rate that you get. What we say to that agency is 
that we start the same way that we do with you. We look at what those 
services cost. Then we add to , knowingly, so that we know what 
takes to j you for your effort, including the risks and 
We are into consideration that you're a 
, or that you're a member of a 10-man law firm, or that 
you're a member of a icly funded organization which doesn't have 
to depend on success or failure. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I don't want to belabor this. If you go 
into a 10 ess of whether you get the lowest man 
on the totem you so much an hour, don't they? If 
you take that 's the lowest or the highest paid is 
inmaterial for the moment, you take him out of the realm of that firm 
so that he can t do the work for the firm for the six months. Whether 
it's over a two year per or whatever time period, you're losing his 
firm 
It will take his firm $150 an hour for that individual re-
of what is is. Isn't that true? 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: You are assuming though that that law 
point is that a lot of firms don't but 
at the highest rate. 
m not quarrel with you. I'm with you 
on that a big firm and they charge me less for 
a specific attorney s s, and he's the one who does the work, 
then his or her normal fee is what should be paid. But if they give 
me another one, you understand what I'm saying-- that's what I'm 
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saying to you. I'm not saying it should be the same, and I agree Wlth 
you. By the same token, if you go into big law f , I ine that 
they normally charge the same whether they've got the lowest flunky or 
their biggest one because I don't imagine the clients know which they're 
getting. But they charge them that. Then that's what it should be. 
It's easy in a one-man law firm because you so much an hour. 
That's all I'm saying. Where I would do my work in the bill is in the 
multiplier and not let the courts go off half 
MR. BENNETT: Well, I agree with you if every firm that we 
dealth with was honest, and we had the regular going rate of what they 
charged given to us in these cases, we might not be here trying to get 
these amendments. But what we have is that the "deep pocket" of public 
entities, which isn't as deep as it once was, is still an attractive in-
centive to inflate those rates. We suddenly have a firm or an organi-
zation that's never in their life gotten $100-an-hour or $200-an-hour 
and suddenly they're a $200-an-hour attorney in case. And the only 
way that you can evaluate those things is to go back and look and start 
with the beginning figure that we can have some certainty in. And those 
are the costs of those services. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, if I come in as a sole practioner in 
a firm and request $200, you should be allowed d covery to find out 
if that is a good request. That wouldn't bother me at all. But, if in 
the discovery it discloses that we charge $200, then that should be the 
figure. 
MR. BENNETT: That would certainly be persuasive material 
evidence. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If I were sitting as a judge and they took 
somebody out of the firm who for that six months would be bringing in 
$200 to the firm, then the firm should be allowed to that $200. 
What the multiplier is, that's another ques But to me, you're 
right, you should be able to discover what they're No question 
about that. To me, the multiplier is the important I'm just 
as concerned as you and Pat are that we aren't go the other way be-
cause we've got the two equities. We've got the interest in 
bringing the litigation, and we've got the public taxpayers from whom 
we're taking this money. We have to make sure we don't get way 
out of line. Let's some balance. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Jack, if I can 
saying as a solo practioner, you're not sure you take the case. 
On the other hand, as a solo practioner seeing this laid out here, all 
of a sudden these cases become not pro bono publ , but instead pro 
bono me. A 700 percent profit is a hell of an incentive for a solo 
practioner to invest six months into. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, if I were a sole , I would 
want to get what I charge an hour, plus some ive. I wouldn't want 
them to talk about my salary. I wouldn't want them to talk about my 
overhead. When the client comes in, I don't say, "Now based on your 
case, this is what I'm going to charge you." I'm on an hourly rate. 
Whatever my hourly rate is. And if my hourly rate brings me in 700 
percent profit a year, that's my business. I'm still a private entre-
preneur, and I charge so much. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: All I'm saying is, this is a heck of an 
incentive. This is no longer encouraging people to do things in the 
interest of the public. This is encouraging people to do it in the 
interest of themselves,to earn a better profit than they would on most 
of their cases. That's what I'm saying. I think we are going to in-
creasingly see private law firms doing this as a means of profit making, 
going into this type oflitigation. Because the profits are so mcuh 
greater than they would make under normal circumstances. I think if we 
continue with the lodestar method, O'Melveney and Meyers is going to see 
this as a very profit-oriented type of litigation. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, by the same token, you might have 
O'Melveney and Meyers say, "We're not going to take some youngster out 
of here to work on. these if he can earn us $150 or whatever he can earn 
if we are going to end up with much smaller awards. It doesn't pay for 
us," and so you don't get an O'Melveney and Meyers, you get the little 
punk attorney like Fenton, when they could get somebody ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Who is brilliant. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Yes, but they don't know it. Seriously, I 
think what you're gettlng at is correct. I think the other method is 
exorbitant. In my opinion it's in the multiplier that you should have 
more guidelines. 
MR. BENNETT: If it's possible and there is still time left 
at the end of the day I would like to respond to some of the opposition. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you. I want to introduce the gentle-
man who is going to chair the Committee while I'm gone, that's Ass~mbly­
man Richard Hayden ~rom Sunnyvale. The next witness is Dennis Myers. ·· 
MR. DENNIS MYERS: Mr. Chairman, I am Dennis Myers, County 
Counsel of Inyo County and I won't take up too much of your time. We 
just heard from a member of the County Counsel's office of the county 
of the first class. We're a county of the 46th class. We're a very 
small county, population wise, very large in land. The awarding of 
attorney's fees is a problem that especially hits small counties. If 
Fred's example were used and there were an award of $300,000 in our 
county it would be 3 percent of our present budget, and would bankrupt 
the county~ There is no provision presently in the law to prevent that 
sort of thing other than the discretion of the court. I believe that 
with this bill, under the section that deals with considering whether 
the award would be paid by public funds, that would be a consideration 
of the court in that case. This has such an impact on small counties 
that we consider attorneys fees from the inception of the lawsuit. 
That's true especially in environmental cases in our county because 
our county is so exposed to them, it's such a large county. One other 
thing I would like to touch on about the inequities of this in a small 
county is that our county probably is in a unique position of having 
been on both sides of this attorneys fees argument. In Inyo v. Yorty, 
Antonio Rossman argued for attorneys fees for our county and we were 
denied them. When we ourselves brought public interest litigation 
against a larger public entity, the City of Los Angeles, we were denied 
attorneys fees. So I think that's an inequitable situation that dis-
courages counties and entities from pursuing public interest litigation. 
If you are going to have something like 1021.5, I think you should 
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allow, at least in the situation where entity is the plaintiff in t~e 
public interest, to also be awarded attorneys fees, because it costs 
us a lot of money to bring litigation. That's about all I have, Mr. 
Chairman. I mainly want to show that it's not just a large county 
problem but it can be a very severe problem for small counties and 
small public entities. 
ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD HAYDEN: Other than the merits of the case, 
what actual process do you go through in determining whether you're 
going to settle a case, in view of the potential attorneys fees? How 
do you make that determination as a county counsel? 
MR. MYERS: First, we do consider the merits of the case. 
Other than that, in our county, we have very limited resources to pay 
attorneys fees or judgments, so if there's a risk at all, we have to 
multiply that risk times the amount of money we have. That's a judg-
ment call in our own minds. Say you have a 10 percent risk of losing 
the case, but the attorneys fees in the case may be $100,000. If we 
could settle the case out, pay the attorney $2,000 or $3,000 for filing 
it, we would do it. And the form of settlement~might take say with an 
environmental lawsuit where we're requested to prepare an EIR, or backup, 
we may go ahead and do that, even though we may think it's unnecessary. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Right, so you're basically speaking in 
favor of at least some version of Assemblyman Nolan's bill? 
MR. MYERS: I am speaking in favor of his bill. I think his 
bill would be very helpful in giving the courts some criteria to at 
least consider the ability of the county or the entity to pay. To con-
sider that it is a public entity as long as the entity deals in good faith. 
Yes, I am speaking in favor of the bill. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: To your knowledge are there county 
counsels or other attorneys representing the public entities who would 
go ahead strictly on the merits of the case regardless of the attorneys 
fees and not take into consideration the financial ability of the en-
tity to pay if they lose? 
MR. MYERS: When I was in Los Angeles County we never hesi-
tated to go ahead with a case if we thought we had a fair case, and we 
thought we had a good shot, but in a rural county you just can't. You 
have to consider the attorneys fee because it becomes an important factor. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: It's pinpointed in a small county I sup-
pose whereas in a big county, you really can't see it because it's so 
large. I always knew that Los Angeles County had more money than any 
other counties but I'm sure it does not have an unlimited supply. 
MR. MYERS: But lawsuits such as this would nearly bankrupt 
our county if there were such a thing as a $300,000 judgment in our 
county. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: A series of cases could bankrupt 
Los Angeles County. 
MR. MYERS: That's true. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: You're just simply pinpointing it, making 
it very vivid with respect to one rural county. 
MR. MYERS: Well, sir, you have to take into consideration 
that attorneys fees aren't that much less just because it's a rural 
county. The attorney is going to put in just as much work on a law-
suit or more there than he would in Los Angeles. So he might be en-
titled to the same award, regardless of whether the County can afford 
to pay it or not. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: All right, thank you, sir. Mr. John 
Klee. Mr. Klee is a Deputy Attorney General of the State of California. 
We're glad to have you with us today, John. 
MR. JOHN KLEE: Thank you. I'm here on behalf of the Attor-
ney General. We are also supporting the bill. I am here not represent~ 
ing a client, like the last two people who have a county or a client in 
a sense who will pay the judgment independent of the state, if an award 
is made. I represent, in a sense, the same people that you represent, 
namely the people of the State of California. So I'm here as much in 
an independent role as I am in a sense as your lawyer telling you what's 
happening with the money which you are the steward over, and that is, 
namely, the State tax funds. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: John, would you say, though, as Mr.. Myers 
testified previously, that the Attorney General's Office does take into 
consideration the potential loss, and that it is a major factor as to 
whether you determine whether a case should be settled up front? 
MR. KLEE: To my knowledge we have not settled a case without 
1 igating 1t on the grounds that we would have to pay more attorneys 
fees, because in a sense it doesn't come out of the Attorney General's 
budget, it just goes back into the Legislature to pay. In some ways it 
works the other way. In many cases we will think that we are right, and 
rather than coming out and making a reasonable solution to the problem, 
we will say, "Well in a sense we have to litigate it and win," because 
if we settle it, the private Attorney Generals,so called, come in and 
ask for attorneys fees anyway on the grounds that they got what they 
wanted. We have a case now in Alameda County against the Department of 
Agriculture and the State of California in which the Legislature re-
pealed the statute, for reasons which we believe are completely unre-
lated to the lawsuit, that was filed challenging the particular statute. 
The judge said, "Well they got what they wanted. They're entitled to 
attorneys fees." And now we have a bill pending, a request for $650,000 
attorneys fees. The case wasn't settled by us. Maybe the legislators 
have to start thinking now, "Should we amend this law? If we do some-
body is going to ask us for attorneys fees because there is a lawsuit 
pending. If we enact a statute which reaches the same goal as what 
they want in the lawsuit, we're subjecting ourselves to half a million 
dollars worth of attorneys fees." That is the type of thing ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You said we're subjecting ourselves to 
atuorneys fees because we're changing the law? 
MR. KLEE: It's happening right now. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You mean the attorney is going to say he 
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lobbied for the change of the law or the fact that he brought the case 
caused the change in the law? 
MR. KLEE: It prompted the Legislature to change the law, yes. 
The courts are buying that. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What if we enact a new law that no attor-
neys fees could be granted because we change the law? 
MR. KLEE: That would be interesting to see. I don't know 
what the public interest firms would do. They might say that you don't 
have that power, that that's a judicial power. I just don't know. You 
have never done that so I don't know what would happen in that case. 
It would be interesting. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If we have the power to say that attorneys 
fees can be granted, why don't we have the power to say attorneys fees 
cannot be granted? 
MR. KLEE: I would say that you could. Remember Serrano v. 
Priest went off on the inherent equitable powers of the court. So 
maybe it could be argued that you have no ability to deny. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: In your settlement with the private attorney, 
do you ever talk about how much attorneys fees are stipulated to? Do 
you do that or is it entirely up to the court? 
MR. KLEE: Well, we could try. Of course, we try to avoid 
litigation and cut down our costs. Actually you're paying us $50-an-
hour to litigate these things. We don't have so many lawyers running 
around with nothing to do that we look for litigation. When it comes 
into us and if there's an entitlement to fees and reasonable requests 
are made, normally we just agree to it. The only standard is reason-
able. Reasonableness like beauty lies in the eye of the beholder. To 
many of us in the Attorney General's Office, who see our office as one 
of the largest offices in the state operating at $50-an-hour, that in-
cludes salaries, overhead, rent, everything, and we see requests coming 
in from law offices that we know operate at less than ours, because 
most of our litigation is against the public interest and the private ..• 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You mean the costs? 
MR. KLEE: The costs, right. And cost includes salaries, and 
law offices like Ot'rs who don't bill, the legal aid offices, the public 
interest law offices who don't, like you, have a billing rate. It's 
easy to talk about it for someone in private practice and the examples 
you gave. "Well, what if I gave up my $150-an-hour?" To me, that is 
the cost to you. If you normally bill at $150-an-hour, for every hour 
you spend on public interest litigation, that is your cost. That's, in 
reality, what you are out of pocket. That doesn't bother me to do that. 
What bothers us is when the private law firms, who normally bill at $50-
an-hour ask $150. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That bothers me, too. 
MR. KLEE: And because they say, "We're not going to look to 
our billing but we're going to look to other people's billing rates. 
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We're going to look to the major antitrust guy, and we're not going to 
look to what we actually do." And the legal aid offices are public 
interest firms who don't b anybody ever, because they're prohibited 
by their charters billing. They don't bill. They operate at from 
$25 to $50-an-hour. And they're paid by the government to do that. 
And they come in and ask for the $150-an-hour rate. That's what happened 
in Serrano, that's what they . They got $150-an-hour augmented to 
$212. I wanted just to let you know with some examples. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: I just have one question, Mr. Chairman, 
to clarify what's been said. The Legislature from time to time in my 
memory has refused to pay a claims bill or portion of a claims bill for 
court ordered legal fees. What is the legal status of that in the 
courts at the present time? 
MR. KLEE: That is before the courts in two cases, Serrano 
v. Priest, and Mandel v. Hodges. In Mandel v. Hodges, the court of 
appeal following 100 years of case law said that that's the prerogative 
of the Legislature. The court said the Legislature holds the power of 
the purse and doesn't have to pay it if in its exercise of discre-
tion it decides not to. Last Wednesday, the Supreme Court granted their 
petition for hearing that case, which forbodes a decision saying that 
the Legislature will no longer have control or the power of the purse. 
They've ordered it paid out of the operating budget of the state agency 
involved, in that case the Department of Health. In the case of Serrano 
they ordered Wilson Riles to pay what would be now over a million dol-
lars out of his budget. He does have an operating budget, and 
they can put him jail. That's how it would work. So I just wanted 
to tell you that as we said, reasonableness lies in the eye of the be-
holder. 
I'd like to say that we support something in the statute which 
puts in some so that people know where they're going. This 
bill, in my , and the Attorney General's opinion, helps it in 
two respects. One, it limits the phrase reasonableness and sort of gets 
it into this of costs that we were looking at, ties it down to 
more than what they ly are doing. Second, it does away with this 
idea that people are fees for fees. In other words they want 
attorneys fees for all the time they spend asking for their own fees 
not doing the public 1 gation. Let me you some examples 
on how that real works and encourages ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: How much time gets involved with this bat-
tling for Is it extensive? 
MR. KLEE: I can't tell you because the way our computers are 
set up on , we don't break that down. We do say how 
much time we spend on each case, but we don't break it down between 
issues. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: 
less. Once 
he knows he's going 
Of course the private attorney could care 
and they're litigating attorneys fees 
for that. Is the lodestar used on that? 
MR. KLEE: Of course. All I know is that there is in our 
office now many cases in we have spent more time litigating the 
fee issue than we have on ther merits of the case. 
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CHAIRMAN FENTON: So what you're saying is that if they didn't 
get paid for litigating the attorneys fees, they would be more prone 
to settling those things a lot faster. 
MR. KLEE: Or at least making a reasonable request. Let me 
give you some examples. We have a case which in a summary judgment was 
entered against the state in 1974, a case in which a summary judgment was 
from the summary judgment by virtue of an unrelated California Supreme 
Court decision that had dome down a few months earlier. The Legal Aid 
Society put in a request for over $2 million in attorneys fees. That's 
been up to the Court of Appeal and back down. We're fussing over dis-
covery and costs and figuring out what their factors are. They have 
now reduced their claim to $517,000, in other words still over half a 
million dollars, for a total of 2,000 hours which they claim they spent 
on the case. This was San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance. 
During that time that they spent that time, the San Francisco Bar 
Association put out a little pamphlet to all the lawyers in San Fran-
cisco, entitled "Volunteer Legal Services Program," in which they asked 
lawyers in San Francisco to do pro bono work and donate at least 50 
hours a year out of their time, to doing pro bono work. They recognized 
that some attorneys wouldn't be able to do this, so they suggested a 
cash contribution to some legal aid office. They said you should know 
that it costs $600 to fund and support a .san Francisco Neighborhood 
Legal Assistance Foundation lawyer to deliver 50 hours of legal ser-
vices, $12 an hour. This was a couple years ago, which was probably 
right, pretty close. But now they're asking you, the state in this 
Sacramento action, to return to them as reasonable attorneys fees 
$12,500 for that same 50 hours. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Do legal aid offices and other organizations 
take this type of case because there's a windfall or do they take them 
because no private attorneys will? 
MR. KLEE: Quite frankly, I don't know why they take them. 
I assume it's because that's what they're supposed to do. They're being 
paid by the federal government to bring this type of case. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Why should they have an incentive for bring-
ing then? 
MR. KLEE: We are not objecting to paying them, reimbursing 
them their costs, that's a decision that you have made in enacting 
1021.5. To us, the key word is reimburse. You're reimbursing them 
for their reasonable efforts. If, in fact, that is true that it costs 
the federal government $600 to fund 50 hours of work, we fail to see 
why it's reasonable to pay them $12,500 of state money to reimburse 
the federal government, in effect, for their $600. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Under this formula you would give them a 
200 percent profit anyhow? 
MR. KLEE: Under that formula which allows the multipliers, 
if they were asking for 50 hours instead __ QL_!:_he l ,_ 000 in his example, 
it would come to $600 as their cost. Now if you multiplied that by 
two you would get it down to $1,200 and you'd still be giving them a 
200 percent profit. But what they do in a sense, and what we're stuck 
with, is that they start with $150. They come in and they say, "We 
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don't want to be second class 
as the highest paid pr 
those same rates." Now, 
My answer to that that 
We want to be reimbursed just 
we should be reimbursed at 
that's to pay them equally. 
in the eyes of the most 
naive and unsophisticated person. 
Let me give you a simple hypothetical. Supposing you 
had a pro bono case two lawyers which we have quite often. 
One will be a legal aid of , the other w~ll be a private law firm. 
We have such a case right now. Supposing the private law firm allows 
one of its associates to work on the case and he normally bills his 
time at $100 an hour. Suppose the legal aid office operates at a total 
cost of say $25 an hour. don't have a billing rate, so we look at 
what it costs the federal government to pay them, the $25-an-hour. Keep 
in mind, the cost of that law firm is $100-an-hour. That's what 
they are out of pocket by their private lawyer to work on it. 
The cost to the legal aid ice s $25-an-hour. If we have a judge 
who takes the ph sophy that we're going to pay everybody equally, 
supposing he sets it at $75-an-hour? That is not fair, that is not 
equality. That's, in fact, cheating the private law firm by $25-an-
hour and giving the office a 300 percent windfall. So, say-
ing that everybody should the same is not equality. It's only 
equality if you close your eyes to the reality, to the real world that 
we live in. Another which you will hear possibly raised to this 
cost approach is it's too icated. Oh my God, we've got to figure 
out what everybody's off , the telephone costs and all that. 
I'd say that's not 
But when 
billing rate. 
don't you just take the hourly rate that 
have to go through all that other ... 
that's true if 
1 aid soc 
have a billing rate. 
, they don't have a 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Then, if it were my bill I would have some 
other 
MR. KLEE: don't have to get into this com-
plicated cos all have public accountants who do their 
yearly books. their yearly budget is. You know how 
many average produce. In other words if you have 
a that funds basically 20 lawyers all 
year long, you know that each works, with overtime and vacation, 
about 2,000 hours, that's 40,000. You divide it into the million, it 
comes out $25-an-hour. It's very simple and it can be done with rough 
justice. You don't have to to each precise lawyer and say, "This 
is a h rank awyer in our legal aid office and a lower one." 
You could them and a reasonable result. But, I wanted 
to point out to you that it's a real world. We are spending more time 
and, in my more time on the question of how much you 
should get, o , and because of the idea that 
you get fees. Because if you have a legal aid office, 
for example, that $2 and they can put in a request 
for $150 or $200-an-hour if you finally beat them down to $100-an-
hour, they're still times what it cost them, for every 
that they the $200 is compensated at $100. It's 
a heads situation. 
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CHAIRMAN FENTON: If you're going to allow them to litigate, 
how much they are to get paid and then pay how much, they are going to 
get paid, then there is no incentive for shortening the time for liti-
gating. 
MR. KLEE: That's right, and that's what's happening to us 
right now in Serrano. I was the attorney that lost Serrano v. Priest 
on the attorneys fees issue. In that decision they remanded it to the 
trial court to determine how much fees they should get for filing their 
briefs in the Supreme Court on the case on the merits and on appeal. 
They originally filed a cost bill asking for $275,000 for filing those 
briefs. By the time they got to the motion and discovery was made they 
reduced it to $219,975. After a lot of discovery and a lot of legal 
fussing we have reduced it down to where they were actually awarded 
$113,000 for filing the briefs in the Supreme Court. $39,000 of that 
related to the fees for getting fees issued. So we don't think that's 
right. We have taken an appeal saying they shouldn't have been awarded 
$40,000 for arguing over the right to fees. They have appealed saying 
that they want more. So that case is going on and on and on. All 
we're fussing about is fees for fees and fees for fees for fees because 
now when they filed a motion for fees they said they wanted not only the 
fees for doing the work in the Supreme Court to get the fees they wanted 
fees for the time that they were spending computing the amount that they 
should get for getting those fees. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let's assume for the sake ot discussion 
that the amount being disputed by the attorney isn't rai~ed on ap,J?ealf 
does he still get attorneys fees for litigating it7 Or does he only 
get attorneys tees if it's raised{ 
MR. KLEE: I'm sorry I don't understand. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let's say the court awards mr $100,000 
attorneys fees on the private attorney general theory and I'm unhappy 
so I appeal it. In the appeal, any of three things may happen: it 
is lowered, it is kept the same or it is raised. Do I get fees in all 
three situation~? 
MR. KLEE: They asked for them in all three respects. So 
far in Mandel v. Hodges there is some indicatio~ that you do not get 
fees for fees, and yet the trial court in Serrano granted them. So 
it's not that sure. It should be to the preva1ling party if fees are 
awarded to you and the other side appeals, and you lose, well you 
shouldn't get fees for fees. But in Mandel v. Hodges, they've asked 
for feeS for feeS for lOSing. we I re-OaCk in the trial COUrt when they-';re 
asking for that. The trouble is this is all a very emerging type thing. 
Some legislation now getting these rules clearcut would be a big help 
because otherwise we're talking about years of judicial and appellate 
decisions getting these things. Those are the basic examples. Another 
one that we have is right now in Alameda Superior Court involves public 
Advocates, Inc.. They are asking for fees of $650,000 in a case that 
never went to trial because the Legislature amended the law while the 
case was pending. They're asking for $450-an-hour for their primary 
attorney, and $180 for the lady who was one year out of law school who 
spent most of her time collating papers. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If I go to the firm and I hire them and 
they charge $180-an-hour and the lady who was out of law school one 
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year does the work, it doesn't matter whether she's in one year or a 
senior partner, that's what they charge. 
But 
not talk Ra 
about going against Ford 
talking about , the 
lenging someth that 
most of the cases against the state, we're 
Nader type of lawsuit where you're talking 
Motor Company or th kind of stuff. We're 
kind we're involved in is where they're chal-
as a legislator did. Ninety-nine percent 
of our cases 
firms. We 
legal aid societies and public interest law 
have the examples that you're talking about. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If I were to go into this law firm that has 
this 
they give me her but 
year out of law school 
what's the difference 
services? 
gation, 
to bring that suit. 
Fred Bennett is 
bill is disagree 
when we have 
and asking for 
very much. 
school one year, and when I hire them 
$180 per hour. The fact that she s a 
she involved with th type of case, 
that firm charges anybody $180-an-hour for 
s you public interest liti-
that $180 is what that ly cost that law firm 
with that. I don't think 
or that's supporting this 
What we're disagreeing with is 
bill at any rate or bill at $100-an-hour 
is what we're talking about. 
side. Thank you 
s here? 
Vidor from the Los Angeles of-
the bill because 
into in the fed-
fee case. I was the attorney to handle 
the Center applied for over two and a half 
million in s some thousand in costs and dis-
bursements. I was a situation where the litigation had 
gone on almost they presented their time records 
through means of rea hearsay affadavit based on the ser-
vices performed some half dozen other , some of whom had 
left the f So the aspect of this bill ich adequate 
records is essential, because, even under the lodestar approach, there 
should be adequate verifiable time records. If these prevailing par-
are go to fees they shouldn't utilize recon-
struction; utilize hearsay; be able to pin-
point what performed what services at what time. And also 
the court should to scrutinize some of that time was 
real 1 cases where you had a number of attorneys in 
complex lit over a long period of time, there's bound 
to be some So that's why we are also in favor of this 
extended To into those details, interrogatories 
and depositions of records, may 1 be necessary. The 
other thing, of course, that has been mentioned, and that we would 
concur with, the actual salaries and the , if it happens to 
be a public interest law firm. The Center for Law in the Public Inter-
est in the case objected to our going into the salaries 
of the , the funding, and all the rest of it. 
So, it realistic basis in award their fees if we 
-16-
knew what their salaries were. And as a matter of fact, in some cases, 
with the law clerks -- they had a law extern program -- those law clerks 
were receiving law school credit for their work. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, we'll hear from them. I'm interested 
in hearing from them. 
MR. VIDOR: Yes. Well I'm sure there were a great deal of 
hours for wh1ch these law clerks were paid nothing, and yet they were 
compensated for at the rate of $20 to $25 per hour. It seems to me 
that that is the grossest example of a windfall to such a law firm. 
It would appear that the State there was subsidizing their legal ex-
tern program. The other thing that we were precluded from going into 
is the degree of success of the Center as a prevailing party. I think 
that this bill is favorable in that it seeks to refine the concept of 
prevailing parties. In effect, if a party prevails on some issues but 
not on others, the court should be able to make some apportionment of 
the time in relation to those issues. Now the Century Freeway case 
was concluded by a consent decree, and that consent decree included 
aspects which were unrelated to the claims on which they sued in court. 
It included things like an affirmative action program, an expansion of 
the housing element, a monitor in connection with relocation benefits. 
All of those things were outside the scope of their claims. So this 
bill has the merit of focusing and refining on the prevailing parties 
to what extent did they prevail, and shaping the reasonable fees to 
those issues. 
The other element of this bill which we certainly would sup-
port and is favorable is the good faith and cooperation of the party 
against whom fees are to be awarded. Again, the District Court in the 
Century Freeway case considered that immaterial. A large portion of 
the fees claimed was for the negotiating process. It took about two 
and a half years. We cooperated with them. We, through our declaration, 
showed that we exhibited good faith in trying to resolve this thing. 
In fact, we showed that a good measure of it at the end was due to 
political considerations. But that was all considered irrelevant by 
the District Court -- our good faith. The court just instead focused 
on the provocative nature of the lawsuit and how their persistence 
helped in arriving at the consent decree. So they got 100 percent of 
the credit, we didn't get any of the credit. So,. I think that that 
certainly is a tangible and objective factor that should be taken into 
account. Particularly in a great many of these cases which are re-
solved by a consent decree or by a stipulated judgment. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you. John Sullivan. 
MR. JOHN SULLIVAN: Good morning. I'm John Sullivan repre-
senting Cal Tax, California Taxpayers Association. We strongly support 
this bill. I think it is obvious that the Legislature is not satis-
fied with the process of determining attorneys fees in these situa-
tions. We've got the Mandel and Serrano cases where the Legislature 
has refused to pay on the claims. We 1ve got budget control language 
that calls for a report in January by the Legislative Analyst and De-
partment of Finance on ways to improve oversight over attorneys fees. 
And we have this hearing today. Public interest litigation supported 
by government definitely has a place, but we believe that there has to 
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be much more 
disbursing ic 
the state agenc 
of disburs 
Legislature would 
problem immed 
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hind government's 
cases wh 
would otherwise 
and then make 
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that is 
formation 
process. I 
would have 
that 
bill like 
CHAIP-MAN 
MR 
CHAIRMAN 
reasons 
governmental 
want to 
more time it 
of the case. 
award. Now 
troversial sect 
that I don't 
necessary, for 
the 
not take 
is If we the same system of 
poss under 1021.5 and case law, if 
under that of broad options 
would be shock and the 
and care of that 
essential, and that this bill goes 
cos method and requirement of definite 
that the fact that a firm or an attorney 
should go to the quest of 
a 1. The very rationale be-
to them to into 
, to represent clients who 
fact that you turn around 
fees, goes against 
the point that they are 
increased instead of represen-
funded to represent. One thing 
is no real good set of in-
that resulting from this 
way to collect this, that we 
I think the kind of information 
at and press very rapidly for a 
Thank you. 
Thank you, John. Rossman. 
rn 
Rossman. I'm the Legal 
reflect the 
to the bill. 
and I guess should 
appear in opposition 
I'm a 
have also 
attorney. I 
been honored to 
to the County 
when have had to bring liti-
So I have been on both sides of the issue 
to say that I have appeared in 
which the committee graciously 
the cases in I was the 
case and the case. I de-
I have receive into 
for that rk. There are two 
case And, two, when a 
case that deserve to lose, if they 
just testified, can spend 
fees than the underlying merits 
the re purpose of a fee 
to what I think are the con-
several things in the bill 
we just don't think are 
there be discovery. That is 
can claim that discovery does 
ate or ized. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I thought one of the gentlemen who testi-
fied said it's difficult, if not impossible, to get that information 
back from the legal aid and the others. 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, that might be their experience. I know 
if I were claiming fees, I would feel that as the moving party in court 
I would have to come forward with the relevant evidence. I think it's 
not so much a dispute over the principle of discovery being available, 
but what is relevant and what should be discovered. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That's always the problem. So, you have 
no problem with that part of the bill? 
MR. ROSSMAN: No, I think that someone who is seeking fees 
has to meet his or her burden of giving the court the adequate data. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: So you have no problems with the discovery 
provision? 
MR. ROSSMAN: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Okay. 
MR. ROSSMAN: But by the same token, because that is existing 
law, I don't think that the Legislature has to enact this bill. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: It depends where you come from. Sometimes 
the trial lawyers say, "It's already existing law. We don't need new 
legislation." Other times it's the other side that says, "It's already 
the law we don't need legislation." One side never needs the legis-
lation because it's already existing law and the other side needs it 
because even though it's existing law you better put it in the statutes. 
MR. ROSSMAN: Yes, sir. I can appreciate that. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If it is existing, if that's the practice, 
why should you be concerned that it's made statutory. What's the dif-
ference if we make it statutory? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, if you make it mandatory or just author-
ized discovery -- I'm not sure how the bill reads in that respect. 
There would be nothing wrong with them enacting a bill that authorizes 
discovery to take place in a proceeding like this. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well what they're doing is analogizing this 
to discovery in other types of cases. What's wrong with that? 
MR. ROSSMAN: There's nothing wrong with it. It's just not 
necessary. If the bill made discovery mandatory, that would be unfor-
tunate. Why should we foment further litigation? Why should you make 
discovery mandatory if the parties don't need it? My basic concern 
here is that what this bill is designed to do is, frankly, make it 
easier to litigate the issue of entitlement to fees, and that's un-
fortunate. The approach that I have taken and that I think that most 
lawyers who work in this area take, is that once that the substantive 
dispute is decided by the court, in the best of all possible worlds 
the fee award ought to be negotiated between the parties involved. And 
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that's not happening because, for better or for worse, there are some 
public agencies or their attorneys who look on the oppoetunity to con-
test the fee as an opportunity, as a litigation tactic, to wear down 
the people who have the case in the first instance. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON All right, how would you expedite that? 
MR. ROSSMAN: The bill should not be justified on the grounds 
of existing law, and I would include in that also the notion of find-
ings of fact being required on a fee award. When a fee award is enter-
ed as part of the judgment, any party has a statutory right now to re-
quire findings of fact. And so there is no need to put that into the 
bill and make findings of fact mandatory if the parties between them-
selves decide that it is not necessary to take the court's time and 
their time to articulate findings of fact. The same thing even is 
true with respect to time records. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Mr. Nolan says the court doesn't always 
grant requests for finding of fact. 
MR. NOLAN: They don't say that applies in every case. 
Again, some judges, yes. But others say, "No, I don't have to give a 
finding of fact to you regards to the fee." What do you do then? 
It's not in the statute. Why not have it in the statute? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, you could authorize it, but I don't think 
it ought If I were getting a judgment for fees in my 
favor, I think as a cautious measure I would at least want to insure 
I had drawn up proposed findings of fact, if that were going to be 
challenged on appeal. If it's not going to be challenged on appeal, 
then there's no reason for findings of fact if both parties 
are ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, it can work just the opposite way. 
It very may wait to get the finding of fact to make the 
determination whether they are going on appeal. 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well the findings of fact are usually entered 
long after the court has entered its intended decision so that they 
know what the fees are going to be and they have some idea from at 
least the oral the judge what the grounds of decision 
are. My concern is that we will actually spend more time litigating 
the fees if we the tools to the opponents to do that. The Serrano 
case is a good . There is a final judgment from the California 
Supreme Court that Public Advocates and the Western Center were entitled 
to fees for the under ing litigation. Now, the underlying 
litigation not have been successful, those entities could not 
afford to stay in business if all the time that they spent on that case 
did not get compensation. I think that's ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What type of compensat would you give 
the Western you use the same of compensation form-
ula that you use for pr attorneys? 
MR. ROSSMAN: I would not let their entitlement to fees turn 
on the fact that they are publicly funded. 
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CHAIRMAN FENTON: Why? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Are you asking if I would preclude them from 
getting a fee award at all, because they are publicly funded? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No. 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well all right. Well, there has been testimony 
here to the effect that we should change the rules and now preclude 
them from a fee award at all. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No. The testimony was that they should be 
entitled to the amount of money that they pay. For instance, if they 
have a student,whom they pay nothing works on he case, you should give 
them nothing for his work. If you take an attorney who works for them 
and you figure out that the cost to them is $20-an-hour, with overhead 
and everything, then they should get $20-an-hour, not $150-an-hour. 
Basically, there should be no windfall for them. They should get re-
imbursed for their cost. That was the testimony that I heard. 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, I think there is a sentiment though that 
was expressed this morning -- it was expressed by the last witness, 
that they shouldn't be entitled to fees at all. And if we are in agree-
ment that that's now an issue, then I would ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Maybe I didn't hear him correctly. 
thought what he said was that you couldn't get the records, and 
they were trying to get fees comparable to a fee that a private 
ney gets. Would you agree or disagree that that type of agency 
be reimbursed for their costs and not get any windfall? 
I 
that 
at tor-
should 
MR. ROSSMAN: No, I would agree with what the Supreme Court 
wrote in Serrano, which I think is recognition of the rule that has 
been followed. As the memorandum prepared for you by the Legal Aid 
Project ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Forget what the Supreme Court said. I 
don't know why attorneys never answer questions. Let me ask you a 
very simple question. Let's say in the Serrano case Western Center's 
costs for the attorneys came to $25-an-hour. And let's assume for 
sake of discussion that they had 1000 hours of $25 costs. What do you 
think would be fair and equitable compensation in that type of case? 
For Western Center, not for a private attorney. 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, since I'm a private attorney ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, it's a very simple question ... 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, I'll give you my views. My views that 
they should be compensated -- the reason I mentioned the Supreme Court 
is that every judge in the country who's looked at this has largely 
come to the same conclusion -- that it is fair to compensate them at 
the value of their services. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I didn't ask you what the Supreme Court 
decided. I asked you what you think ... 
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MR. ROSSMAN: I'm telling you that I agree with the Supreme 
Court. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, then you agree with them. 
MR. ROSSMAN: But the fact that every judge in the country, 
whether federal or in California, who's looked at this has come to the 
same conclusion, I think. That's something that we should all give a 
lot of credence to. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: But don't you also feel that they looked 
at the very narrow 1nterest of the two parties in front of them rather 
than --we as a legislative body, who have to look at the total budget 
and the total costs of the taxpayers. The courts are precluded from 
looking at that. They can't take that into account. 
MR. ROSSMAN: I think the Supreme Court of California did 
take that 1nto account in Serrano when they ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: It was not addressed in their opinion. 
MR. ROSSMAN: They did point out that the source of funding 
of the agency could be a factor in determining the size of the award. 
My experience with judges is that they are extremely deferential, as 
indeed they should be, in looking at both the source of the funding of 
the plaintiffs and where the money is coming from. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: To me it's illogical to pay a publicly fi-
nanced agency, such as Western Center, more than their costs when they 
sue another public agency. All you've done is force the other entity 
to bear the cost. It doesn't make sense to me. It's illogical to me, 
as a Los Angeles County taxpayer, to pay $100-an-hour to federally 
funded agencies whose cost is $25-an-hour. 
MR. ROOSMAN: Well, not every case they bring in winds up 
earning these types of fees. I think the hypotheticals that have been 
presented to you this morning are most unrealistic. The reason that 
we would want to compensate the Western Center, and again I emphasize 
I am not speaking for those institutions and I hope that the Committee 
will address questions to those representatives when they appear later 
this morning. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I just asked you your opinion. 
MR. ROSSMAN: But the basis of the opinion is that with 
Western Center and Public Advocates, unlike private law firms, we want 
them to take cases in which there is going to be no conceivable chance 
of recovery. That's what they're chartered to do. They are given a 
certain grant, either by public foundations or by the government, which 
is essentially to meet the front-end costs, to put them into business, 
to provide a legal service. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: And if they took all the cases all year 
and didn't w1n a one, they would be funded, wouldn't they? 
MR. ROSSMAN: They would be funded at a bare bones level. But 
if they won some cases, and got compensated, they could then begin to 
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do what we want them to do which is ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That depends on what your philosophy is. 
It depends what you want them to do, of course. 
MR. ROSSMAN: If you want them to take only cases that are 
sure winners, then they are not going to be able to fullfill the func-
tion for which they are chartered, which is to take cases where people 
just have a human need. They have got to be free, as any other law 
firm is free, to make a mix of their practice to meet their basic 
charter which is to provide, in their case, a broad range of legal 
services to everything from the landlord/tenant person who cannot get 
compensated ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Does the federal government give this fund-
ing and say, "This is what you are supposed to do. We don't expect to 
get our money back." Maybe I don't understand what's going on. I 
don't think that the federal government tells these agencies, "Now 
we're giving you this money initially but we expect you to take cases 
and pay us back. We don't expect to continually fund this thing." 
That isn't the way I understood it. 
MR. ROSSMAN: No. But the funding that the federal govern-
ment provides to any of these public interest law firms through the 
Legal Services Corporation, does not constitute anywhere near their 
entire budget each year. And it's not intended to. But, again, I 
think you should ask that question of them because they are more 
familiar with that. I'm pointing out that, even as a private attar-
nay, even if you compensate me according to the rules that are now in 
effect, that there is no way that a private attorney can start out and 
be sure that he or she is going to do 1000 hours of "successful public 
interest litigation" each year. I spend virtually all my time in public 
interest litigation. I don't take a case if I don't think it's meri-
torious. Sometimes the courts happen to disagree with me on that and 
that's part of the risk of being in the business. By the same token, 
I also don't want to have every case I take be one where I necessarily 
see a large fee award coming in. I really question a lot of the numbers 
that have been put forward to you today as hypotheticals or horror 
stories. I have never asked for fees of the order that have been 
talked about today and never would expect to get them awarded that way 
if I were able to negotiate with the agency and come to a reasonable 
agreement as to what the fee ought to be. 
ASSEMBLY~mN NOLAN: What if you weren't able to negotiate? 
Would you then put forth ... 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, if I had to go in and litigate, I guess 
the first thing I would do as just part of the bargaining process is 
to pick the top dollar. Because you know it's going to get whittled 
down either in negotiation or litigation. And the problem is that so 
often in these cases -- I think what really bothers Mr. Klee, to be 
very honest with you, I've seen it happen in many public law offices --
they're still trying to litigate the underlying merits of the case that 
they lost. They still believe that Serrano v. Priest should have really 
come out the other way. The City of Los Angeles st1ll can't accept the 
fact that they were wrong in the Woodland Hills case, that they should 
have followed the General Plan and carried out the mandate that the 
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Legislature dictated. And under these circumstances, just human nature 
makes it very hard to reach an agreement. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Well, you don't dispute Mr. Klee's 
figures about what was claimed as far as fees. 
MR. ROSSMAN: I would hope that before you finish your delib-
erations, you would get the other side. For example, I don't know the 
young woman to whom he was referring to in the Alameda case, but I 
know many people one year out of law school who do the laboring burden 
on a case and they probably are worth every bit of that money. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Worth every bit of what? Do you mean 
worth $150-an-hour? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Might be. Depends on the result that's 
achieved. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What kind of outfit are they working for? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, you're getting back to your same question. 
I don't think it should really matter. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, to you it doesn't; but to me it does. 
If I go to a firm and hire a firm and they charge me less for some per-
son like that, then that's what I consider should be charged. If I 
go to Western Center and they have somebody they don't pay, then that's 
another factor. Because now we're not dealing with private people we're 
dealing my money on the other side, another public entity. 
MR. ROSSMAN: But I think that if you are going to encourage 
firms like the Western Center, if you're going to encourage lawyers 
whether private or public to go out and do this work, I think that the 
ultimate lodestar that's got to be used is what is the value of the 
legal service to society. That's the ultimate purpose for a bill like 
1021.5. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: But you also have another factor to consider. 
You went to law shcool and you know this concept, it is the utility of 
the conduct versus the gravity of the harm. In public interest liti-
gation against a public agency you have two public interests to con-
sider. You have the public interest issue the plaintiff wants to pro-
tect and you have the cost to the public. Therefore you have a little 
different factor involved. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Plus we're also already paying. We sub-
sidizing the law firm itself. 
MR. ROSSMAN: To what extent that's subsidy ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Antonio, continue on, we'll get to others 
on that particular point. Please tell us about the private attorney 
perspective, for the moment. 
MR. ROSS~~N: The cost-accounting figures that you were given 
-- it's interest1ng that the charts were drawn to make it look as if 
-24-
the cost-accounting would come out to what really is the fees generally 
do come out. I think judges in this state have not really been giving 
out outrageously large awards and the cases will show that. I have not 
yet seen a case where a lawyer has claimed $150-an-hour and gotten these 
multipliers throughout the litigation. A lot of numbers are being given 
to you and being painted with a very broad brush. I wish that someone 
were here from the Center for Law, for example, to explain the Century 
Freeway litigation. But having looked at their claim, and knowing how 
they handled that, as the litigation proceeded and the risk became less, 
they were not charging or claiming a risk factor. When it was in nego-
tiation, they were saying, "Okay, we're in negotiation on this thing." 
But they should still have an accounting for the time that they spent 
in negotiation. That's what they are lawyers for. That was the skill 
that they had to bring to that. If they could do it by negotiation and 
get done in two years what would have taken five or six years more in 
court, that shouldn't be penalized. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You would increase the fee because they cut 
the time in litigation from six to two? 
MR. ROSSMAN: No, I would just say that because the time was 
spent in negot1at1on rather than in litigation, they should not be dis-
qualified from their fee. And .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Do you think that's included in the bill? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Well, that goes to a basic question. It was 
in testimony g1ven to you this morning as to why this bill was needed. 
What I'm saying is that existing practice both by the attorneys and by 
the judges takes into account the different risk factors at different 
stages of the litigation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Okay, so you're just saying the multi-
plier would not be two for all the hours billed, but would be appor-
tioned so many hours at a multiplier of two and some at ..• 
MR. ROSSMAN: That's right. And I think that in the many 
cases when you have long litigation that's the way it works. Judge 
Jefferson, for example, in the Serrano case cut out a lot of time that 
he felt was duplicative. I think the different multiplier factors were 
used in different parts of that litigation depending at which stage in 
the litigation it was. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Okay, but this bill does not address the 
multiplier, this bill instead addresses the costs. We don't affect 
the judge's right to apportion the multiplier in any way. 
MR. ROSSMAN: But as I understand this bill, this bill would 
establish the cost accounting for the private attorney as well as the 
public interest attorney. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Yes. 
MR. ROSSMAN: I think Mr. Fenton has probably already made 
the point so I don't have to belabor it, but at least for the private 
attorney, he or she is in the marketplace to sell a service, and has 
-25-
to set a certain rate on that service in order at the end of the year 
to make the balance sheet come out. How can I carry out my practice 
and make my living? It is just sheer efficiency if nothing else and 
to be consistent with every other private enterprise that we have to 
let those fees be valued by that marketplace value. I do think there 
is a danger, again, of fomenting litigation and a lot of insensitivity 
creeping into the system if we get into this notion of not what is your 
time worth as an attorney which is a relatively objective figure~. You 
can take a private attorney, look at how many years they've been out 
there, their standing in the community, and that's a fairly objective 
fact for a judge to ascertain, the fair market value of his or her ser-
vices. But if you do it the other way and start looking at cost account-
ing you're going to penalize the lawyer who might want to spend more 
time taking cases that don't win at all. I see nothing wrong, for ex-
ample, with getting high quality law firms to devote parts of their 
practice in this area. That's been the complaint for years, that the 
pig law firms would not get into these cases. There are a lot of cases 
in the public interest area that may need to be brought, that I just 
wouldn't begin to touch because it requires a battery of lawyers to do 
all the discovery and what not. We ought not to disqualify those. My 
final point is on litigation for fees. I think the law presently in 
California is that that's an open question, but I think the law in Cali-
fornia also is that there is yet to be an appellate decision affirming 
a claim of litigation of fees for fees. The only case that's come down 
that has decided the issue on the merits is Mandel v. Lackner, which we 
learn now the Supreme Court has taken over, presumably on the other 
issue of separation of powers. But in Mandel, the Court of Appeal re-
fused to allow a claim for fees on fees. That is to say that, even in 
that case, in which the court of appeal was basically sympathetic to 
the plaintiffs, and to what they had done, the court did not allow it. 
I think it should remain that way with the courts able to look at it 
in each case upon each set of facts. Now we learn from Woodland Hills 
that that's an open question insofar as the Supreme Court ~s concerned. 
I think that's the best way it should remain. Because there might be 
some cases, and if I were the judge, I'd be the first to come down hard 
on the lawyer who trying to make a living off litigating fees on 
fees. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let me ask you a question. If an attorney 
were to further litigate a fee award but the fee remained the same or 
was lowered, would you approve of attorneys fees being granted for that 
action? 
MR. ROSSMAN: It would depend on the grounds. If no fees 
were awarded ~n the Superior Court and you had to go up on appeal and 
you got an entitlement to fees there might be an award there. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I didn't ask you that. That's more isn't 
it? I asked if it was the same or less than was awarded in the trial 
court. Let's assume you were awarded a quarter of million in a trial 
court and you go up on appeal and they cut it to $200,000, would you 
then grant additional attorney fees for the appeal? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Probably not. You're assuming that someone is 
going to take an appeal just on the amount of fees? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Don't they? I assume that they do from all 
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the conversation we have heard. It would seem to me that one of the 
vital things to the attorney in this public interest of litigation is 
the attorneys fees. If it wasn't important then all attorneys would take 
whatever they were awarded and go home. So, the attorneys fees are 
important. I don't with that. 
MR. ROSSMAN: To answer your question, I think the Supreme 
Court has made 1t pretty clear that the amount of the fee is pretty 
largely in the discretion of the trial court. So if someone takes an 
appeal from an award of fees in the trial court, 're not going to 
take that appeal unless there is some issue of law that goes under-
neath just the straight amount. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let's just stipulate it for the sake of 
this discussion that some attorney, other than you, appeals solely on 
the issue of attorney fees, and if it remains the same or laower do 
you think you should be entitled to attorneys fees for seeking more 
attorneys fees? 
MR. ROSSMAN: And he was going just on the issue of how much 
he was awarded. Probably not. I would put the other case -- suppose 
there is a litigation in which perhaps the attorney has claimed $50,000 
in fees, and the public entity puts that lawyer through a litigation 
almost as long as the underlying litigation in trial court over fees, 
and the court says, "Yes, your $50,000 fee claim was meritorious," and 
suppose the attorney had to spend on the same basis, $20,000 or $30,000 
worth of his or her time getting the court to enter that order. If 
those fees cannot be compensated under those circumstances, what has 
the public agency succeeded in doing? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I see you're doing something else. You're 
going the other way. You wouldn't answer my question, yet you're say-
ing if he has to further litigate to get his fees, then he should get 
additional compensation. I asked you if he litigated to get more fees 
was the same or lower, just litigating the amount, you said, "Probably." 
You won't give me a definitive answer. C~ ahead, I understand where 
you're coming from. 
MR. ROSSMAN: But I think there is a common ground between both 
of the points, the hypothetical you posed and the situation that I just 
proposed. But, existing law would not preclude the Court of Appeal 
from disallowing a claim for fees in the situation you propose. So, 
what I'm saying is that this is an open area, and it is subject to 
abuse if the Legislature makes it absolutely impossible for a judge to 
award fees, to perfect a fee claim award regardless of the inequities 
in each situation. But, I would leave the Committee with one thought. 
The judges in this state, I think read the popular mind as well as 
this Committee, as well as hopefully those of us who practice in this 
area, and they are sensitive to the economics of the issue. They are 
sensitive to where the money is coming from and I think they are sen-
sitive to, when they see lawyers doing what they ought not to do, they 
come down hard on them. And I would say that the best thing to do at 
this point is to leave that discretion in the hands of the judges. If 
you do more, I think then what you're basically doing is asking the 
question of whether Section 1021.5 is good policy overall. And I would 
hope that we're not doing that since even the Congress of the United 
States, after the Supreme Court decided Alyeska, itself has decided 
that there must be this basic authorization to permit this type of 
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litigation to come forth which is not being brought by anyone else. 
Thank you very much for your time. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you. Aviva Bobb. 
Ms. AVIVA BOBB: I'm Aviva Bobb, Executive Director of the 
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles. I would like to take a few minutes 
only to talk about one aspect of the bill though I'm happy to answer 
questions about any other aspect, and that is that portion which would 
direct the court to consider in determining the fee what is appropriate 
to provide fees to an agency that receives governmental funding, and 
to consider the funding in determining the size of the award. Taking 
the first issue, I got the impression from your question to Mr. Rossman 
that you believe that the bill does not leave open the question of 
whether it's appropriate to give awards to publicly funded entities? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: It doesn't matter what it said, I'm asking 
what the intent 1s. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: It's for the court to take into account 
what the funding is and whether it's appropriate to award these. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: So conceivably when legal aid is involved 
in one of these they could award nothing. 
MS. ROBB: Let me first address that matter. I'd like to 
address the quest1on of whether that should be in the bill, whether 
the court ought to consider the fact that the funding comes from a 
government source as opposed to some other source. If one thinks 
quickly about the matter, one might well say that if an organization 
is being given public funds to do this general kind of litigation, why 
should they be paid extra money for doing it, or double money for doing 
it again? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You said you were first going to 
whether they should be paid at all, now you're talking about 
extra money. Why don't you talk about the first point now. 
agree with you on the second one. 
talk about 
double or 
I may 
MS. ROBB: On the first one, one could say for example the 
legal services program receives federal money to enforce the law on be-
half of the poor. When does that, why should it not only continue 
to receive its federal money, but also be recompensed or reimbursed by 
the losing party on the other side, that's really the question. The 
reality is, government provides funding for attorneys really only on 
behalf of two classes of people, to my knowledge, low income people 
and elderly people. Low income people through the Legal Services Cor-
poration Act and senior citizens through the Older Americans Act, and 
that is really it. The amount of funding provided through those two 
vehicles is very small. For poor people, it is less than $8 a poor 
person per year. It doesn't get you very far. If you have one divorce 
in your lifetime that is uncontested perhaps, that has taken care of 
your entire allotment. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: What do you think, for middle income 
people, the attorneys fees spent during the year would average out to? 
Do you think it would be as much as $8 for every middle class person? 
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MS. BOBB: I ink there is no question that low income 
people have much greater needs for lawyers than middle income people 
do for a variety of reasons which I can discuss with you. Their own 
subsistence is dependent on the government. These are issues about 
whether their social security check arrives on time, and sometimes they 
need a lawyer to go it for them. They have a lot of issues that 
middle class people don't have. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: My only point is that you made it sound 
like a paltry sum, yet I 1m sure it's much. higher than that which is 
spent by the middle class person. 
MS. BOBB: Let me put it to you another way. In Los Angeles, 
every attorney 1n my program has the potential client popu-
lation of over 10,000 people. There is no way that one lawyer can even 
begin to meet the legal needs of 10,000 people. Admittedly they don't 
all have legal problems at the same time, but the ABA I think has said 
that one in four poor people, will have legal problems in a given year. 
There is just no way that we can serve the numbers of clients that we 
have. My point is that the fact that when we do -- most of our funds 
are used to deal with small matters, consumer matters, landlord/tenant 
matters, divorces, etcetera. When you have to bring a major piece of 
litigation to enforce the rights of the poor, there's an opportunity 
cost on behalf of the poor. You are not doing something else, which is 
also vitally necessary to do, and when you get reimbursement in the 
form of attorneys fees, what that does merely is allow you to do some-
thing else, something that you should have done anyway. I will give 
you an example. In Los Angeles County in the last two years there has 
been an incredible scandal of what we called equity ripoff and lien 
sale foreclosures,, I believe Mr. Fenton is certainly aware of that. 
It has taken a lot of our time, and a lot of our attorney time to pros-
ecute those cases to insure that homeowners get their homes back. There 
is a cost to doing that. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Now when you do that, presumably some people 
who need your service don't get it from you. How do they get the 
services? 
MS. BOBB: We have to take away other services that we would 
normally want to provide our clients. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If you get this type of or case and you 
get yo~r so-called windfall profits, what does that do about getting 
you more attorneys to handle the cases you weren't able to take? Do 
you hire people based on the fact that you're going to get extra money 
from these cases, and you're going to be able to have a bigger budget? 
Is that what you're saying? 
MS. BOBB: Absolutely. If, in fact, you got enough fees that 
you could hire one lawyer for a year to provide services for poor 
people that's exactly what you would do, and you would let them know 
they have a one year job to provide legal services. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I have no quarrel with even getting some 
windfall. My quarrel is that if it costs you $25-an-hour for one of 
your attorneys, including overhead, then that should be the basis on 
which they then compute the lodestar. I have no quarrel with the 
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windfall for your agency, but I don't see why you should be able to 
charge $100 or $150 for that lawyer since that's not your cost. That's 
all I'm saying. 
MS. BOBB: Let me get to that because I think there are a 
variety of reasons why that may make sense even though at first blush 
it doesn't, it does sound like an atrocious profit that we're making. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well it's not atrocious, it's just very 
large. 
MS. BOBB: If I may go to the question of whether it's appro-
priate for legal services programs or government funded entities to 
receive attorneys fees, what you, in effect, would be doing is saying 
to low income people, "You have a cap on the amount of attorneys time 
available to you, and that's what the federal government gives you, 
and that cap cannot be taken off through reimbursements for attorneys 
fees for litigation where attorneys fees might otherwise be available." 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You lost me. When your agency takes a major 
public interest case, what limitation do you have? 
MS. BOBB: Our funding is based on what the federal govern-
ment gives us. If the legislation passes ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: But you also get volunteer services from 
attorneys don 1 t you? 
MS. BOBB: We don't directly, there is an organization that 
can provide this. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Yours is strictly funded by the federal 
government and nothing else? 
MS. BOBB: That's right. My point is that if this piece stays 
in the legislation which says that the court ought to consider whether 
it's appropriate to give legal services programs attorneys fees what 
you are telling the poor is that they, different from other people ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Forget what the legislation says. I'm try-
ing to learn something. Under our present law, if your agency has rep-
resented some people in this type of case, you're now asking for attor-
neys fees. Let's say for the sake of discussion you're working 1,000 
hours on the case. Under the lodestar method we try to find out what 
the cost is. ? What the going rate is for that attorney. Right? 
If I were the judge sitting, I'd say, "Mr. Nolan's entitled to $150-an-
hour or something like that, and you're an agency and your costs are 
$20 or $25 so you're entitled to $25-an-hour. 11 Then would I go into 
the multiplier? But you don't do that. You go in and you take the 
going rate for attorneys, maybe $100-an-hour, don't you? I don't see 
the justification. You tell me what the justification is. 
MS. BOBB: What we believe is that our services ought to be 
valued at their value, not at their cost, and I'll explain why. If you 
use the cost-plus method, which is the method that's being suggested, 
you penalize ... 
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CHAIRMAN FENTON: Fo what he's suggest Let's con-
sider , which unless you can convince me other-
wise is incorrect, in my ion. You don't take your cost in that 
first lodestar method. You take the market value. 
no for your 
so it's 
CHAIID1AN FENTON: You take the average. 
MS. BOBB: We take what attorneys of comparable competence 
in the private sector would charge. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Right, based on you get your lodestar 
which you multiply by a given factor. So in addition to increasing 
what the actual costs are, you start with that increase, and you also 
get a plus factor based on that increase. I can see the us factor, 
based on your cost, but I can't see the plus factor being based on the 
going rate. Because you are a different type You're specifi-
cally set up to provide these types of services us taxpayers. 
So what you're saying is, "You are funding us to represent these peop1e, 
and now we want you to give us more money to represent people. 
We want you to give us more money to take away more money from you." 
To me, something seems a little wrong. 
MS. BOBB: The is that there is no other rational way, 
I believe, to handle the problem. It would be to penalize 
the poor because their attorneys have chosen to take lower salaries and 
have lower overhead. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: How are you penali the You're 
going to 
fact that you think you're 
going to represent them, 
that instead of -- instead 
You don't them based on the 
going to get a attorneys fee. You're 
How do you ize them by the 
of getting 00 per hour as the going 
rate, you get $30 per 
penalized way? 
and the plus factor? How are the poor people 
've got your representation 
MS. BOBB: But, different from other classes, have very 
limited access justice system. Their access to the just sys-
tem is limited by the $7 a poor person s. To the 
extent that ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let's say I'm poor and I come in to you, 
and I say, of case, would you represent me?" You 
would take ? How would I get penalized by the court for 
not giving you $100-an-hour when they figure out your attorneys fees 
than $30. Don't you give me the representation I'm supposed to get, 
regardless of whether I win or whether I lose? How am I as a poor 
person you're representing by the fact that instead of using the 
factor of $100-an-hour we use $30-an-hour? How do I hurt? 
MS. BOBB: Well, for one you get hurt because you don't have 
equal bargain1ng power the other side. For example, in settlement 
negotiations the defendant will know that, in fact, he's liable for 
much less attorneys because he's dealing with a poor client in 
legal services programs, and he's not deal with somebody else. So 
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you are allowing the defendant to escape from full assessment, but 
you're also making negotiation on behalf of the poor relatively more 
difficult because you don't have the same attorneys fees potential at 
stake. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You would 
off because they're going to pay less 
would be easier to negotiate and give 
off $70-an-hour plus the multiplier. 
won't pay in attorneys fees and throw 
ment. That's all. 
think that they would be better 
in attorneys fees, therefore, it 
a little more if we are knocking 
They could take part of what they 
it in and give a bigger settle-
Before we go on, I'd like to introduce Mr. Art Torres from 
Los Angeles County. 
MS. ROBB: Let me talk about the question of how you should 
calculate the fees on the assumption that we agree that it's appro-
priate for legal services and other government funded entities to ob-
tain fees. The cost-plus method penalizes programs that have chosen 
to work cheaply on behalf of the poor. Let me give you an example. 
The disparity that we're talking about between legal services salaries 
now and legal services and private attorneys salaries is the result of 
a conscious decision by the legal services programs that they will pay 
lawyers less salary and have cheaper overhead in order to maximize 
client services. But, what this system would do would be to encourage 
waste. It would encourage us to say, "Okay, we're going to triple our 
salaries next year. We're going to have fancier space and buy fancier 
equipment. We'll make up the deficit, indeed, by reducing our services 
to our clients." And now our fees would triple because we'd be three 
times as expensive. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I don't believe that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: But you don't determine that, Congress 
determines what you're going to get. 
MS. BOBB: We determine our own budget. It has to be reason-
able, but I can assure you our salaries are half of what public defend-
ers and county counsel, with all due respect, in Los Angeles County are 
currently earning. Nobody would criticize a decision on our part to 
double our salaries. We could easily do that and get double the fees. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That wouldn't bother me either if you 
doubled the salaries but went to what it cost. That wouldn't bother 
me. 
MS. ROBB: My point only is that this bill encourages us to 
be ineffic1ent and greedy instead of the opposite. It encourages -- if 
we wanted to and if we were mindful of this bill, we would increase our 
costs and get larger fees. We obviously will not do it, but I'm trying 
to point out the illogic of the bill using cost-plus method as op-
posed to the value of services method. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I don't know what encourages inefficiency, 
but we have it throughout the whole system. No reflection on you. I 
think we have it built in inefficiency in government, including the 
Legislature. 
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MS. BOBB: I invite you to visit my program. It's an exception. 
The second po1nt,I think,is that what has been called windfall is not a 
windfall to a 1 s program. What we rea are providing is 
more funds for the of legal services to poor people or senior 
citizens or not money that's go into the of 
staff attorneys certa think the use of the e "windfall" 
is inappropriate in that regard. I just want to make a comment about 
some earlier testimony about the fears of people into the deep 
pockets of the county. In the desegregation lawsuit from '76 through 
'79, the county over one million dollars very ex-
pensive legal services in L. A. County to defend it. At the same time 
attorneys fees were awarded to the plaintiff at some $167,000. My 
point is that I think it is hypocritical for our system to say on one 
hand that the county can be defended by the most expens lawyers in 
the city at the normal rates, but then say that there is no rational 
basis for imposing on the public sector the highest standards of legal 
reimbursement it applied, when you're paying for prosecut the county's 
violation of the law. 
ASSEMBLY~iliN NOLAN: What actually was 
getting the most expens1ve lawyer? 
MS. BOBB: All I know is they spent 
lars in attorneys fees, and the comparable time 
imbursed for something like ... 
by the county for 
a million dol-
aintiffs are re-
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Where'd you get the figure of $1,000,000? 
MS. BOBB: Those figures are in a document that's before you 
in the Derfner paper that I think if you haven't all read, I would 
heartily recommend that you all read it. There is to the 
Derfner memo that you should all have which goes this entire 
piece of legislation. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You know perfec well that that's illogical 
with the sentiment of the people of Los on busing is-
sue, they could spend a million dollars and the vast majority of the 
people would never that. All of us have to account to the 
public, so if they spent a million dollars to bus would 
go up in arms. The fact that they spent a million dollars to try to 
stop it doesn't get the vast majority upset. 
MS. BOBB: We're talking about law enforcement as to 
politics, but there are other examples where the hired very 
expensive law firms. It currently is doing so in a regarding 
non-emergency medical care undocumented persons, where they go out 
and hire very expensive lawyers, which is fine, but then one can assume 
that under this legislation when it comes to paying the fees of 
public interest groups we the people are going to be them back 
at a relatively low rate. My point is that it does not seem consistent. 
Finally, I would just 1 to say that it seems to me providing 
for the full reimbursement for value of services in successful liti-
gation is really serving to help assure the continued availability of 
legal services to those most in need of assistance in enforcing the 
law and is not in any respect to be considered windfall or money grub-
bing as some people have called it. You ought to consider that a pro-
gram like mine probably one-half of one percent of its budget 
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from attorneys fees. We're not talking about huge sums of money. 
There may be three of four cases in the state where there have been 
large awards, but primarily you're not talking about those kinds of 
awards. You're talking about small awards that are very useful in 
helping extend the ability of legal service programs to increase their 
services to the public. 
CHAIID1AN FENTON: Thank you very much. Richard Pearl. 
MR. ROBERT LEIDIGH: Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. 
I am Robert Leidigh, attorney with California Rural Legal Assistance. 
We have with us this morning, Richard Pearl, who is our Director of 
Litigation who will present our testimony on the bill. 
MR. RICHARD PEARL: Thank you. I'm Richard Pearl, Director 
of Litigation for California Rural Legal Assistance. As the Director 
of Litigation I'm responsible for supervising our 15 offices through-
out the State. In addition, I've spent a substantial amount of time 
litigating CRLA's attorneys fees awards cases and in supervising others 
that I haven't been directly involved in, I have also participated in 
preparing attorneys fees manuals in both federal and state court. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What do you go in as your rate when you go 
in on attorneys fees? What do you maintain your hourly rate is for 
your group? 
MR. PEARL: The last judicial award of attorneys fees that 
I was awarded for my work, and I've been out of law school for 11 years, 
was $85 an hour. That was for me, for my work. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I assume that you get close to that per 
hour working for them. 
MR. PEARL: As a sala~, no I don't get anywhere close to 
that. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Does it vary with your group as to the 
caliber of attorney that does the work? 
MR. PEARL: With the level of experience, yes. It does vary. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What's the range? 
MR. PEARL: I think $84 is probably the largest anyone in 
our firm has ever been awarded. We've gone down to as low as $20, but 
the rate we ask is anywhere from $55 to $85-an-hour. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That's the factor that you use before you 
get into the multipliers? 
MR. PEARL: Right. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: $85 is what they figured yours was. 
MR. PEARL: That's what they figured mine was. That was what 
I requested. If I had requested more, I don't know if I would have got-
ten more, but that's what I requested. And that's what a Federal judge 
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in San Francisco found and also a superior court judge in Santa Cruz 
County found was a reasonable value for my services, given the pre-
vailing rates in the community. First of all, I had planned to talk 
about some of the legal aspects of the -- the precedential aspects of 
some of the revisions that are being proposed in this amendment. I 
know that you've evidenced a concern to talk more about the policy and 
so I'll stick to that, but I would urge the Committee to look at the 
analysis prepared by Mary Francis Derfner on AB 3172 which is not only 
thoroughly documented with the Federal precedents that deal with each 
of these issues, but articulates, I think, very well the policy behind 
the Federal precedents on these issues. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: The Federal government and the Federal 
court, they don't care aEout money anyhow, I guess, because they fig-
ure that the Federal government can just print it. We in the counties 
and cities in the State of California have a little more difficulty. 
That's one of the ~roblems we have. 
MR. PEARL: I understand that. I know that the experience 
that the proponents of the bill set forth would sound differently, but 
my experience has been that Federal judges and state judges are very 
aware of the resources of the defendant when they are making an award 
of fees, and that a rate awarded to me of $85-an-hour against a govern-
mental defendant takes into account very much the fact of whether the 
governmental defendant is a small rural county or a large county, 
whether the resources which have been expended by the plaintiffs were 
reasonable and that they are not totally blind to this reality of gov-
erment funding of the defendant or the plaintiff's lawyer. 
What I would like to address today is one element of the bill 
that I think is particularly pernicious, and that would basically emas-
culate the entire act, and that is the consideration of the good faith 
of the defendant in whether to award a fee at all and the amount of fee 
which would be awarded. I would note that we have to start with the 
premise that the purpose of Section 1021.5 is to encourage the vindi-
cation of important constitutional and statutory rights that benefit a 
large class of persons, that is in the act now, and that's the underlying 
purpose. It is not to punish a guilty or a bad faith defendant. The 
courts both Federal and state have been unanimous in recognizing that 
the good faith or bad faith of the defendant is simply irrelevant to 
this purpose of encouraging the vindication of important rights that 
benefit a lot of people. The courts recognize that if you make the act 
require a finding of bad faith by the defendant, which essentially you 
will if the court is given a direction not to award fees upon a finding 
of good faith, you're going to require a finding of bad faith, and if 
you require a finding of bad faith by a court aimed at a governmental 
defendant, there will not be a civil rights attorneys fees award act 
in state or Federal courts, and the courts have recognized that. Even 
Justice White in the most recent opinion out of the United States 
Supreme Court in the case involving lawyer advertising out of the 
Virginia Supreme Court, ~ecognized that, under the Federal attorneys 
fees award act, the good faith of the defendant simply cannot be a 
factor in determining whether to award fees. 
I would submit that there are some circumstances where the 
good faith of a defendant might be a factor, but those are already 
included in the statute. Under Section 1021.5, the court must find 
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that the lawsuit was necessary to vindicate this purpose. The case 
law as it has developed has established that if the defenda~t can show 
that it would have its po of the lawsuit, that 
the lawsuit was not a to changing an unlawful policy, or that 
a mere letter or an ve procedure ~rould have resulted in the 
very same change as the did, then fees cannot be awarded. I 
would submit that in those c tances faith already included 
in the statute, and there no need to amend it. Where a lawsuit is 
necessary to effect a change in policy, then fees have to be awarded 
if we're going to maintain the purpose of encouraging the vindication 
of important rights. 
With res to the amount of fees, I think good faith is 
also irrelevant as a factor and of elf. In reality, however, 
good faith plays a substantial in the amount of attorneys fees 
that are awarded, the faith of the defendant, and like-
wise the good fa of the ff is a contributing factor 
to how the case to be litigated, how much attorney resources 
are allocated to case, how much time the attorneys and the court 
have to spend to resolve a particular issue. Let me give you an example. 
We had a case that arose out of Sonoma Superior Court where we 
challenged the consti anal of a Cal ia statute that allowed 
the use of confess of j by private persons, but it had not 
reached the county level In fact, the Legislature had passed re-
pealing lation once and the Governor had vetoed it. We brought 
this lawsuit, a canst challenge to this practice. The county 
of Sonoma 1 the case in good faith. They realized that it had 
to be resolved through the courts. Although could have stopped 
the practice their own , they could not have undone the stat-
ute. We tried the case before the Sonoma Court on a 
st statement of facts. There was no discovery. There was no 
trial. We went to the Court of 1. We went to the Cali-
fornia Court. the case Cali Supreme 
Court. We won took it to the States Supreme Court 
wh dismissed the appeal we ended up with a dec that idated 
a statute affected tens of thousands of p9or people and middle in-
come people as well as s We performed, I would , a sig-
nificant public benef , and we were le to arr at an agreement on 
attorneys fees that was, I believe, about $16,000 for that lawsuit. 
That is not in the realm that we're hearing today of $45 and 
that kind of That s a perfectly fee for a case of 
that magnitude. 
any less 
to the bill? 
would 
would have ur 
the trial court that 
that the init 
set the rate of fees 
is. And because the 
tensive discovery to 
based on a 
that was needed, and 
Do you think that that fee would have been 
effect? If not, what's your objection 
It could have been a lot less, yes. How 
s under this bill? There s two ways this bill 
affected that. One, we success argued in 
factors like our costs and the extensive discovery 
that it wanted to perform in order to 
, which under exist case law, it 
was not able to get into this kind of ex-
and ask the court to set an amount of fee 
, we greatly s ined the amount of work 
expedited the 's desire to settle 
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the case. In terms of our rate we ask, we took a substantial cut 
in our rate in order to settle the case. Had we started from a rate 
that was cos , tak into account our low salaries and low 
overhead of our office, we would have been forced to settle the case 
for even less. think the of this case and the kind of fee 
that we have been awarded in this case is much more 
ASSEHBLYMAN NOLAN: Would you have settled? If the $16,000 
was not reasonable fees for you, would you have settled? In a negoti-
ated settlement that's .. 
HR. PEARL: No, we would not have s 
would have been one of the more pernicious as 
, and that I think 
of th amendment. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: No, what I'm at it was obvi-
ously worth it to the county to settle with you for that. And so that's 
what they would have settled at. This bill wouldn t affect that. 
MR. PEARL: Oh, I don't think that's true. To some extent, 
we're looking at this thing from two different 1 The county's 
willingness to settle for $16,500, which I think was the exact amount, 
was based in large on what think the court would have awarded 
had we gone ahead and lit the fee issue. It was not on 
what they thought was a reasonable value of our services. It was based 
on, like any other , an assessment of the risk, and an assessment 
of what the law versus what they would have to spend, and the 
risk of being assessed at much h fee had li it. Under 
this bill, had the r been far less, then the not have been 
willing to settle. We would have had to litigate it. And we might 
have ended up with a based on a smaller amount s be-
cause we would have had to so much more do it. So, I 
think it's important to realize that we're not talk here about an 
abstract setting or market value when we're talk ing 
something but you're negotiat just like any other 
So what I would urge body to consi-
dering how courts set the amount of a fee, a fac-
tor. It's an impl it factor in the way 1 and a 
county that decides that it is going to 1 and 
nail, fight every d , fight 
every subpoena fees than one 
who litigates in good , than a good ith 
dlspute over a princ of law. Let's get court and settle this 
in the most pract efficient way possible." If a county takes that 
position, the amount of fees that they ll be assessed if 
they lose, if they are wrong the law, would be less than if they 
take the tooth and nail type approach, which we 
taken here. 
seen is often 
I'd like to also address just brief the on fees ques-
tion Mr. Fenton raised earl , and that is would we ask for fees if 
we lost an appeal seeking more fees, or simply had the same amount of 
fees affirmed. 
CHAIRHAN FENTON: If you were the one who brought the appeal? 
MR. PEARL: If we were the one that did the appeal, if we 
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went up on appeal saying that our fees were too low, we lost that 
appeal, we would not ask for further fees, and we would not be entitled 
to them under either Federal law or the state law as it has evolved. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If it's the same or less, you don't get any 
additional fees? 
MR. PEARL: Right. What is happening though, and what my 
experience has been, is that in the last two cases in which we have 
been awarded fees by the trial court after a hearing where we presented 
substantial documentation of the prevailing market rate or the amount 
of hours that we spent, the reasonableness of our expenditure of time, 
in both these last two cases is that in one case the state, and in one 
case a private defendant have appealed that award. And, in my mind, 
and I think to any objective lawyer's mind, these appeals have a very 
minimal chance of succeeding, given the present state of the law and 
the broad discretion that is afforded a trial court in setting a fee. 
Yet by appealing, the state loses nothing. It is not forced to pay the 
award pending appeal. If we win we may be entitled to interest which 
is less than inflation and we're forced ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: The same is true of awards against insur-
ance companies 1n personal ury cases today. They appeal because 
they can put the money out to work ... 
MR. PEARL: And not only that. We're forced to expend a 
great bit of t1me on appeal, briefing the appeal, arguing the appeal, 
the time that we should be devoting to other client services. If we 
are not to be awarded fees for that time, then the whole purpose of 
the Civil Rights Act in encouraging us and private attorneys to bring 
this kind of cases subs ly diminished because what started out 
as a prevailing market rate and a reasonable fee for services, by the 
time you that by the time spent on appeal defending a succes-
sful award, it becomes de minimis, and attorneys are simply not going 
to do it anymore. For that reason I would urge you not to adopt an 
amendment that would limit fees on fees under those circumstances. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: How about the justification of your fees 
originally? You've got all the computation of what time you put in and 
everything haven't 
MR. PEARL: Oh, yes. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Why should you be entitled to fees on that 
part? I' on the appeal. I can understand.that. But 
in ly. 
MR. PEARL: The way we claim fees when we have won a decision 
is by following the procedure, although 1021.5 calls for a 
motion. Basically, we've done it pretty much like lawyers have always 
done cost bills We 1 submit a statement cost b asking for a cer-
tain amount of fee, attach declarations that detail the amount of 
fees, how we it, whether we spent it on investigation, motion 
work, etcetera, and sets a specific rate and asks for an amount. Now 
the time spent in that, we have billed for just like a lawyer 
would bill for a cost bill. But it's de minimis, it's an hour, four 
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hours at the most in time. I don't think there's any problem in getting 
fees for that just ike a would get fees for preparing a judg-
ment or a cost bill in a private contract case. The time that comes in 
and the thing that's real at issue here is when a defendant opposes 
it, and here, in these cases, has real taken up the time have 
been defendants like the state and like various of governments 
and even private defendants raising all these factors that they are 
asking this body to in the bill, but which are not part of the case 
law. I must have briefed the issue of cost accounting five or six 
times, and there is not a single court that has validated the issue of 
cost accounting. But we've had to litigate over and over again why 
cost accounting is not the appropriate formula under Federal law and 
under state law. The same is true of the other factors that are being 
considered here: the good of the~defendant, the extent to which we 
prevail, the fact that we are legal services programs. Despite the 
fact that perhaps 25 courts, both state and Federal, have said that 
that should be irrelevant to whether we are entitled to a fee we are 
met with that defense in every case we file. We have to prepare a 
brief in response. We have to argue them. That's what runs up the 
fees on fees. It is not the fact that we're claiming excessive fees. 
Now I admit if someone puts in a bill for $450-an-hour, and the County 
has to defend against that, and the bill is cut back to a more reason-
able fee then perhaps they shouldn't get gees for all that time, but 
that has not been our experience, and that's not what we're talking 
about here today. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much. 
MR. LEIDIGH: Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, 
Robert Leidigh again, and I'd like to just point up a of things 
that were made by the proponents in their test and bring them to 
the attention of the Committee. I believe it was Mr. Klee the 
Attorney General's office that made the remark that the vast proportion 
of these kinds of cases that they're facing are brought by public in-
terest and legal aid programs. I think he used a of 90 percent 
or 95 percent and yet the opening witness to this incredible 
profit that is supposed to be the incentive to private to take 
these cases. I think there's a real incons If the profits 
that can be made are so great, why aren't private lawyers taking these 
cases? 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Probably there are a lot of risks in a lot 
of cases. 
MR. LEIDIGH: That's A tremendous amount of risk. 
Legal aid programs 1n the first place can't take fee generating cases 
unless the private bar has turned them down. That's the only time we 
take those cases so the private bar is sitting there and they're look-
ing at these figures, and they're saying, "Well, we don t think we can 
make any money off of this," and so they aren't taking those cases. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If a person, an elderly person, comes into 
your office with a case, one of these cases, and you can't handle it, 
who do you send them to? 
MR. LEIDIGH: We send them out to the lawyer referral service. 
We're required to do that because otherwise we could channel to one 
firm or another. They're sent out, the private bar has a shot at 
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taking those cases, and the fact is in the instances where we're 
representing someone, they're not taking those cases. My own experience 
in a rural county, and I have found in my experience rural counties are 
often less likely to settle than more likely to settle, but in my ex-
perience with a rural county, we sued the county, no private lawyer in 
that county would take that case. They wouldn't touch it. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: If you take all the cases that private 
attorneys won 1 t cover, the private attorneys take the ones that they 
think there's a good chance for them to succeed. Why should they get 
all this windfall since you get the bad stuff? Why should they get 
all of that windfall since they have now culled the good ones out and 
given you the junk? 
MR. LEIDIGH: First of all, we are not operating in all com-
munities so not all private lawyers have legal services programs to 
put the junk onto. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Why should we give them such a great wind-
fall since they now have said, "The cases that we have maybe it's a 
two to one shot that we'll win." Why do we give them that big wind-
fall? 
MR. LEIDIGH: I think perhaps the next witness from the Trial 
Lawyers can speak to their need on that too. But I think the essence 
of the existing section, and the essence of the Federal law and the 
case law on this subject generally is that it is the benefit that is 
conferred upon the public. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: I'm asking you for your opinion. 
MR. LEIDIGH: That's my opinion as well, that the benefit 
that is conferred on the public, you only get this not only if you 
succeed, there may be a longshot at winning the case, but then you've 
got to go back in and convince the court that you're entitled to fees 
because it conferred a significant benefit on the public, and it met 
all these other standards. So it's not just winning the case. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: A private attorney considers those two 
factors, ve never handled one. I wouldn't know how so I 
don't get involved. I'm sure if someone came into my office with 
that, the first thing I would want to know is, one, what are my chances 
of success, and two, what are my chances to make sure that it's of 
public benefit so that I'll get attorneys fees. Now let me ask you a 
question. If you take those particular cases of private attorneys, 
take it on the bas that the court is going to award attorneys fees 
-- can they take it on the basis that if the court finds that it was 
the public that benefited-- never mind, I'll ask Mr. Werchick my 
question. Arne, so you'll be prepared, my question is, can you pro-
vide in your contract with a client a provision that says, "If the 
court doesn't award attorneys fees, I'll get a certain percentage of 
the judgment?" We'll let you answer that, Arne. 
MR. LEIDIGH: To go back to your question about why don't 
they just skim off the cream of the crop and send the rest up to us. 
First of all though, the only cases that we're involved in are those 
involving poor people. There are other cases that confer a benefit 
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on the public where the plaintiff or the intiff that starts 
out is not impoverished. So those folks are not go to be able to 
have their cases come back and be handled us get handled. 
One of the factors that you were address to Mr. , which is 
already in the law is the fact that the interest , the 
attorneys fees ought not to come out of the recovery, and oftentimes 
there is no recovery. In the cases that create most benefit to the 
public, there is no monetary recovery to the ff. Let's look at 
the Mandel case. They wanted to save the taxpayers' money. They're 
not go1ng to get any benefit. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: In your there is a public benefit 
although there 1s no monetary award. In that case you are not going to 
get attorneys fees. We understand that. Mine was just the opposite. 
MR. LEIDIGH: The one other point is when services and 
other publ1c 1nterest firms are involved, private will look at 
the awards that are received by entities such as ours in determining 
whether this is the kind of case that they want to get into. They're 
going to look at what kinds of recoveries are made. If we're assigned 
a lower value and get lower awards they're go to be less likely to 
take those cases. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You mean get fees. 
MR. LEIDIGH: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: They're liable to what? 
MR. LEIDIGH: They'll be less 1 
they're going to look at what kind of awards 
for attorneys fees these kinds of cases. 
take it, because 
judges are making 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: That has nothing to do with your award. 
Are you talking about based on your cost factor? 
MR. LEIDIGH: No, I'm about if we 
on our cost factor rather than on the value of the 
we provided, then that gets reported ... 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: They won't look at 
very unhappy with that anyhow, regardless what you 
not enough for the -- I understand that. 
an award based 
services that 
at all, they'll be 
because that's 
MR. LEIDIGH: And I think that's an factor in de-
termining what amount of award should be granted to us because they 
will look to what we get in determining what they're likely to get. 
That's the experience I had in doing these kinds of cases. When you 
start doing those cases, private lawyers are standing back from them, 
and if you win one and get a good attorneys fee, then the next one, 
they'll take. But until we blaze the won't take them. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You mean you get $85-an-hour and a high 
powered attorney 1s go1ng to look at you because you get $85-an-hour 
with the windfall factor in there? They are going to come because 
they give you $85, is that what you mean? 
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MR. LEIDIGH: Yes. Maybe not in San Francisco at $85, but 
certainly in rural communities. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much. Arne Werchick. 
MR. ARNE WERCHICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Arne Wer-
chick, President of California Trial Lawyers' Association. Even though 
a very tiny percentage of our members are affected by this proposed 
legislation because only a very small number of lawyers in private prac-
tice in California engage in this type of litigation, CTLA is particu-
larly concerned about this measure because it seeks to use the principle 
of regulating the contingency fee as a way of increasing the disincen-
tive for certain lawyers to take on certain types of cases. This isn't 
just a regulation statute. In fact the statute would have the effect 
of deterring private lawyers from handling this kind of a case. Not 
every lawyer who is working for $20-an-hour now desires to work for $20-
an-hour because they're young attorneys who are dedicated and determined. 
They're willing to work for poor people, or low-middle income people. 
They're willing to put in many hours of work that isn't very well com-
pensated, partly out of the necessity of finding work in an overcrowded 
legal community, and partly out of a desire that someday it will lead 
to something and produce something. If they have an opportunity and 
are invited under the existing statute to perform as a great public ser-
vice the most speculative type contingency fee litigation and the long-
est term type of contingency fee litigation, with the largest volume 
of years involved before you see a nickel. If there are young private 
practice attorneys who are willing to take these risks to fulfill the 
mission that this statute supposedly created for them when it was pas-
sed some three years ago, they should not be discouraged by being told 
that at the end of the long road some court will subpoena all of their 
records, find that they only made $20-an-hour for the past three years, 
and award them the fee of $20 per hour for what may be the most valuable 
public service that an attorney has rendered in California during that 
period of time. 
By contrast, if O'Melveney and Meyers has been hired by the 
City of Los Angeles to defend the case, to cite one of the examples 
that has been given, the court would not be inclined to take into con-
sideration the fact that the award to the plaintiff attorney should 
certainly be equal if not greater than the amount of fees paid to the 
defense attorney in such a case when it was the defense counsel that 
lost, and the plaintiff's counsel that won. So, our first concern is 
real right to the po that your Committee has been considering, 
Mr. Chairman, and that is whether the premise of the first speaker this 
morning should be given any credence at all, and we say, "no." This 
business about what did the lawyer make per hour and therefore we 
should determine the fee in a public interest lawsuit on that basis, is 
exactly the opposite of the way that fees in such cases are to be cal-
culated because all does is rather arrogantly give the highest fees 
to the richest law firms in California and seeks to exclude everybody 
else from this type of work. If you want to pass this statute and en-
act a code section that tells the court what to do, the court should be 
instructed to determine what fair and reasonable fees for comparable 
services are. And the court should specifically be instructed not to 
consider that some law firms get $250-an-hour for trivial work, and 
that all other law f $20-an-hour for very substantial work be-
cause that's not the value in any way of the services that have been 
rendered. 
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Now, as to whether a publicly funded or quasi-publicly funded 
agency -- and I should say here when I address myself to their prob-
lems, these generally are not our members. There are many attorneys, 
and I received a dozen letters this year from people saying that they 
would like to participate in our functions but they cannot afford to 
pay our dues at $120 a year -- and $50 for lawyers practicing under 
three years has even troubled a few people. But I still will speak on 
behalf of these agencies receiving the very same fees that a private 
attorney would receive for comparable work for the very simple reason 
that the philosophy of the law is that we want to expand and increase 
the availability of these services. We do not for a minute believe 
that all of the people who need these services are receiving them. 
And we know as a practical matter that we cannot go back to the Federal 
government or to municipal governments and ask for greater funding for 
these agencies to secure their services for all of the people who need 
them. So one of the ways to make a small expansion in the availability 
of publicly and quasi-publicly funded services is to allow them to col-
lect a reasonable attorney fee for the services which they render which, 
had that same litigant gone into a major private pro bono firm which 
gives maybe two or three or five percent of its annual services for 
cases that would be highly speculative of this sort, that that private 
firm would certainly get paid and at a very high rate, then the public 
and quasi-public law should also be paid at the same rate. Because 
when you pay the money to the public and quasi-public firm, you know 
at least the money is going into expanded services, whereas if you pay 
it to the private law firm, you can suspect a good part of it goes into 
partnership profits. And although I may be speaking against the inter-
est of many of my members who as private law firms would rather have 
the business, I still feel that it is urgent that the Legislature con-
tinue to recognize the service of the public law firm. 
I think fundamentally here what's been missed up to this 
point is an understanding of the fundamental nature of lawyers who work 
on contingency fees. We don't have an hourly value to our service. 
The value of our service is whatever the value of our existing inventory 
is. If we've got a dozen cases that are worth $100,000, then the value 
of our hour spent that year is worth the fees we collect on the dozen 
cases worth $100,000. If we have twenty cases worth $10,000 then the 
value of our services for that year is going to be the value of twenty 
cases worth $10,000. It's going to go up some years and down other 
years. That's the fundamental risk that contingency fee lawyers are 
willing to undertake. We try to average it out over the years by main-
taining inventory, controlling the size of staff, being very attentive 
to overhead and such. But it's a very different kind of operation than 
people who do a fixed commercial or corporate practice where they know 
as long as they have a certain number of clients, they will have what 
are called billable hours. we don't have what are called billable 
hours. Incidentally, on that point, I was amused at the first presen-
tation at the indication that there are 2164 billable hours for an 
average attorney's average work year, because if it's an eleven month 
work year allowing the lawyer a month off, that's fifty billable hours 
a week. That's a lot of good billable hours for some very big commer-
cial firms. But I don't know that all of my colleagues do indeed work 
fifty hours a week. There's a joke told about the oldest lawyer in 
the world who went to heaven and they knew that he was the oldest law-
yer in the world because they checked his billing record. As a plain-
tiff's attorney it wouldn't be fair for me to address the billing hab-
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its of defense counsel or corporate counsel. But the point is that I 
think you mispreceive what we're talking about here. This is a con-
tingency fee statute you're addressing yourself to. Not how to fix a 
proper billable hour rate for the work done. Now, in fact, the courts 
have addressed it and many of the pro bono firms that have become in-
volved in the problem are used to dealing with the so-called billable 
hour concept and that's why the law has looked at it that way. But I 
don't think you should codify the billable hour concept as the way the 
fee here should be determined. Instead you'd have to look upon this 
riskiest type of litigation. And to say that in a given case you're 
going to award somebody with a 25 percent or 50 percent surcharge fac-
tor because of the quality of the work -- and I think, my God, the 
medical malpractice cases that I've worked on, if I could only increase 
my hourly productivity by 25 percent or 50 percent and I had to charge 
by the hour for that type of litigation, I quickly would have gone out 
of that type of work and I would have gone broke a long time ago. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: But you also aren't subsidized in the 
practice of that type ... 
MR. WERCHICK: That's true. But consider, Mr. Nolan, that 
I have to make 500 percent or a 1,000 percent surcharge on an hour of 
medical malpractice work or that type of litigation can't be afforded. 
And that's two and three years worth of litigation where I can be 
highly selective in the cases. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: But you also don't have your overhead 
paid for and your attorneys paid for already by the public, which these 
public interest firms do. 
MR. WERCHICK: Now you're talking about public interest law 
firms where the pUblic very generously giving them $12 to $15-an-
hour for attorney time. And I understand they pay secretaries $500 
and $600 a month in those firms. I'm being facetious, of course. But 
what I'm suggesting to you is that those firms are already badly under-
funded. Now, we may disagree. From a conservative standpoint, it may 
be the view of many legislators that we shouldn't have public agency 
law firms at all, and that might be their legitimate expression of the 
political viewpoint of the community. But let's not confuse whether or 
not we ought to have them with whether we're being generous in the way 
we pay them. I think that everybody concedes that these are low budget 
operations consider what we do with them, and that any additional 
funds that they could get from these lawsuits would allow them to ex-
pand service. You personally may not want them to expand service, and 
I can respect your viewpoint even though I would disagree with it. But 
that's a different issue than what this statute supposedly addresses. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: This bill doesn't address that at all? 
MR. WERCHICK: That's right. Except for the fact that it 
would have the impact of causing a reduction in services to the extent 
you reduce their fees. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Not if you assume that the Legislature 
or the Congress funds them to the extent that they want them to be 
funded already. 
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MR. WERCHICK: Well, then we have the statute here that then 
says, "In add1t1on to how you're funded, you ought to go ahead and 
handle public interest litigation because there will be a fee in it." 
But that's kind of a false promise if we're now going to say, "There 
really won't be much of a fee, it's a fee based upon what your usual 
hourly is and you should therefore abandon those services." The young 
woman, for example, who spoke on behalf of the Los Angeles Project 
pointed out that there are a limited number of attorneys available and 
they cannot possibly service all of their clients. If you are going to 
say to them, "We won't increase the fees that can be generated from 
some fee generating cases," then you are going to say to them, "You'd bet-
ter just address yourself only to those areas for which you have re-
ceived the government funding and not follow the invitation of the Cali-
fornia Legislature in this statute and never take on public interest 
cases because that's far too speculative in terms of how many years 
you may have to work and you still might not get a fee." I will ad-
dress myself, since many people have been somewhat reluctant to, to 
the question of whether attorneys should be compensated for time spent 
litigating over their fees, I will say yes they should be. They should 
have a right to ask for it, Mr. Fenton, even if they are being foolish 
about it. Even if they took a frivolous appeal and lost. If they want 
to be frivolous enough to ask for it. I feel quite confident in the 
judiciary of California that they will be told in short order that they 
will not receive fees and that they may be unwelcome in that same court 
again. On the other hand, if you tell them they can't ask for it in 
the frivolous situation you are also telling them they can't ask for 
it where, as many speakers have observed today, they've been forced in to 
litigating fees. Where they've been forced to ask for a fee that was 
higher than the reasonable fee simply because they knew they were going 
to have to spend two years defending it and they would get half of what 
they asked for. And what we're doing in a sense, in this type of liti-
gation frequently, is turning the determination of fees into a kind of 
real estate market where you have to price the product very high be-
cause you know that it's expected that you will go through several 
tiers and layers of bargaining and compromise and trial court and 
appellate court litigation before the final fee is set. 
Now if you want to address yourself to that and give the 
Superior Court greater authority to determine fees so that it reduces 
the opportunity for defendants, both public and private, to harass 
plaintiffs' attorneys by appealing the fees, that might make some sense. 
You would then discourage the appeal of fees and then when an attorney 
was factoring his fees he wouldn't have to say to himself, "I better 
allow myself plenty of latitude because of the amount of fighting that 
I know is going to go on over the fee." Because he still has to put 
that number of hours into the lawsuit for him before it's finished. 
And one way or another, whether you say he's going to be paid addition-
ally for the time spent on fees, or you simply ask him to kind of de-
ceive himself and the world by increasing his hourly fee to allow 20 
percent of the time to be spent on fees -- which I'm not in favor of, 
I would rather see it be done openly -- you've got to permit him to 
ask the court to give him an award when it's appropriate for the time 
that he spent on fees -- on the theory that the court should be told 
don't give him anything if you don't think it's appropriate. But if 
you feel he had to do a lot of work on fees and the work was merited 
to be done on the case, it should be paid for. He shouldn't be asked 
to contribute those services any more than any of the basic underlying 
services. 
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I want to add my voice to the people who protest the inclu-
sion of a good faith standard in this statute. As I see the way the 
words are being put in this statute, Mr. Nolan, and I don't know if you 
intend it to be this broad, the good faith of a public or private de-
fendant in violating the law, would be a defense against the payment 
of attorney's fees to the people who brought that violation of the law 
to the attention of the courts and rectified it. That is, the school 
district which didn't intend to segregate but in fact did segregate, 
would be able to set that up as a defense against the payment of attor-
ney's fees, even if it litigated for five years whether or not it should 
intergrate, whether or not it should pay attorney's fees. The good 
faith of the telephone company that doesn't promote women, and hasn't 
done so for twenty years, unless it could be proven that it was a delib-
erate and intentional policy as opposed to an inadvertant or careless 
policy or not necessarily a high level corporate policy, not only would 
that be a defense through three years of litigation but it would again 
become a defense now through three years of litigation over attorney 
fees, because the company would say, "Well we weren't really bad people 
and so the attorney for the other side shouldn't be paid." 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: I recall your argument for inclusion of 
good faith in .the bill that just passed in the last month of session 
involving pursuit of cases wrongfully against governmental entities, 
where you insisted the faith be included in it. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, Pat, inconsistency isn't just charac-
teristic of the Legislature. 
MR. WERCHICK: Mr. Chair, I don't think I ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Where in spite of knowingly proceeding 
against a governmental entity -- knowing that they were not involved 
in the case, that you still would have to show bad faith. 
MR. WERCHICK: The test there was whether a court could sum-
marily impose sanct1ons or penalties, if I recall the statute cor-
rectly, ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: No, just attorney's fees. 
MR. ~'JERCHICK: Including attorney 1 s fees. There was also all 
costs, expenses, expert witness fees and attorney's fees ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: The change in the law was that this added 
attorney Tees to the fees that they could already ... 
MR. WERCHICK: No, it also greatly increased the exposure to 
costs as well as fees, and the .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Anyway, I just wanted to point out ... 
MR. WERCHICK: I don't think I'm being inconsistent. I don't 
think I'm be1ng 1nconsistent because it is one thing for a court to 
judge the good faith of the attorneys in their asking for the fees and 
in their participation in the courtroom, but your statute here seems to 
say we should judge the good faith of the defendant's conduct over the 
past five or ten or twenty years in deciding whether the attorney on 
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the opposing side should be paid. Now that's not a penalty that we•re 
imposing upon the defendant. Your bill sought to impose a penalty on 
a lawyer who -- originally, whether or not he acted in good faith, sued 
a public entity and he lost. We ask you at least to ameliorate that 
standard by judging whether or not that attorney was acting fairly and 
reasonably in bringing the public entity into the lawsuit. I don't see 
that at all as inconsistent in asking you not to put a good faith stand-
ard in when you're saying should the opposing counsel get paid at all --
one dollar -- for his services. Part of the standard is going to be --
is the person that he sued and defeated is going to be able to setup as 
an excuse; "I was breaking the law inadvertantly, not intentionally and 
maliciously." And I am simply saying that since that's not the purpose 
of these public interest lawsuits -- to ascertain whether the defendant 
was breaking the law maliciously as opposed to innocently. We're wil-
ling to concede in most of this type of litigation the breaking of the 
law may have been taking place for political reasons. It may have been 
taking place out of ignorance. It may have been taking place out of 
bureaucratic lassitude. There could be a thousand explanations short 
of willful and malicious type of conduct. And that should never be the 
test of whether it was a good faith effort by the opposing side to rec-
tify a deficiency in public or private performance. 
I've noticed everybody to this point has addressed themselves 
only to the issue of the public entity that has to pay the judgment. 
Once again, as we have noticed many times in litigation that was draf-
ted to solve a problem, supposedly the public entities -- I caution 
the Legislature not to paint with such a broad brush, that it gives 
undeserved immunities and privileges to the private sector whether or 
not it needs it out of some concern, whether it be a real or an exag-
gerated concern over the welfare of government during a time of limi-
ted tax resouces. I do not know of any instance, though, where a pub-
lic entity, let alone a private defendant, has been bankrupted or 
brought to its knees because of any award of attorneys fees for any 
such public interest litigation. And I don't know too many sitting 
Superior Court judges in too many counties in California, knowing that 
they are going to have to run for reelection every six years, that want 
to go down in flames as the judge that bankrupted his own county. Es-
pecially if he's asking for a new court house or courtroom to be built 
in that county. In any event we recognize that this is a problem that 
may legitimately concern the Legislature because it is a new area and 
a somewhat expanding area. But we urge that you not act out of haste 
or overly broadly, in an effort to address yourselves to this problem. 
I think you for your attention. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you. Our last witness is Robert 
Harris. 
MR. ROBERT HARRIS: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the 
Committee, I'm Robert Harris, the immediate past-President of the 
National Bar Association. Today I'm speaking on behalf of the Cali-
fornia Association of Black Lawyers. I note that the time is close to 
noon. The testimony has been exhaustive. I don't think that I can 
add anything significantly new. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Is that something you want to put into the 
record? 
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MR. HARRIS: No. But I will make simply a two minute state-
ment on behalf of the California Association of Black Lawyers. We 
think that it is very important that the private bar be encouraged to 
bring actions that will bring about an enforcement of significant rights 
in the State. From the perspective, especially of black people, this 
statute is important because historically the rights of black people 
have been ignored and aren't enforced. Whether we are talking about 
breaking down the legal walls of segregation or enforcing other civil 
rights acts or civil rights in behalf of black people, blacks have had 
for the most part to rely on the volunteer efforts of the private bar. 
The existence of 1021.5 certainly provides at least some encouragement 
for the private bar to enter, especially from members of the white bar, 
to enter the arena. I need not give you the long history of what the 
black lawyers had to struggle through to get rid of Plessy v. Ferguson 
-- to bring it to Brown v. Board of Education. Certainly they were not 
compensated for the many, many cases and hours that they had to liti-
gate, but we think that they must now, in 1980, be joined by white law-
yers who are litigating in this area. I can understnad the desire to 
enact the proposed amendment to 1021.5, but I think it would be a ser-
ious mistake to do so, especially when we in the legal profession are 
debating the issue of the effective delivery of legal services to the 
poor. A statutory change of 1021 would have an effect that would be 
adverse to that interest. And for those reasons, especially for 
many of the reasons I've heard this morning, I think it would be ill 
advised at this time to change this particular statute. I think that 
the courts have acted reasonably and I'm not aware of and I'm certain 
that the proponents cannot point to any wide spread, systematic abuse 
of this particular section. So, the California Association of Black 
Lawyers urges you not to change Section 1021.5. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you. Thank you all for testifying. 
# # # # # # 
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Hearing on AB 3172, Attorneys' Fe~s in Public 
Interest Litigation 
On September 29, 1980, the Assembly Judiciary Committee 
will hold an interim hearing on AB 3172 (Nolan) relating 
to the awarding of attorneys' fees in public interest liti-
gation. The hearing is scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m. in 
the Health Department Conference Room, 1200 Aquajito Road, 
Monterey. 
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide background 
information that may be of interest to you in preparation 
for the hearing. 
AB 3172 
AB 3172 was heard by the Committee on April 30, 1980 and 
was referred to interim study at that time. The bill would 
amend Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5 which provides 
for the awarding of attorneys' fees in certain public inter-
est litigation, commonly referred to as "private attorney 
general" actions. 
CCP Section 1021.5 was enacted in 1977 (AB 1310, Berman, 
Ch. 1197, Statutes of 1977) in order to encourage the 
bringing of suits for the enforcement of important legal 
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rights. Section 1021.5 codifies criteria similar to those 
which had historically been used by federal courts in 
awarding "private attorney general" fees. It provides that 
"upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a suc-
cessful party against one or more opposing parties in any 
action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important 
right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant 
benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been confer-
red on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) 
the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement 
are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such 
fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of 
the recovery, if any. With respect to actions involving 
public entities, this section applies to allowances against, 
but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be 
filed therefor." 
AB 3172 is sponsored by the Los Angeles County Counsel,who 
contends that, although the existing legislation's purpose 
of attracting competent counsel to bring public interest 
litigation "may be salutary, the lack of specific criteria 
and procedures for dealing with such awards has resulted in 
large numbers of unreasonably large and unwarranted awards 
that are acing increasing demands on scarce public re-
sources." The County Counsel's office further states that 
the measure would establish appropriate criteria and pro-
cedures for the mak of such awards, consistent with the 
goal of encouraging competent lawyers to bring necessary 
public interest litigation but also precluding "unwarranted 
windfalls" to attorneys. 
AB 3172 is opposed by various public interest law firms 
and legal services programs as well as the California Trial 
Lawyers Association and the State Bar. Generally, the bill's 
opponents argue that the practical effect of AB 3172 would 
be far greater than ils proponents outline. It is contended 
that enactment of AB 3172 "would destroy the original goals 
of the'private attorney general' statute to encourage the 
representation of people who otherwise cannot afford lawyers 
and to vindicate rtant rights that would otherwise re-
main unenforced. The bill would make it difficult to impos-
sible for legal aid programs and public interest law firms 
to recover attorneys' fees and would reduce the amount of 
fee recoveries so severely that they would no longer serve 
their original purpose." 
Please see the enclosed bill digest for an analysis of AB 3172. 
History of the Public Interest Attorneys' Fee Awards 
The traditional "American Rule" has been that litigants must nor-
mal bear their own a ' fees costs l ion. Con-
sistent with that rule, the United States Court held in 
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Alyeska Pipeline Co. v Wilderness Society, 41 U.S. 240 
(1975) that, in the absence of statutory authorization, 
federal courts under federal law could not properly award 
attorneys' fees on a private attorney general theory. In 
1974, in the case of D'amico v Board of Medical Examiners, 
ll Cal. 3d 1 (1974), the Califoin1a Supreme Court had 
expressly declined to consider the "private attorney general" 
doctrine's possible application in this state "pending an 
announcement by the (United States Supreme Court) con-
cerning its limits and contours on the federal level." 
In Serrano v Priest,20 Cal. 3d 25, (1977), (Serrano III), 
the California Supreme Court concluded that California 
courts, exercising their inherent equitable authority, may 
award attorney fees under a "private attorney general" 
rationale to litigants who successfully pursue "public 
interest" litigation vindicating important constitutional 
rights. The court expressly left open the question "whether 
courts may award attorney fees under the 'private attorney 
general' theory, where the litigation at hand has a statutory 
basis." 
At almost the same time as the Serrano III opinion, the 
Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5, 
thereby providing explicit statutory authority for court-
awarded attorneys' fees under a "private attorney general" theory. 
Section 1021.5 goes beyond Serrano III by explicitly author-
izing "private attorney general" attorneys' fee awards when other 
statutory criteria are satisfied, "in any action which has 
resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting 
the public interest" regardless of its source,whether con-
stitutional, statutory or other. 
The leading California Supreme Court case which interprets 
CCP Section 1021.5 is Woodland Hills Residents Association, 
Inc. v City Council of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 3d 917, (1979). 
In its Woodland Hills opinion, the court found that "the 
Legislature adopted section 1021.5 as a codification of the 
'private attorney general' attorney fee doctrine that had 
been developed in numerous prior judicial decisions." 
Quoting from Serrano III, the court stated that the funda-
mental objective of the "private attorney general" doctrine 
is "to encourage suits effectuating a strong [public] policy 
by awarding substantial attorneys' fees ... to those who suc-
cessfully bring such suits and thereby bring about benefits 
to a broad class of citizens." The court further stated 
that " .•. without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney 
fees, private actions to enforce such important public pol-
icies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible." 
23 Cal. 3d at 933 
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The court also pointed out that "in significant measure 
[CCP 1021.5) was an explicit reaction to the •.. Alyeska 
decision .•. (which) reflected a legislative declaration that, 
in California, courts do enjoy the authority .•. to award 
attorney fees on a private attorney general theory." 
In order to focus the inquiry of the hearing, the following 
considerations should provide a useful frame of reference: 
The bill's source states that enactment of AB 3172 
would preclude excessive fee awards. Would the bill's 
various provisions, either individually or taken as a 
whole, serve that function? Would the policy of en-
couraging competent counsel to bring public interest 
litigation to enforce important rights be adequately 
preserved? 
One of the most significant aspects of AB 3172 is its. 
proposed change in the method of computing fee awards. 
The traditional "lodestar" approach which is based on 
providing just compensation for the attorney's services 
in terms of time expended on the case would be replaced 
by the "cost-plus" method (i.e., basing the award on 
the reasonable cost of providing legal services, in-
cluding, where appropriate, a reasonable and control-
lable profit margin.) Would the "cost-plus" method of 
computation result in awards which will provide attorneys 
with sufficient incentive to initiate "private attorney 
general" suits? 
Copies of memoranda prepared by supporters and opponents of 
AB 3172 as well as copies of the leading relevant cases will 
be available at the hearing. 
Please note that the bill's source has indicated that it does 
not intend to pursue enactment of the section of the bill 
that would repeal the existing prohibition against fee awards 
to public entities. Therefore, that aspect of AB 3172 is not 
included in the enclosed bill analysis. 
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EXHIBIT B 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1979-80 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3172 
Introduced by Assemblyman Nolan 
March 10, 1980 
REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
An act to amend Section 102US of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, relating to attorneys' fees. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSJtl:S DIGEST 
AB 3172, as introduced, Nolan Qud.). Attorneys' fees. 
Under existing law, a court may award, attorneys' fees to a 
successful party in an action which has resulted in the 
enforcement of an important right affecting the .· public 
interest. Such provisions do not permit an award in favor of 
public entities. 
This bill would permit such an award only upon motion 
made upon at least 60 days' notice, and subject to discovery 
provisions. It would specify that rea,sonable attorneys' fees 
could be awarded to a prevailing party. It would permit such 
awards to public entities. 
The bill would specify that the motion for attorneys' fees 
must be made upon adequate time records. It would require 
the court to make findings, if requested. It would require the 
court to consider the good faith and cooperation of the. party 
against whom it is awarded, the relief granted, the success of 
the respective parties, whether fees could be paid from any 
recovery, the funding of the person to whom fees are 
awarded, and whether the award will be paid by public funds. 
It would not permit attorneys' fees to be awarded for 
litigation regarding the award of attorneys' fees. The bill 
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would make related changes. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-m~ndated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil 
2 Procedure is amended to read: 
3 1021.5. Upon motion made upon at least 60 days 
4 notice, and subject to the provisions of this code relating 
5 to discovery, a court may award reasonable attorneys' 
6 fees to a st~eeessful prevailing party against one or more 
7 opposing parties in a11;y action which has resulted in the 
8 enforcement of an important right affecting the public 
9 interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or 
10 nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public 
11 or a large class of persons, and (b) the necessity and 
12 financial burden of private enforcement are such as to 
13 make the award appropriate ; ttfttl: -fet Stte.ft fees shot~ld 
14 ~ ffi ~ iaterer?t ef jt;tstiee ae .~at* ef ~recovery, 
15 if~ W#ft respect t.e aetioas ia·toh·iag f'mblie eatities, 
16 ~ seetiofl applies·~ ano ... vaaees agaiast, ~ ~ ffi ~ 
17 ef; tmalie eatities, ttfttl: a:e eleiffl sftel.l ae reqt~ired t.e ae 
18 filed tkerefor. · 
19 Such a motion for §lttorneys' fees must be made upon 
20 adequate time records. Findings shall be made, if 
21 requested, on all material issues of fact. The award shall 
22 be based upon the reasonable cost of providing the legal 
23 se,rvices, including,. where appropriate, a reasonable and 
24. con(rollable marglZJ for profit. In making an award of 
25' fees, lhe court may''apportion the: award between the 
26 par~ies OJ) the. safl1e pr adverse sides, and in determining 
27 the appropriate.nes$ qf the award or its size, shall consider 
28 ·'the good faith aild cq~peration of the party against whom 
29. it is a warded, .the relief granted, the degree of success of 
30 the respective parties; the extent to which attorneys' fees 
31. can be paid /Tom the' recovery, if any, the public or 
32 privat(J.funding of the person or organization to whom 
33 fees are awarded, BI)d whether the award wlll ultimately 
34 be paid by public funds. 
99 50 
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1 No attorneys' fees shall' be awarded for litigating the 
2 right to or the amount of an award . 
0 
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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
JACK R. FENTON, CHAIRMAN 
Prepared by 
R. LeBov 
EXHIBIT C 
BILL DIGEST 
BILL: AB 3172 
AUTHOR: Nolan 
SUBJECT: Attorneys' fees: public interest litigation 
OBJECTIVE: 
This bill is intended to establish criteria and procedures 
for awarding attorneys' fees in certain public interest 
litigation. 
BILL DESCRIPTION: 
Existing law provides that, upon motion, a court may award 
attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more 
opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the 
enforcement of an important right affecting the public 
interest if: 
(a) a significant benefit has been conferred on the 
general public or a large class of persons; 
(b) the necessity and financial burden of private 
enforcement make the award appropriate; and 
(c) such fees should not in the interest of justice 
be paid out of the recovery. 
This bill would make the following changes relating to 
awards of attorneys' fees in such cases: 
I PROCEDURAL CHANGES 
A. The motion would have to be made upon at least 
60 days notice, would be subject to the dis-
covery provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
and would have to be supported by adequate time 
records. 
(CONTINUED) 
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COMMENT: 
CCP 1021.5 provides that a court may make an 
award "upon motion" but does not provide for 
a time limit on such motion. The bill's source 
contends that the lack of a time limit can pre-
clude a public entity from adequately opposing 
the motion. 
Proponents state that since the existing statute 
does not require time records, many courts have 
either not required such records or have based 
awards on inadequate records. It is argued that 
"unless such records are used as a constant check 
on applications for attorneys' fees, there is 
a grave danger that the bar and bench will be 
brought in disrepute," and that discovery is es-
sential in verifying the truthfulness and accuracy 
of the time records which are submitted. 
Opponents of AB 3172 argue that adoption of the 
bill's "cost-plus" system of computation (see II, 
A., below) would make such discovery burdensome 
and oppressive, requiring a detailed accounting 
of a firm's entire operation, and making arguably 
"relevant" much privileged information. Opponents 
also point out that since the bill also provides 
that no attorneys' fees may be awarded for liti-
gating the right to or the amount of an award, 
defendants' counsel would have an incentive to 
use abusive discovery in order to lengthen or 
complicate the fee proceedings. 
B. Findings would be made, if requested, on all 
material issues of fact. 
COMMENT: 
CCP 1021.5 makes no provision for findings of 
fact regarding an award of attorneys' fees. 
Proponents state that findings are needed to en-
sure that (1) there is an adequate factual basis 
upon which an award is made and (2) that the 
court explain clearly the effect of each factor 
used in determining the amount of the award. 
The bill's opponents point out that this pro-
vision would lengthen fee proceedings for which 
plaintiffs' counsel would not be, and defense 
counsel would be, paid. 
(CONTINUED) 
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II CHANGES IN METHOD OF COMPUTING THE FEE AWARD 
In determining the award, the court would be: 
A. Requ;i;red to base the award on the reasonable 
cost of providing the legal services, including, 
where appropriate, a reasonable and controllable 
profit margin 
COMMENT: 
The existing statute does not prescribe any 
specific method for determining the amount of 
an attorneys' fee award. Generally, courts in 
CalTiorrda -and in other jur1s2f:Lctlons use the ~­
"lodestar" or "touchstone" approach. 
The California Supreme Court adopted that ap-
proach in the leading case of Serrano v Priest, 
20 Cal. 3d 25, (1977), citing a Un~ted States 
Court of Appeal holding to the effect that "the 
starting point of every fee award, once it is 
recognized that the court's role ... is to provide 
just compensation for the attorney's services in 
terms of the time he has expended on the case •.•• 
(Using) this concept is the only way of approaching 
the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim 
which is obviously vital to the prestige of the 
bar and the courts." The Supreme Court said that 
a "touchstone" should be calculated based on a 
compilation of time spent and a reasonable hourly 
compensation. The "touchstone" is then to be 
adjusted according to the consideration of various 
factors, some of which "militate in favor of 
augmentation and some in favor of diminution." 
The Supreme Court found that the trial court in 
Serrano properly considered the following factors: 
(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill displayed in pre-
senting them; 
(2) the extent to which the nature of the liti-
gation precluded other employment by the 
attorneys; 
(3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both 
from the point of view of eventual victory 
on the merits and the point of view of 
establishing eligibility for an award; 
(CONTINUED) 
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(4) the fact that an award against the state 
would ultimately fall upon the taxpayers; 
(5) the fact that the attorneys in question 
received public and charitable funding for 
the purpose of bringing law -suits of the 
character here involved; 
(6) the fact that the monies awarded would inure 
not to the individual benefit of the attor-
neys involved but the organizations by which 
they are employed; and 
(7) the fact that in the court's view the two 
law firms involved had approximately an 
equal share in the success of the litigation. 
The bill's supporters argue that the "lodestar" 
approach results in awards far in excess of the 
costs of providing legal services, including 
reasonable profit, and far in excess of fees 
that the attorneys ought expect to earn in other 
litigation. They contend that the "cost-plus" 
method of AB 3172 would result in attorneys in-
volved in public interest litigation being fully 
compensated for their time and services with a 
reasonable profit and an incentive while pre-
cluding unjust "windfalls." 
Opponents of the "cost-plus" method state that 
if counsel are not compensated for the true 
value of their public interest services, those 
services then cannot "compete" with other ser-
vices, and undertaking public interest cases 
would become too great a sacrifice. It is 
argued that adoption of "cost-plus" would thwart 
the purposes of attorneys' fee legislation by 
making such cases "second class" litigation. 
Opponents further state that the current system 
relies on the discretion of the judiciary which 
has been excercised with care and that judges 
should maintain the flexibility to suit the fee 
to the particular case with a view toward fair-
ness and effecting the purposes of the fee pro-
vision. 
B. Permitted to apportion the award between parties 
on the same or adverse sides 
c. Required to consider: 
1. the good faith and cooperation of the party 
against whom it is awarded 
(CONTINUED) 
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COMMENT: 
The bill's source states that such a re-
quirement would serve as a further incentive 
for public officials to comply with the law. 
The source argues that when the law is un-
clear, "the only hope (a public official) has 
of defeating an (attorney fee) award is to 
litigate the issues to their fullest ex-
tent •.. in hopes that he will be the pre-
vailing party .... If he knew the court 
would consider his good faith •.. he would be 
motivated to work cooperatively toward com-
promise ... " 
Opponents state that the purpose of Section 
1021.5 ("to encourage enforcement of im-
portant rights") would be thwarted if a 
defendant could raise a defense of good 
faith, which would be impossible to dis-
prove. 
2. the relief granted 
3. the degree of success of the respective 
parties 
COMMENT: 
Proponents contend that a party should not 
be permitted to stack issues in one action 
in order to enhance the fee award and that 
therefore the court should be required to 
take into account the extent to which the 
party has prevailed. 
This provision is opposed because of the 
practical burden it would impose on the 
court and the prevailing party in separating 
successful and unsuccessful claims. Also, 
it is pointed out that the denial of fees 
for unsuccessful claims would encourage 
attorneys to bring "the narrowest case 
imaginable" thereby preventing proper ex-
amination and clarification of the law. 
4. the extent to which attorneys' fees can be 
paid from the recovery 
5. the public or private funding of the per-
sons or organization to whom fees are 
awarded 
(CONTINUED) 
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COMMENT: 
The source contends that this factor is 
merely a recognition that the public has 
already taken steps to fund and encourage 
a particular organization to bring liti-
gation of the type in which the fee award is 
sought and that, therefore, the purposes of 
the act have already been accomplished. 
Opponents point out that the California 
Supreme Court has held that while the fact 
or public or foundational support may prop-
erly be considered in determining the size 
of the award, it "should not have any rel-
evance to the question of eligibility •.. " 
Opponents cite the federal case of Palmer 
v Columbia Gas of Ohio, 375 F. Supp. 634, 
(1973): "Those seeking to vindicate their 
constitutional rights should not be forced 
to rely upon the political vagaries of 
governmental benevolence or private 
philanthropy." 
6. whether the award will ultimately be paid 
by public funds 
D. Prohibited from awarding attorneys' fees for liti-
gating the right to or the amount of an award 
COMMENT: 
Proponents state that fee awards are permitted 
to the prevailing party in public interest liti-
gation in recognition of the benefit conferred 
on the public but that litigation concerning the 
right to or the amount of a fee award accrues only 
to the private benefit of the attorneys. 
Opponents say that time spent on the fee issue 
should be compensated because the fee itself is 
an integral part of the remedies necessary to 
obtain compliance with the law. The allowance 
of a public interest fee promotes public interest 
litigation, and therefore the fee itself benefits 
the public. Further, a disallowance would permit 
parties to dilute the value of a fee award by 
forcing prevailing attorneys into extensive, 
uncompensated litigation in order to gain any 
fees. 
(CONTINUED) 
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SOURCE: 
County of Los Angeles 
SUPPORT: 
League of California Cities 
Counties of Fresno, Humboldt, Kings, Inyo, Lake, San Diego, 
San Bernardino, Santa Cruz, Solano and Trinity 
American Insurance Association 
Department of Justice, State of California 
California Taxpayers' Association 
County Supervisors Association of California 
OPPOSITION: 
California Association of Black Lawyers 
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles 
State Bar of California 
American Civil Liberties Union 
California Rural Legal Assistance 
California Trial Lawyers Association 
Western Center on Law and Poverty 
Community Action for the Urbanized American Indian, Inc. 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
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Background Inforrr~tion nnd Analysis 
A.B. 3172 
Pre p~1 red by 
Frederick R. Bennett 
Deputy County ·counsel 
County of Los Aneelcs 
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formn tion llnd Analysis 
A. B •. 3172 
1. Introduetion. 
Although tr.rJdition.:ll American Rule has been that , 
litig:::nts must normally r their o'tm attorneys' fee costs 
in litigation (/1lyes Pir:: rv Co. v. t-lilderness 1 
Society (1975) ·q:tru.s-. ·ur;u:any court's Tn-recent years 
fiave--ac .. ve loped theor upon 't-lhich can B\vard attorneys • 
fees to the preva rties, rt rly in public 
interest litig:c.Jt • te toi-ney General Theory: 
Serrano v. Priest 197 ) 20 Cal 3d 35, 44-1+7 ;· Count:z::. of I.nyo 
v. City of Los Ange (1978) 78 Cal .App 3d 8:r;-1f6. Sub-
stant.J~nef:Li·-~.rfieory: Serrano v :i.est supra, at 86; 
Handel v. Hodgc·s, C.:: 1 , v. Indus tries, 
Inc., T66 Cal App 2d 3 • Func:r"£l1e-o-ry: County of--
~YS' ':· Cit_y____9_~ L~ Anr,cl~ supra, ~t 86; .~~tate--of-­
StanT:cer, "53 ca1:o:c1IV-t, ljL.. Vex£lt~ous Lu::cgant Tneory: 
Scr:rDno v. at 42; County of lf!YO v. City_ of 
i..os t.nr~eles, -87. 
-_....l..l.--
Court's 
ity to a·Hard 
ence of 
e Services 
The Fcdere~l 
Attm .. ·ncys' Pees 
The Federal 
Government enacted the Civil Rights 
11 
••• the court 
party ••• a reasonnb 
The purpose of 
such litigat 
comply Hith 
Cong., 2d Sess 
p. 5913). 
of 1976 (42 u.s.c. § 1988). 
that in Civil Rights Actions 
m9y allou the prev<:l ilinft 
ns pa of the costs.' 
was to encourage attorneys to bring 
encourage public officials to 
enate Report No. 94-1011, 94th 
7 ) , U.S. Code Cong ... & Admin. Ne\·7S , 
-66-
•. 
• 
. ' 
While the ca liforni.a Supreme Court was still cons ider:f.ng 
the question in California, the State Le!j:islature 1enacted . 
s i_rnilnr legh; la tion (Code of Civil Procedure, Section 
1021.5) to permit av1ards of such fees in certain public 
interest litig<1tion. The apparent purpose of such 
·legislation as with the comJ3rativc Federal Statute, was 
to attract con.petent counsel to bring such litigation. 
Neither the Federal nor the Galifornin statutes 
prescribe either procedures for d2termining such a"t·mrds 
nor criteria for deterr";l:ining the appropri<Jte arr:aunts of 
such 8\vEirds. As a result, t·he courts have developed 
methodologies on their ow~ ~1ich generally result j~ 
very large l!wards many times in excess. of the .costs of 
p:cov id ing the services. 
Almost everything th8t govcrnrr:ents do affects the 
public broCJdly-and that is the fund.smcnt ~tpon v:rhich mast 
8\~·ards are m~~de. Rapidly cb.:::mging lm·Y, pnrticularly in 
the arcn of civil rights, mnlccs it difficult for public 
offlcialr. to knoH \-.7hat is requb:cd of them, m3king it 
difficult: to avoid such litigatio:·1 and_ mnn:-cls of fees 
a ga inB t them, cve.n tllou,gb they m:J ke good faith und diligent 
efforts to try and stay current on the low and do all the 
lm·? ·r~quircs. of them. Volunta1.-y comnliance and !:ettlcments 
1 1 · ff ~ · · · ·, · r· ~ nre aJ.:-r;e y :J.ne:. .cct.l.Ve J_n avo:tal.n£; -ec B\·'::lrl•S, as E•!:'iny 
decisions favor otvards of attorneys' fees C-:!ven when the 
ccsc ls settled. ·· 
. Class actiono makh1g b~oad challenges to ~irtually 
all a'spects of an agency's opera::ion almost ensures some 
affirm<? tivc _rglief on S(Jl;}9 issues, cntitUJ1g the prev.!l iling 
party to nn B\\'.:tJ:c'l of fec.s, generally-for all effort: ·0-xpeli(k:!d, 
even· on i.ssues for 'Nhich no affixrnBtive relief 'qas granted. 
Al thom:,h . cia j or lit i.ga tion ·resulting in ia rge at·Ul rds 
of attorneys 1 fees have L"1 the p~s t generally been 
brought ar;ainst larger mctropolitE!n count:tes, perhaps 
because of the concentration of legal service agencies 
there, htcreas i113ly such acti.ons Ltre be:i.ng brought in the 
£mnller, more rural areas as t·:ell. Precedent successfully 
created in one area, large or sm.Jll, m:1kc.s similar suite 
in other areas easier. In increasing numbers such 
litigation l-7:tth 1,·esul ting large aHards of a ttorneyr. fees 
are brour,ht agah1st the state itself, tho creator of the 
leg:i.sl:.1tion. 
The so-called "ueep pocket" of publ:i.c entitles, which 
is not so deep anyi';1ore, is an llttractive incentive to 
-2.. -67-
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a ttorncys and in tc a ttorncy fee .~nvards. 
Although the a ppiJrent purpo!;e of attorneys 1 fees legis-
la t:Lon may be so , the lack of s ific criteria 
and procedures ling \'lith such .3\·;.irds has resulted 
in lorge nur:tbers 1.Jnl e.:::; one: bly laq:c nnd um1arrantcd 
a'I.·Wrds tba t are plncing :Lncrcas ing cc~m:1nds on scarce 
public resources, 
A.B. 3172 has been drafted to esta ish appropriate 
criteria and procedures the m:1ldng of such <H-iards, 
consistent with the 1 of encourag g cornpctent lawyers 
to bring necessary ic :Lnt8rest litigntion, and, at the 
same time preclude tL'l'l.var1·nntcd 't·:indf.nlls to attorneys and 
provide the jud ry w specific criter to guide 
it in making reasonable m..rards of atto1:neys 1 fees in 
proper cases. 
No apec ic procedure 
the question of an award 
required for dealing with 
_a t.tol'ncys' fees. 
. Although Code il Procedure Section 
102 L 5 t a court mFiy m:J ke an IH1ard 
"upon mot cou.1~ts b~V8 i)c.rmi ttcd the 
reque:s t m-:de as rt of 
cost bill o1.· ~ mcnns •. ~~c Plum~ir)&.t Ht~. 
and 1'1:.£ in g etc -L~-~}: .. ::::..?12. , {19, b 64 Cal App-:ra--zrs;- e ·.:..:ot.u:t d(:;CLlen "irrelevant 
the procedure a party uses to nssc.rt D claim of 
attorneys 1 • 4 • 11 . 'l:'.:..f.·.l:?..· __ r:i.r~_r .. Co_. v. 
Walter E. Hcl & Co. 1'91~) 3""8 Caf7~pp-3(f""""5"0; 
· Hen.e1ic~St.nilCiariT"fironcrtics. Inc. v. Sch::Jr~ (TST/7)Gtc;a-f7\pp-3o-Z2-</. """ -
B. 
Time 
As a result 
motions on 
precludes 
meeting 
for exmnp , 
of the cost 
bill must fi 
Elnd any motlon 
m·JUC Hi thin 10 
are not specified by the statute. 
havt! sometil.1:::s entctta ined such 
t notice tvhich effectivcdy 
entity from adequately 
motion. This occurs when, 
st for s m3dc as part 
is occurs, the cost 
dn of the judgment, 
co3t bill must be 
\·l<i Code of Civil 
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Procedure f;cction 1033. -l:n other ci.rcurr..stances \ 
Courts have permitted requests for fees to be made • 
many month~ nnd even ye;1rs cfter the litigation (Cf. 
Rah~cy _v. Jncl~on _S~1tc f2911~ge (5th Cir. 1977} .S~"T F. 2d 
'b/T), \-Jhc:n toe cviclence ~s stnTc or the public entJ_ty 
reason<.1bly assumes that no reserve need be established 
to cover such an award. 
Requ :i.1~ lng that rcqucs ts for attorneys 1 fees be 
nnd:-~ on 60 d.:.1yG not:i.cc is not onerous; ancl provides a rca-
sonnble period of tim3 for the public ent:Lty to respond 
to the Hot:i.on and the records upon which it is based. 
c. Pro_P-os~d Requir~ment that the Motion be Based 
up011Mequa te Time l~ecords. 
As the existir.g state does not require time records, 
II"..Sny courts have either not required such. records or have 
based a-vn:n1s on inadeqna tc records. 
HoPever, it is generally recognized that a principal 
ingn:-dient neccssnry to a reasonable fee B't·lard is the 
tira~ gpent on the action, and any nccurc.te computation 
of tim? necessarily dcm9nds accurate tim3 records con-
ter,-,r,nr::~ne<'u;:-.J.y kept. Cf. Attorn(!ys' FGcs : Pr:~ c tic a 1, 
f.E-c:.~:-.tl~~}~:]., l)ncl ~;th:i:£~: . .!;:-cons idu:.:-1 t ions; C. E. B7(~rcu-the, 
Cw.lcJN~, 11<111 & H:.t.lsori J976) p. 68; Su::nt1nnls for .Judic:i.al 
!li?l~?~.ov£__~ of ~tt_g_,12:J .. £,Y~--'-._Fecs in . C!J·l sp/>~c~Fir-;~nd ~t)I~lc~x -L:.t.t).~G<.ltJ.trn, J. Clay bmJ .. 8.00 hm·1. J.. ... J. 1..0, ::;6 (19!1). 
The reasons underlying the need for detailed, 
complete, ac.curate, timely prepat~ed, and understandable 
record!; of tirre spent are of the utm..Jst importance 
~;here an mw.'illing J?Crty is required to pny the 
successful attorneys' bill. Unlc~s such records are 
used as a const~nt check on applications for attorneys' 
fees "there is a grave danger thnt the bnr and bench 
\·:ill be brcn~llt in d:i.sn:pute ••• " Chernel~ v. TranB itm) 
E).:..c:ct;·on i~~--9.s:Tr... (D. Hass. 1963} 2T11~:-Supp-:-:55;--bC 
See, ror cxampieJ the attached declaration of an 
auditor \·:ho rcvic-;·n~d the time records submitted by 
the:. A. C. L. U. for an 3\·lA r.d of attorneys 1 fees a z:;a ins t 
the County. The auditor indica ted that ,-;htle the 
incomplcten'.~~;s of the records Dnd l.:tck of supporting 
data prcclu~ed a meaningful nudit, the records did not 
"ppe<.tr accu1:.1Le,. contc:tiw.::d requests for reimbursement 
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for days on 'tvhich the nttorncy wns on vacatic;m, 
contained claims for reimbursement of exce~,s:z..ve numbers 
of hours tbat '>v~re b~yond rcasonnble belief, and ·, 
\vere such that he could express little confidence 1in 
them. 
D. The Proponed Provis}on for Discovery Procedures .. 
As the statute currently makes no provision for 
d iscoveJ-:-y procedures, courts hr.we bt~en in cons is tent 
in permitting necessary discovery. 
As indicated in the attached declar:Jtion of the 
County Auditor Hho audited the A.C.L.U. 1s time 
recorCJs submitted in support of a motion for attorneys 1 
fees, discovery is an essential and ~nportant means 
of meeting and verifying the truthfulness c;nd accuracy 
of 'tvhat tin1e records are submitted. 
The atto't·ncy:::> 1 fees in ronny cases are quite 
lnr~e) often \·Jell in excess of $100,000. In n damage 
action for a judgmc:nt in that cH'1ount, discovGry \·lould 
be availahle as a mntte~ of course and right. Cf. Code 
of Civil I'roccdure Sect 2 OlG -2 037. Th2re is 
little, if any, reason why the sEme pro 1 safe-
gu::n.·ds should not: be av.::iih>ble in e:n <:~ppl ation for 
attorneys 1 fees a s r amc;un t. Concerns about 
oppressive discovery, or brc~ches of confid~ntiality 
can be a·1equa tC" ly dealt Hi th in the normal \-:ay through 
protc.:_ctivc orders and objections. 
E. Tbe ProEo3ed Provision for _FindjJ1gs. 
.. 
· · The current s ta t:ute rr:a kes no provision for findings 
of fact or ccmclun:Lons of l<::\·7 regc:rding an mm1~d of 
attorneys' fees. Find :ings Drc, hrn:cvcr, an important safeguard 
to cnoure that there is Dn adequAte facttml basis upon which 
an mv<;rd is rna • The '>·Jide range of d cretio11 a llo~:<~cd a 
court in determining the size of .::m attorneys 1 fee m·wrd rnakes 
it important thnt the court e>:pl:i.catc clearly the effect of 
each factor us~d in de ing the ar.1ount ·of the auard. 
As o11': Court has pointed out: 
" ••• a court in sett:fng nttorneys 1· fees in 
public intere.st litigotion n1'J3t do more than 
1 prcservP decoru:n, turn the 1 nnd \vh~n it 
stops redeem the winners chi.ps at posted 
rates.'" C_£yeJnnd v. Hnrsh.:t1l (D.C. Ch· 1978) 
59!• F. 2d 2tt4. 
..s-
-?o-
... 
.. 
/ 
F. E~:__is_!:il~L}ie·p1~c~oh!.(~1 _ __fgr Determining the 
S"1:::e 01.: t[i(! 7lttorncy Fee 1\.\HJriJ. · 
---------- - J - \ 
The existing stntute does not prescribe any 
Sp?cifi.c methodology for de:terr.1ining the amount 
of an attorney f~c award. As a result courts have . . 
developed their mm m~thodology '1•1hich normally results 
in very large Dwards. 
The m0st accepted sppronch to calculnting an 
Attorney fcc <n·!ard, beth by california Courts and courts 
of other jtn: i~;d ictionn io the 11 lodcs tar" or "touch-
stone" approach. Under this approach a court 
· llSccrta ins the numher of hours \·lorked on the case 
and Dscert::::d.ns a so-called ''market rate" for the 
services, usually looking to the highest rate charged 
in othc~r ec:-::plex or anti-trust litigation. These 
t\W figurc~s, the number of hours and the so-called 
"'marl;._et rate'' per hom~, arc multiplied to arrive 
at the ''lodc~st:<1!." 11 or "toueh3tone". This "lodestar" 
c:mount i::.>. then multiplied by n \·Je:i.ghted f.;;ctor of 
woi:,2. or less than one (us1:.a lly more than one), 
c1E:T',!nd ing upon tll€ prc:->ence o1· <1 bsence of add itiona 1 
notc~·10rthy fuctors such as the c;:ce llcncc of the vJOrli:, 
the difficulty of the c~r;.e, etc., to arrive nt the 
nn1:::1t:nt of the ultir,~.::: tf\ f•lv~rd. 
Linuy J)rotlK:rs, Inc., of l'hiladelph:i.D v·. f.m'.?:r:Lcan 
Rn c1 i.:.:-;_:o:;:;-;:;i·Rr }~T!i-r·a;i7~,- c mJ) : {:, l:cr-crr:r--r~i73J---z}.ff';-F·-. -2cr 
·16T;--rs--cw·-rc~r~d).Il-i~-JdecGron using this approach 
(on l:'cmnl!d, the trit:~l conrt tn Lindy Bro~:bers used a 
\·Jcigbt·~d f:c.~ctor cf 2 to accoUJlt-rDr co11Cingency and 
. quality f;: ct:ors (382 F. Supp 999, 1024), there by 
<lh'Grd ing $L l mill im1 in fees, or $2 99 per hour 
for nll huv~s claimed). Cf. Serrano v. Priest 
(1977) 20 Cfll 3d 25, 1+8 n-.-3 -("'l.ocicstar•r--oT:-
$225, 625 c.:'!lcula ted ll t a varying rate of $150 to 
$35 per bou:c, incrc.:H:cd to $400,000 by using a \veighted 
factor of neorly 2). 
This approQch generAlly results in very large 
a ttorncy~' fee. a\·:a rcls far in .e>~cess of the costs 
of: providing tbr?.se set"Vices, includL'lg reasonable 
profit, and far in excess of fees that the attorneys 
mir;ht expect to cnrn i11 other litigation. 
Thl~ec cDses jnvoJving the County of Los Angeles 
Dre worthy of: furtbc::r dir.cussion. 
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' fees 
on 
madcet rates for nttorTJcys ond that the actual costs 
of the service provided, including overhead and 
prc,fit lWS much lou.:.~r than the amount cl\:arded, the 
Cot1rt a\~·arclcd nttorncys' fees in excess of $100,000. 
The matter is on a ppcal. 
. (iii) J3J:·o•vn v. Pitchess, J...A.S.C. No. 3 24464. 
This case ·rs--anoTilei-~fciTf"class acti.on case. In 
this case, even though the County convinced the Court 
to reduce the B\·Jard substantially because of the inade-
quacy of the supporting time records and that the 
County \>;ras the prev<:< ili.ng party on tr.3ny of the issues, 
and thot the cost of the attorneys'· services, including 
overhead end profit;. was less than $20,000, the County 
H<1S only able to have the B\·JBrd reduced ·to $90,000 
from the $200,000 prayed for. · 
Although the Co1.mty has achieved some apparent 
·measure of success :i.n baviug the auards rcduc<:-.d, 
the 8\·:ards rn.-;de, a lthm1gh cons is tent '·lith the 
pJ::b1c:i.ples of a v~c-::1 J.th of: case·~, wou1 d still a ppc:-~r 
t.u.,ret~~onablc, um.;-nr1:c:mted, anc;i excessive. In e<::c.h 
cef;e, the laek of spe::clfied proceduru3 and critcric 
for dcterm:in:i.ng an Bppropric:;tc f.:\\Tard lK;S been the 
m.njor c.::Jnr::C'. In each case, the .::lppnrent deep-pocket 
of the· Cct.m!~y bns been an Dttr.:~ctive incentive. 
for the a tt(n:n(:ys and the courts to inflate the 
a1·:<1rdr> th~co·Jgh cxAggr..;.,~Gtcd clr:ims of hours spent, 
· tlxe usc of tmn..::Jlictic and r;rti.fic:Lal rr.~irtk:ct-r.:tes, 
and the un:inhibited use of 1!1UJ.U.plers in the 
··lode.~ star approach. . 
The propo~;ed .::nn~ndmcmt to Code of Civil Procedure 
Section 1021.5 abandons the tr~ditional approach to 
de termin :i.113 the amount of th~ fee c:!\·7D:nl iil fEivor 
. ·of a pt·incip~ll of reirnburscmc.!nt to a .firm for its 
costs, plus a rcnso:.1al>J.e and c-.ontrollnble m~rgin 
for profit. The. nc1·1 .3ppronch should yield a far 
more cquit;:~bJ.e and supportable result. Inflated 
hourly fees would be avoided as a basis fcir awards 
of n ttorneys' fees, nnd, :i.t~s tcad, compllttt tic·n -v;ould 
begin \oJitb consideration of f>unJ.S required for re-
imh::..lrscmc:nt of a tto:n·lCys for their i11ves tm~mt of time 
nud facilities, plu~ a reas6nable profit as nn 
incentive to them cmd others to bring s iinilar litigation 
in the public interest. 
-8-
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The trndlt 1 m~thod of: ctllculatinz an hourly 
r.n tc by look g at e preva lU.ng nJ.Drb:t rn te charted 
in comn~rcinl <md ant.:L-u:ust ·litigation creates 
purely artificial measures of a reasonable fee. The 
high fees often chart;od to pnrties ln the \.:orld of 
private business a1·c surely higher thDn tl10sc 
requ:b:ed to provide an inN:n tive to rr:::.:'cJLers of 
the private bar to pursue pnblic crest: litig..1tion 
with vigor. There is no ration3l sis for paying 
attol~eys, on an unadjusted bos • highest fcc 
rates charge~ by iling attorncy3 to other 
cli.ents for sen: xr.nttc•rs unrclntcd to public 
interest lit · 
Attm:ncys involved in puhl:tc interc.st litigc;tion 
should be fully compensated for invcstn:ent of 
time and services, and a reason2b profit as an 
incentive, but t all. Such publie service should 
not be a money grubbin[; profccs ion, and \·7indfe~lls 
should not b2 given. 
Such an a pp1:o.s 
the public sector of 
re~~nerntion app 
which are out of 1 
sc::rv:tce \d_ j 
in public inte:rl:St 
risk turn g c 
H. 
would avoid.the imposition on 
)1 ~ c-'hr·c-<- c-t~ . __ ,,. of 1(•'·"1 
. .J.... 0 t;.·:,~~.. "" .-.n ;_u.., ·t:.•···. 
:t.vc tc sector - s tui!dt::rds 
c of: public · 
such [c'::S • 
. n· t D :L~" cY c· t: ion 
In ~-:.1any public il!tcrcst ca~;cs, there are a 
·wealth of issues. part rly tr~e in 
jail condit r 2ct:Lons 
\<Jbere a v;ide. ran nlntcntol action is ch~llc.nged. 
·In nDny cncc:s, tiffs pn::.vn on some, but not 
all of the ted; :Ln sor:1e ccses, the 
· plaint:Lff on only n of a J.nq~c number 
of issues. Yet, when a party obta s at least 
som~ <Jffirnt3t rel f, he cons cr.:~d the p!.:evailing 
party for the scs cf an award attorneys' fees~ 
In such case;, courts s c the: am(nmt of the 
llHard on all ef ·cxp2nded :In cnsc, i.nchu~i11g 
effort expend sues on did not prevail. 
Such an D 
The proposed sta 
discretion to :'l 
of success. 
the courts 
-7 -
ir not appropriate. 
would give the court 
b::J sed np;1n th~ degree 
tEl kt:n 
L:.S 
• 
costs i.n equit.:Jl•le. Dctions. Cf. Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 1032 (c), g·ivinr, the court 
the discretion to apportion costs L~twecn the parties, 
or even to disallow them in appropriate c0scs, Cf •. 
9>·1en ~:!-r:-£01wn_ (19LJ?-) 19 C.:'d. 2d 11:.7; !::=-sl~t-n "~-J!.frna~ (f971J) _ll) Cal /~r)P 2d 235; Cf-n:-tc>r v. CnotJ.l!t>.r (1~:.0) 
210 c'~1 288; A.n.c. Ep:p; r~...,n-C:i11Dc~--v.A&clc-;-'•nout· 
(1963) 233 ea if.pp-7cf-IZ·; 
. 
Nany fcdcrnl courts have follo'd-~d a slmil<'~r 
appronch. C[._. £>teele _Q~::·~.tru~_t::i-.:E~ __ C_o •.. v. _ _J.:'ou:i.si~_:.:O: 
Hic·Jn·Y2.V COP'8l.SGion {£:1). lf-J. rt.dl})). Gu:t:r:-sui)P• loJ, I9T-3~~li(;):e the co,1rt taxed 90% of the costs againr.t 
a prev<J iling p2rty '\vho proved only one of tv~cnty-six 
itet.'lS for 't·ihicb proof uc::s attempted. See also, 
S\·;ceny v. Boord of Trnstcer. of Kcr-m::! State College 
Tf8tcT:.~-r9·/7")5'6·n-;·-zcr1u·0-, ;_;:"lc::~i:ea-on 6B~e1~ grounds, 
58 L. J:d. 2d 21G> 'ivhc~rc a successful plaintiff in a 
Civil l~:i.gbts Action 't·ms <.,·mrclcd co!:;\.:S and wttorncys' 
fees ,.;ith a 20% reduction. Co~:1pnre, tlnitcd St<:Jtcs 
~- Ke J.).: '( (D • C, A ln r; lr..a lSi C) 1 ) 192 F. Su.pi_.1. 1''/4;-IT~f-; 
where tha court conclud~d that both parties prevailed 
in p.<:J~t, <md ordu.rod tl.:.:1 t: neith8r uouJ.d receive 
a ttorn(~ys' fcc:->. 
In r.:ult:i-:l~~suc act5.o:1.s J each i.::su2 could be: the 
subject a separate: suit, and) if lo::t, Hould not 
· warr;cn: t <'.! fc:e au;::rd. • A p<lrt:y shonld not be:-!. permittEd 
to stndt i!lsuca :in one Dction to enhance the fee 
. awa 1.·d. 
One of tho purposes bohL'1d a stntute permitting 
B'i\·nrt~s of n~:torne.ys' fees in public intm:cst tmd 
. civil r:i t;hts l:i.tig.:1tion is to encourage pul.JJ.ic entitieB 
and off:l.c:Lals to cumply ·oith the lD'tv, Cf. Senate Itcpc;rt 
No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Session (19/t)), u.s. Code 
CcJiig, & Ad:nin. N8\vS, p. 5913 rct;;rd:i.ng the C5.vil 
Rights /d.:lorneys' fees .11-v:nrd Act of 1976. · 'fhe thrcnt 
of an 3Hard of n tton1cya 1 fc-eu is, no doubt~ an 
effective motivation in tL":my cases, 
· Hov~c'v~r, in tnany c::HH?~;, the lfro;,_, concerning the 
public officinl is unclear, even though he is 
highly r.totiva ted to colliply Hith it. In li.tit.ntion 
c.ouccrn:i,;1g hi~ duties, he tc-:!y even bo motivoted to 
do ns the liti~_;ot:i.ng pnrt:ics dir<:ct, but feel 
pl·ct:ludcd frov1 doJ.ng [iO by the ilpparcnt stt:tc of tbe 
l41H. ln such circttmstr~nccr., the r1v<.dlnbili.ty of nn 
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BHard of attorn2ys' fees tn-1Y work nt cross purposes 
to the intended purpose of the li.ti.g.:ttion. In such 
a cnsc, th2. public official knm:s that evc:n i.f his 
Dctioi1S nrc in r,ood faith, nnd ev:::::n if he ..:Jttempts 
to 't·:orl: out often intr~ct<: ble soluticms with tbe cou:rt • 
he rnay st:i.ll be ch't;::-gcd \·lith a subst~:ntial CJH.nrd of 
nttorn2ys' fees. The on1.y hope he lws of ck:fcatinr; 
such en f\Hard is to litir;:Jte the issues to tlteir 
fullest extent, .:rvoid:i.ur; co:qn~oud.!·:i:, i11 the hopes 
that ht! 'tvi.ll be~ the l'\rc\'<1 lU.n[; p.:-n~ty. On th.; otbc~· 
hnnd, if he:: knc=~., the cou,.:t \·Joul<.l c:o;1~, ider b good 
faith \~ith rcgonl td_ l'ln m·;<n·c1 of D ttorneys 1 fees, 
he \·Jould be moti\'2 tc~d to l.'orl:: eor.pcrn tively to~-;ards 
compronise or othsr solutions. 
'Dw c/=<nnples involving the County of I..os Angeles 
illustrate tbis point. Bcfth 'tverc cl<'!SS actions 
conce-rn i.:ng j;:• i.l cund:Ltions c.lur ing a tiue in 1-:hich 
the L"n·? \'!<Ls rDp ly changing. In both cDscs the 
Court q.:ec:Lf lly found tl1<d..: tl12 ~~ilcriff could not 
hnve fors c:::n the ch-.::nr,rcs in the l."1u, thn t the sheriff 
hEld vol1::1tBTily m~,c}c c1!~nges :Ln L p:cacticcs ns the 
chrmr;c::-: :;_n the lr>H bz::c;;::r;:~:: .''lpp:_'rC!l~:, <:-nd cor::f'.C:r,dcd the 
s b;:.ri:f:T fo:::: h ic i~c.od :f<i :Lth ~; ttc::'tpt[; to 't·:ork. out 
renson::hl c sohtt:l.odr: to th~.: cl ficult su:~G Loforc 
·tl·lr, ('O,tl"''· N~>·rr,... "'" ·in bo'-}1 "''"''"''' attc:t:'')r>'>S I ~- .. _J~t...• .._ \ t..l~ \.,._.,;:.) ·-4 L. '-·~'~..-~~.,- ... ~ J ~ ... ~·.Y"'" 
fc;es <:q,in.·o::1ch g $ )OOU v7e:re a>;;a ar;::; st the 
~l1c~r·iff c 
Tht?. ob·v:totlG tnr:~s2 to tl1o cllc.J_·j~f:f i11 eacl1 cnse, 
· \Jas th9t little \·?.28 to be ~~::lined Ly his good faith 
and co::)p8rative s t:.:mcc tm~.J::cds the sues fore the 
court. 
At: leeist sc:ne courts h:::vco recor',n th3 bc:nefits 
of deny i'ug nn B\·;:;-;_·d o£ n ttorncys 1 f(:::~s bssed upon a 
sho':·7ing o[ good fa th. Abo v. Cl<: ,:k (9th Cir. 197 8) 
608 F. 2d 365 • f1oj~eo\;e:;?;-ti1is is cons:i.stcnt . 
·\'lith the good ith defcn£;e 'l:vh:Lch feats a d:.1p1age 
act:ion :J:n Civ11 r:.iehts Actions. In Civil IU.r;hts 
Actions s a pubJ.:ic officinl m:1y defc;st a c!r:r.nr;e nwr.;rd 
c11t:i.reJ.y even :if he is fotJdd to b:"vc violat,.:d the civil 
r:i.ghts of the lit:i.gont, if he hns found to h:..~ve acted 
:in the good fa reP. ~:rm~~ hlc bo l icf tbJ t his 
actions \Jere l0 l. 0 1 Cc:,mnr v. llonoldson (1975) /f22 
u.s .• 563; Ho StrTcTJ::.=:i!(l--(Tirr!.>)--fi'LO-ir-.-s. 308; 
]~·ocun .. --- 8) /:)/1. U.S. 555, 560-61. 
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This f.::ctor i.s me:rely a ·recor;nition that the 
public has al:;:<..:.:'!Jy tc1lc·:.m steps t:a fund and encourage 
th~ particnl;n~ orf,<l in::-::1tion to bring litit,t::tion of 
th2 type. the fee 8't-:'DJ;d is sought i.n. In such c<1ses, 
.the pu:::pc::>e:s of tb.:; act h:>vc nlrcady been accomplished. 
I 
The inclusion of this factor in the propo~ed 
amcndr.:211t ta Sectio~ 1 02l. 5 ref lee ts the s iiail3r 
holc1:b;g of our Euprem.~ Court in Sf.::rrono :v. Priest 
(1977) 2 0 Cal 3d 25, l7here th~ court sa1.C1 at n-:---24: 
''l\lhilc .... the fact of public or founc1cticmal 
suppo~t sh0uld.n~t.~~ve any relevance to the 
qut!S tJ.on o£ ell.gl.bJ..Ll.ty for an cn,:<!rd, "t-JC 
believe th<lt it may properly be consi.d2red in 
dctei:minin[; th2 si~~c of the e\·~nrd." [emphasis 
... ] --auoco. . 
-12-
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'l'hr:~ re:1son h::hhld this provu;l.on is !>:ur;ple Rnd 
consistent witb put·p,1::;e: of a! tcn·nt!y::> 1 .:Cees <cHv.J:r.d 
s t.:J tutcs. A fl.·C' ~~:an! i~:. p(>nnittcd to th2 pj:~v~ iling 
p2rty in public intu:c.st lit tion :in rccopnt1.ou of: 
the be>.ncfit: co~: ::reel ur-;o'n the public. Hm;;::ver, litir,a tion 
concc.rnin~. the rigLt to <: c: av.':"J n1 o!: tl12 0r:·:Junt th~reof 
cl ccrucs only tel th:! pr iv::1te bc:n(;f it of t: J{.! n ttorncys 
for vlhich tbc:t·c i~; no sir:.il<Jl~ justif:i.cat:i.on. 
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ANALYSIS: AB 3172 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure currently 
provides: 
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees 
to a successful party against one or more opposing 
parties in any action \olhich has resulted in the en-
forcement of an important right affecting the pub-
] ic intl·rest if: (a) a significant benefit, wheth-
er pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has heen conferred 
on the general pub 1 i.e or a large r] ass of persons, 
(b) the necessity and financial burden of private 
enforcement are such as to make the award appropri-
ate; and (c) such fees should not in the interest 
of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. 
Uith respect to actions involving public entities, 
this section <:lpplies to allowances against, but 
not in favor of, public entities, and no claim 
shall be required to be filed therefor. 
This provision is paralleled by federal legislation passed at about 
the same time, permitting the allowance of attorneys' fees to par-
ties who prevail in actions under a variety of federal civil rights 
ll 
statutes. The obvious purpose of both of these provisions is to 
benefit the public by i.ncreasing law enforcement. Such provisions 
enable priv<>L(' r·it.izens to correct violations of the law, by fore-
inb the violator to pay the costs of litigation which establishes 
2/ 
the violation. 
ll The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, amending 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 [hereinafter "the 1976 Act"]. 
:?:_/ "The violation of an important public policy 
may involve little by way of actual damages, so 
far as a single individual is concerned, or little 
[Footnote Continued] 
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AB 3172 is an amendment which, if accepted, would stand the 
California attorney's fpe provision on its head, ;mel d_o_~c_I_ the pri-
vate enforce1;1ent of public rLghts which S<·cliuu 102!.') w;.>s initial-
ly passed to promote. It is unprecedented and unnecessary legisla-
tion that runs counter to principles which have evolved over more 
than a century of careful federal judicial and legislative scrutiny. 
This paper will discuss hmv federal law and the commonsense 
notions on which it is based are in accord with Section 1021.5 and 
the manner in which it is currently being applied, and in conflict 
with most of the provisions of AB 3172. It is important to remem-
ber that the federal legislation which will be discussed the 1976 
Act -- was passed at the same time, under similar circumstances, 
and for the same purposes as the California provision involved here. 
3/ 
The County of Los Angeles, which urges its adoption, concedes as 
[Footnote Continued] 
in comparison with the cost of vindication . • .• 
If a defendant may feel that the c.ost of litigation, 
and, particular , that the financial circumstances 
of an injured party may mean that the chances of 
suit being brought or continued :in the f [\CC of op-
position, will be· small, there w1 11 be little hrake 
upon delibc>rate wrongdoing. In such instances pub-
lic rolicv may suggvHt an award of costs that wi11 
remove the burden from the shoulders of the plain-
tiff to vindicate the public right." 
Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972). 
1/ The amendment was proposed by the County of Los Angeles, and 
authored by Assembl)rman Patrick J'. Nolan. 
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much. The legJsl<et ive history and judicial interpretation of the 
1976 Act are therefore right on point. 
Contrary to the assertions of the County of Los Angeles, 
the leeislative history of the 1976 Act deals extensively with meth-
ods of co~puting attorneys' fees and standards for determining when 
&_I 
an award is appropriate. Congress, relying on tre evolution of 
proper standards through the courts and through prior fee legisla-
tion, could not have made computation and eligibility standards un-
Jj 
der the 1976 Act nore clear. 
The County of Los 1\ngeles tells us that All 3172 
"has been drafted to establish appropriate criter-
ia and procedures for the making of [fee] awards, 
consistent with the goal of encouraging competent 
lawyers to bring necessary public interest liti-
gation, and, at the same time preclude unwarranted 
41 Background Information and Analysis, A.B. 3172, prepared by 
Frederick R. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, County of Los 
Angeles [hereinafter "Background and Analysis"], at 1-2. 
_2_/ Id., at 2. 
61 The legislative history of the 1976 Act is more complete than 
that of any fee authorizing act ever passed. The Act was ac-
companied by a seven-page Senate Report, a 24-page House Report, 
and legislative debates which. took the better part of seven days 
in the Senate, and extensive debate in the House. 
II Similarly, the State of California was precise in spelling out 
the standards for eligibility, within the language of the stat-
ute itself. While the California statute does not prescribe a 
method for computing fees, the County of Los Angeles informs us, 
Background and Analysis, at 6, that the California courts have been 
guided by the traditional "lodestar" ?pproach approved by Congress 
under the 1976 Act. Thus the criteria which have evolved on the 
federal level are, quite appropriately, being applied by the state 
courts in California. 
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windfalls to attorneys and provide the judiciary 
with specific criteria to guide it in making reas-
onable awards of attorneys' fees in proper cases." §j 
It is not the lack of specific criteria which prompts this legisla-
tion, however, but r~ther the County of Los Angeles' disagree-
ment with the criteria which already exist. AB 3172 rejects these 
time-tested and appropriate standards and adopts contrary standards 
-- standards most of which have been considered and largely or com-
pletely rejected under federal attorneys' fee provisions. 
II. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR PROVISIONS 
A. Adoption of a "Cost-Plus" Hethod of Fee Computation 
When Congress passed the 1976 Act, it specified: 
"It is intended that the amount of fees award-
ed under S. 2278 be soverned by the same standards 
which prevail in other types of Pqua11y complex 
Federal lit ion, such as antitrust cases and 
not be reduced because the rlghts lnvoJ vecl may be 
nonpecuntary in nature. The nppropriatt• Htalldards, 
see Johnson v. Geoq~ia Highway Express, L,88 F.2d 
714 (5th Cir. 1974), are correctly applied in such 
cases as Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 
(N.D. Cal. 1974); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 
8 E.P.D. ~~ 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974); and Swann v. 
Charlotte-Hecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 
483 (W.D.N.C. 1975). These cases have resulted in 
fees which are adequate to attract competent coun-
sel but which do not produce windfalls to attorn-
eys." 9 
~/ Background and Analysis, at 3. 
9/ S. Rep. :in. 911-lOll, CJ/1th Cong., 2d Sc,ss. (197())I!JC'n'inaftcr 
s~nat~ R•.>portl, at G. 1\c.cord ll.R. R~:·p. No. CJL•-1558, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1976)[hereinafter !louse Rep.ort], at 9. All three of the 
cases listed by Congress as having correctly applied the relevant 
factors used the "lodestar" approach, add a "bonus" or increas-
ing a rate-times-hours touchstone. 
-84-
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This is a clear statement of the standards which an obviously in-
formed Congress intended courts to follow to further the aims of 
public interest fee legislation. A court need only turn .to the 
cases cited to obtain a very specific blueprint for computing fees. 
A court is instructed to multiply a reasonable number of hours 
10/ 11/ 
spent on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, and arrive 
at a "lodestar." The lodestar is then either accepted, or, in the 
12/ 
presence of well--known "f:wtors,"- adjustt'd, e·ither np or down, 
10/ TltC' cPurt. is itl~;tt:uclcd not merely to accept the hours claim-
ed, but to ascertain how many hours were reasonable in a par-
ticular case, and to award fees for that number of hours. See, e. 
~··King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert:-denied, 
438 u.s. 916 (1978). 
11/ Once again, a court need not accept an attorr.ey's normal hour-
ly rate as "reasonable," but is instructed to ascertain what 
is reasonable by weighing requested rate's in light of a petition-
er's experience and reputation, normal rates for comparable work 
within the community, and a variety of other guideposts. See, e. 
£·• Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
12/ The "factors" listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway I:xpress, 
supra, and approved by Congress for use under the 1976 Act, 
are: 
"(1) The time and labor required .•. (2) The nov-
elty and difficulty of the questions ••• (3) The 
skill requisite to perform the legal service prop-
erly ••. (4) The preclusion of other employment 
by the attorney due to acceptance of the case • . • 
(5) The customary fee ••• (6) Whether the fee is 
fixed or contingent • • • (7) Time limitations im-
posed by the client or the circumstances ..• (8) 
The amount involved and the results obtained ••• 
(9) The expPri CTWI', reputation ;md ability of the 
attorneys •.. (1) The 'undesirability' of the 
case •.• (11) The nature and. length of the profes-
sional relationship with the client ~ •• [and] ••• 
(12) Awards in similar cases." 488 F.2d at 717-19. 
-85-
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to reflect the true value of an attorney's services. All eleven 
circuits have espoused the traditional lodestar approach, with the 
]dl 
use of Johnson-type factors, for use in civil rights cases. 
AB 3172 would abandon the traditional approach found approp-
riate under the 1976 Act, and adopt a "cost-plus" method of computa-
ti.on, basing a fee upon "the reasonable cost of providing the leg-
al services, including, where appropriate, a reasonable and control-
14/ 
lable margin for profit,"- rather than upon the value of the serv-
ices. While the cost-plus method of bi has been found suitable 
for contractors, often accruing to their benefit, it has yet to be 
adopted by any commercial lawfirm, and has been rejected for use 
in cases under the 1976 Act by every federal court to which defend-
15/ 
ants have proposed it, save one. The reason for the federal 
13/ See,~~- King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Prate v. Freedman, 17 E.P.D. 
" 8535 (2d Cir. 197 ; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 
573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978), ~ 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977); 
Walston v. School Bd. of City of Suffolk, 566 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 
1977); Knighton v. 1-Jatkins, 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980); North-
cross v. :Sd. of Ed. of the City of Hemphis, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980); Konczak v. Tyrrell, 
603 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1979); Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275 
(8th Cir. 197 ; FounULJ v. Carter, 571 F.2d !187 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Frz.ncia v. Hldtc, 591, .2ll 7/8 (lOth Cir. l!J7<J); Evans v. Sheraton 
Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
lil AB 3172, lines 22-24. 
121 Only Federal District Judge Hanson, from the Southern District 
of Iowa, has computed fees under the 1976 Act in this manner. 
,\lsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 6,!+7 F. Supp. 572 
(S.D. Iowa 1977); Page v. Preisser, 468 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Iowa 1979). 
[Footnote Continued] 
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rejection of cost-plus computation is obvious: if counsel are not 
compensated for the true value of their public interest services, 
those services cannot "compete" with other services, and undertak-
ing public interest cases must become a sacrifice. 
"Focussing on the fair market V<Jlue of the attor-
ney's services will best fulfill the purposes of the 
Fees Awards Act, by providing adequate compensation 
to attract qualifjed and competent attorneys without 
<1ffording any windfall to those who undertake such 
representation. The entire purpose of the statutes 
was to ensure that the representation of important 
national concerns would not depend upon the charit-
able instincts of a few generous attorneys." 16/ 
Hence Congress specified that 1976 Act fees be computed using "the 
same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Fed-
17/ 
1 1 l 't II- h II '1 era itigation, suc1 as ant1 rust cases •.• , and t at civ1 
rights plaintiffs should not be singled out for different and less 
18/ 
favorable treatment" than antitrust plaintiffs.- Application of 
[Footnote Continued] 
The cost-plus method of fee canputation has just been resounding-
ly rejected in an exhaustive opinion by the D.C. Circuit sitting en 
bane in the Title VII case of Copeland v. Marshall, F.2d 
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 1980). That opinion deals with every one of the 
arguments proffered for this portion of AB 3172, and more, and graph-
ically shows the fallacies in the cost-plus approach. 
1!!_/ Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 
624, 638 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980). 
1]_/ Senate Report, at 6. 
18/ House Report, at 9. 
"Tht' r<1t ionale of awarding reasonnhlc <~ttorll<:ys fees, 
after all, springs from the need for placing the 
[Footnote Continued) 
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the less remunerative cos lus method of computation to public in-
terest cases would thwart the purposes of attorneys 1 fee legislation 
19/ 
by making such cases "second class" litigation. 
AB 3172 leads to many practical prohlcms in addition to 
the above one. Most obviously, counsel working in pub-
lie interest cases could not to be compensated for the reas-
onable value of hours on the plaintiff's side, they would, 
20 
if hired by the County of Los Angeles to defend such a case, bill 
at the regular commercial rate for such work. Application of the 
"cost-plus" neth0d to 1 interest lit ig~1t ion t1m creates :1 ells-
incentive for prosecut no disincentive for defending against, 
21 
public interest claims. 
(Footnote Continued] 
legal defense of tain constitutional principles 
and some congres ional policies on an foot-
ing with the of interests." 
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 
550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 
(1978). 
12_/ i\t least 
in passing 
torneys be "more li 
way Express, Inc. 
J., dissent ) . 
Court Justice bus concludvd that Congress, 
slat ion, lntended that puh1 i c interest nt-
to be well tl1an other lawyers." Road-
per, 48 U.S.L.W. l;S36, 4841 (1980)(Stevens, 
20/ Los les bodies frequently 
hire outside counsel ion, and have no hesi-
tation in paying them Appendix A. See also HcPher-
son v. School Dist. No. 186, , Ill., 465 F. Supp. 749 (S. 
D. Ill. 1978), where use of the lodestar approach, including a con-
tingency increment, resulted in rates to laintiffs' counsel 
below those by the defendants. 
21/ It is also true that, public interest litigation, plaintiffs' 
(Footnote Contlnued] 
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A further disincentive for private attorneys is created by 
the intrusion into confidential financial information which will 
be necessary to justify a cost-plus fee. The cost-plus method 
]dl 
would require a time-consuming, intrusive inquiry into the fin-
ancial details of a firm's entire practice. Many firms would be 
unwilling to disclose their financial condition, or to be subject-
ed to an audit in an adversary proceeding. This, combined with an 
unwillingness to accept lower rates of compensation compared with 
fees charged to private clients, especially where the fee is con-
tingent upon success, h; a most serious Jeterrent to private law-
finns wishing to undertake public interest representation. 
The cost-plus method sets up an irrational system whereby 
fees are determined by the type of law practice that happens to be 
carried on by plaintiffs' attorneys, and not by the nature, quality 
[Footnote Continued] 
counsel receive fees only when they win, while defense counsel are 
paid whether they '"in or lose. To compensate for this fact, and 
thereby reduce a potential disincentive to taking public interest 
cases, many courts have increased plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rates 
to <lCcount f(1r contingency. See, ~·..8.·, Aumiiler v. University of 
Delaware, /155 F. Supp. 676 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem., 594 F.2d 854 
(3d Cir. 1979); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 
700 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978); Rheuark 
v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Such an increment would 
be impossible under a cost-plus method, thus doubling the disincen-
tive. 
111 Because no firm bills on a cost-plus basis, it is impossible 
to determine how much additional time would be required under 
the cost-plus method, but it is apt tp be substantial, and a bur-· 
den which falls not only upon the counsel, but the already overtaxed 
courts as well. The onus of thi~ additional time is greatly exacer-
bated under AB 3172 by the fact that the bill precludes compensation 
[Footnote Continued] 
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1:1..1 
or value of the legal work done. ThuH a largt' finn, with high 
overhead, sa.larics, and profit margins, :il it <'uuld :;om<'how bl' per-
suaded to take on a public interest case despite the disincentives 
spelled out above, would receive large fees in relation to others. 
Sole practitioners and smaller firms often have smaller overhead 
and profit margins, so that fees awarded them, regardless of their 
24/ 
expertise and the value of their work, would be smaller. A sole 
practitioner or small-firm practitioner can rarely afford to under-
take public interest litigation, which is often against public bod-
ies with substantial economic resources and personnel, Hhen to do 
so would reduce the amount of time available for cases which are 
less complex, and compensated at a much greater rate and with more 
certainty. Even a Criminal Justice Act appointment is apt to result 
[Footnote Continued] 
for time spent seeking and computing fee1->. _:'>l'_{C I'· 2P., ;!._~L!_":· 
23/ The irrationality of permitting this type of distinction to af-
fect fee computation is perhaps best illustrat<'d .in thP case 
where a defendant ·urged a reduction in private counsel's rates be-
cause the case could have been handled for less by a salaried, £.!:.£ 
bono attorney. Levin v. Parkhouse, 484 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
1:.!!.1 Only one federal cou rl has been pn'sented an argument that a 
substantial fee to a sole practitioner in a case under the 
1976 Act should be reduced because plaintiff 1 s counsel's low over-
head would not justify such a large fee. The court disagreed, stat-
ing: "The central focus of a reasonable hourly rate is the attor-
ney's legal reputation and status as well as the quality of his 
work in the case." Foster v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen Free-
holders, 465 F. Supp. 293, 299 (D.N.J. 1978). All other defense at-
tempts to adopt cost-plus computation in cases under the 1976 Act 
have been in lawsuits where plaintiffs were represented by private-
ly or publicly funded legal organizations. 
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in larger hourly rates to a sole practitioner than a cost-plus fee 
in a public interest case, and the CJA fee is guaranteed, win, lose 
or draw. 
Adoption of the cost-plus method of computation would have 
]21 
the most deleterious effect on public interest legal groups. Many 
defendants have argued that fee awards to salaried employees of pub-
lie interest groups, either privately or publicly funded, should 
be based upon the salaries paid those lawyers. All courts but one 
2:1_1 
have rejected that argument under the 1976 Act, for a variety of 
28/ 
reasons. 
]2/ AD 3172 calls for fees based upon cost, plus, "where approp-
26/ 
riate," a reasonable profit. Because most public interest 
litigating organizations are nonprofit, it is unlikely that a court 
would consider a profit "appropriate." The cost-plus fee to a sal-
aried employee of a public interest group would therefore be based 
upon salary alan<:' -- and a salary which is often significantly be-
low that paid private attorneys. See note 30, and accompanying 
text, infra; Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 447 
F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Iowa 1977)(cost-plus fees of less than $6.00 
per hour to salaried ACLU staffer). 
26/ See note 15, supra. 
2:1_/ See,~·..&·, Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Fla. 
1978); Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111 {N.D. Ill. 1979); 
Hid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 261 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732 (D.R.I. 
1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980); Becker v. Blum, 487 
F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Custom v. Quern, 482 F. Supp. 1000 
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Urbina v. Quern, 482 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ill. 
1930); Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc., 4!36 F. Supp. 1195 
(N.D. Ga. 1980). 
28/ Some of these reasons are spelled out at pp. 46-52, infra. 
Host of ther.J. turn on the fact that a fee award to a public in-
terest group promotes the public interest just as an award to a 
private counsel does. 
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"By comparing, for purposes of discussing the amount 
of fees, civil rights cases to other 'complex fed-
eral liUgation, such as antitrust cases, 1 Cong-
ress .implicitly placed a value on the services per-
formed by attorneys in civil rights cases .1nd in-
structed us to credit that value.2/ Moreover, Cong-
ress enacted § 1988 to reduce civil rights plaintiffs' 
litigation costs, and litigation costs would be meas-
ured in terms of the value of the services to the 
plaintiff and the cost of those services in the mar-
ketplace. 
"There is no basis for concluding that the val-
ue of services provided by [the Legal Services Cor-
poration] is less than that of services that private 
attorneys provide. . . • Because the value to the 
client and to societal interests is substantial, we 
cannot hold that (Legal Services] attorneys' time is 
less va luahlc· than the time of at turneys in private 
practice. Thus to recognize ~his equivalent value, 
we should award plaintiffs' counsel the market rate." 
5/ It is significant that the quoted statement 
from the Senate Report is the only reference in 
the legislative history to the amount of fees." 31/ 
The County of Los Angeles argues that public interest fee 
awards computed according to the traditional approach have been too 
large -- "far in excess of fees that the attorneys might expect to 
32/ 
earn in other litigation,"- and "unreasonable, unwarranted and 
2:!:_/ Custom v. t~uern, 482 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
]1/ Backgr_~!EA and Analysis, at 6. This is hardly true. 1Jhile the 
legislative l1Jstory of the 1976 Act specifies that public inter-
est fees and antitrust fees should be comparable, Senate Report at 6, 
average rates in antitrust cases are four and a half times larger 
than average rates in public interest cases. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 
466 F. Supp. 732, 738 (D.R.I. 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 
1980). Only seven of the more-than 80 reported cases under the 
1976 Act for which. hou!"ly rates e.ra P.scertainable during the Act's 
first tLree ye.nrs resultt>d in fPel'l ~)f $100 or more per hour. Dy 
[Footnote Continued] 
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ifornia and the United States, by passing public interest fee pro-
visions, have attempted to place human rights and commercial rights 
on the same footing. AB 3172 attempts to devalue human rights, by 
devaluing the efforts of attorneys to promote them. 
The current system relies upon the equitable discretion of 
the judiciary, which, even according to the examples cited by the 
]]_/ 
County of Los Angeles, has been exercised with care. Defendants 
are entHlod to offer proof of lower r:tU•!; than those claimed; to 
challenge as unreasonable or duplicatiV(' any number of hours claim-
cd; and to att:vmpt Lo reduce awardable fees in a variety of other 
ways. A judge is aware of local rates of compensation, and, hav-
ing presided over trial or settlement, is aware of the nature of 
the controversy, the benefits produced, and the quality of the rep-
resentation. He or she is in a much better position to judge the 
value of an attorney's efforts than is either the attorney seeking 
the fcc or the party oppo::;ing the fee. Thl! flexibility vested in 
the judge enables him or her to suit the fee to the particular case 
with a view toward fairness and effectuating the purposes of the 
fee provision; the result is a far more equitable one than would 
occur under an inflexible mathematical formula. 
]2/ In each of the three cases cited by the County as having 're-
sulted in excessive fees, Background and Analysis, at 7-8, the 
amounts granted were far less than those sought: in one of the 
cases, the amount awarded was one-fif.th the amount sought, and in 
the others it was less thnn half of the request. It is unlikely 
that counsel rec~iving these awards were totally satisfied with them 
either. 
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!:.52_/ 
versally rejected this notion for cases under the 1976 Act, and 
have held tl~t where a statute authorizes an attorney's fee to a 
prevailing party, to be paid by an opposing party, time spent on 
the fee issue should be compensated because the statutory fee it-
self is, like an injunction, "an integral part of the remedies nec-
41/ 
essary .to obtain ••• compliance [with the law]."- The allow-
ance of a public interest fee promotes public interest litigation, 
42/ 
and therefore the fee itself benefits the public. 
Hany courts which have awarded fees for time spent pursu-
ing fees in public interest litigation have also noted that a dis-
~/ See, ~·£·• Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978); Gagne 
v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4891 
(1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979); Bills v. Hodges, 
F.2d (4th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795 
(5th Cir. 1980); Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City Schools, 
611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.H. 3803 (1980); 
Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978); 
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 
550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 
(1978); Love v. Hayor, City of Cheyenne, 620 F,2d 235 {lOth Cir. 
1980). While a few early cases disallowed fees for time spent pur-
StJing a 1976 Act fee, in each instance the particulnr circuit court 
has since rejected these holdings by ruling that time spent on fees 
should be compensated. 
41/ Senate Report, at 5. 
42/ !·K·• Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979); Gagne v. 
Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.lv. 4891 
(1980); Jo~1son v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1979); 
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1979); ~1cPherson v. 
School District No. 186, Springfield, Illinois, 465 F. Supp. 749 
(S.D. Ill. 1978); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Fla. 
1978); Mental Patients Civil Libertief Project v. Hospital Staff 
Civil Rights Committee, 444 F. Supp. 981 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Smith v. 
Fussenich, 487 P. Supp. 628 (D. Conn. '1980) (three-judge court). 
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l'<'lvl'r to re>fuse such an :1pportion:ment in the interests of justice, 
a provision perr.litting the apportionment of fees between opposing 
parties reflects a raisunderstandinb of the concept of "successful" 
!:!]_/ 
or "prevailing" party. As one court has explained: 
"The qnt'Ht ion as to whether plaintiffs have pre-
vailed is a preliminary determination, necessary be-
fore the statute comes into play at all. Once .that 
issue is determined in the plaintiffs' favor, they 
are entitled to recover fees for 'all time reasonab-
ly spent on a matter. 1 The fact that some of that 
time was spent in pursuing issues on [sic] research 
which w:~s ultimately unproductive, rejected by the 
court, or mooted by intervening events is wholly ir-
relevant. So long as the party has prevailed on 
the case as a whole the district courts are to al-
low compensation for hours expended on unsuccessful 
research or litigation, unless the positions assert-
ed are frivolous or in bad faith. 11 L•BI 
A party must "prevail" or "succeed" in litigation before he is en-
titled to any fees at all. An apportionment approach would result 
in an award of partial fees to an unsuccessful party, which is a 
result not contemplated by either Section 1021.5 or the 1976 Act. 
46/ See, !:.·£·, Swicker v. i.Jilliam Armstrong & Sons, Inc., 484 F. 
46/ 
Supp. 7o2 (E.D. Pa. 1980), where the court held co-defenchmts 
jointly :md Rl'Vl'r;JUy liable for fees, refusing to apportion them 
because apportionment might result in a reduction of allowable fees. 
!i!_/ Sect ion 1021.5 allows fees to a "successful" party; the 1976 
Act allows fees to a "prevailing" party. The two terms a""e 
synonymous. See note 92, infra. 
48/ Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Nemphis City Schools, 611 F. 
2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 
(1980). Accord, !:.·£·• Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978); 
Greminger v. Seaborne, 581; F.2d 275 (.8th Cir. 1978). 
-99-
.. 
Numero 
t any type of 
In Section IV-C below 
prevailing 
lack of success. 
equal or greater f 
between 
untenable, 
fees as 
apportioned 
permit the 
portion of the case. 
maj f 
vate attorney 
who 
perform as 1 
custom calls for 
public 
for • • * 
!fi/ pp. 
- 20 
tua.l ion~:: n rguc a-
between oppos parties. 
of these when showing why a 
not be reduced to reflect a partial 
set forth there apply with 
suggestion t ees be apportioned 
ionment suggestion is even more 
destroys the bas idea of attorneys' 
lie If a fee can be 
re:1.d to 
ees for at least a 
lifornia Sect 1021.5 and the great 
ee essentially "pri-
fees to 
United States, 
icers The /\mericnn 
-1 
to effectuate strong 
t s. Thus, 
if well founded, are in the 
the cost of prosecuting 
borne not those who 
have violated the [law] 
of this 
1 s fees not 
I 
- 21 -
compliance, but promotes the settlement of contro-
versies at the conference table or in thf' .q<Jninis-
trative office rather thnn the courts. No similar 
points, lt is thought, can be made for imposing on 
an unsuccessful plaintiff the costs of the Jefendant's 
lawyer. The defendant's vindicntion in a larger 
sense serves the interests of justice, but no more 
so than the successful defense of any suit. Ther.e-
fore, the public is not more interested in aiding him 
than any other successful defendant. Horeover, to 
allow him to recover his out-of-pocket expenses 
would deter suits by the plaintiffs who ••• are as-
sumed, often correctly, to be necessitous persons re-
quiring the protective hand of the legislature." 50/ 
In following this reasoning, most federal attorneys' fee provisions 
51/ 
have not permitted defendants to recover attorneys' fees at all.--
Under the modern public interest attorneys' fee provisions, Cong-
ress has penni.ttcd defendants to recover attorneys' fees, but only 
if a plaintiff has brought a suit which is "frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad 
50/ Hutchinson v. Hilliam c. Barry, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 292, 298 (D. 
~lass. 1943)(discussing the Fair Labor Standards Act fee provi-
sion). See also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 43lf U.S. 412, 
418-19 (1978): 
"[T]he plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Cong-
ress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress consider-
ed of the highest priority.' ••• [~]hen a ••• 
court awards counsel .fees to a prevailing plaintiff, 
it is awarding them against a violator of federal 
law. [Thus] 'policy considerations which support 
the award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not 
present in the case of a prevailing defendant.'" (Ci-
tation omitted). 
211 Congress, in 1976, noted that two-thirds of the fifty fee pro-
visions which then existed allo~ed fees to plaintiffs only. 
House Report, at 6. 
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56/ 
only to a private attorney general. 
If the apportionment approach is understood to incorporate 
the prerequisites to an award of fees which Section 1021.5 already 
contains -- that is, if partial fees are allowed defendants only 
where their success on an issue enforces a public right and bene-
fits a large class, and only where fees are appropriate in view of 
the expense and necessity of private enforcement -- then its great-
est harmful impact might be prevented. But such situations will 
be extremely rare, and they do not se~1 to be what the amendment 
is aimed at. 
The County of Los Angeles argues that apportionment between 
opposing parties is historical in types of litigation other than 
public interest cases, and cites several federal cases and Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure Section 1032(c) in support of an ap-
2!_/ 
portionment approach. None of the federal cases cited supports 
58/ 
an apportionment of attorneys' fees, however, and Section 1032(c) 
56/ This is the course that the Department of Justice would have 
preferred Congress to take in the 1976 Act. House Report, at 
6. Congress, however, felt that judicial standards developed in 
the federal courts would significantly lessen any deterrence of po-
tential plaintiffs, by providing fees to defendants on1y in rare 
ciJ·cumsLJnccs. Id. 
2ZI Background and Ana~sis, at 9-10. 
58/ The one case which the County cites as approving apportionment 
of attorneys' fees, Sweeny v. Bd. of Trustees of Keene State 
College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1977),, involved not an apportion-
ment of fees, but the reduction of a fee to reflect partial success. 
See pp. 42-46, infra, for a discussion of this issue. The County 
[Footnote Continued] 
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unlike a costs provision, must be liberally construed to further 
63/ 
its substantive purpose. 
An award of costs, while sometimes denied a prevailing liti-
gant for reasons of equity, is very rarely apportioned. An appor-
64/ 
tionment of fees, on the other hand, is unheard of. The appor-
tionment of fees is illogical, impracticaJ, time-consuming and 
tqtally unprecedented in public interest litigation, or litiga-
tion of any sort. 
III. AUALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS 
All 3172 contains several procedural provisions, most of 
which are both unnecessary and of a minor natu:r:e and importance,: 
except insofar as they are made major by other features of AB 3172. 
A. Provision Requiring 60 Days' Notice 
In federal cases, the courts generally allow plaintiff 
from 15 to 20 days to file a fee petition and accompanying docu-
65/ 
mentation, and defendants from 10 to 15 days to respond. This 
fill !·£·,Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1980). 
64/ There have been a few cases under the 1976 Act where a party 
has prevailed against only one of two or more defendants, and 
the successful defendant or defendants have sought fees. In none 
of these cases has a defendant both been taxed and awarded fees. 
_S_e_e., e..g., Hughes v. Repko. 429 F. Supp. Q28 (W.n. Pa. 1977), aff'~ 
ln part, rev'd it_~£trl & r,~manded, 578 F.::d L18} (3d Cir. 1978). 
65/ See,~·£·, Parks v. Goff, 483 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Ark. 1980); 
Commonwealth of PennsylVania v. Porter, 480 F. Supp. 691 (W. 
D. Pa. 1979). 
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procedur~ often gives the defendant more than 60 days before a de-
cision on the fee application, because the defendant's initial re-
sponse to the fee application need not be the final response. The 
time for filing the response can be, and often is, extended, and 
where there are material facts in dispute, discovery is allowed, 
and an evidentiary hearing may be required. A 60-day requirement 
is not necessary in order to allow an informed opposition to a fee 
petition. 
B. Provision Requiring Adequate Tir1e Records 
The acceptability of this fea.turc depends largely on the 
definition of "adequate," which is not given in the bill. Because 
courts require adequate time records now, this provision is not 
necessary. Furthermore, the provision of i\B 3172 which permits 
apportionment of fees between opposing sides might be read to re-
quire maintenance of extremely detailed time records, yet an at-
torney in a public interest case ought not be required to maintain 
time records in any more dC'tilil than an ;11 tornvy i1. ,• •·ommvrcLil. 
66/ 
case, or any more deta Ll than the salar led government attorney 
67/ 
on the opposite side. 
66 See note 115, infra. 
~/ Because the time spent by defense counsel is pertinent and dis-
coverable by a fee petitioner, see note 63, infra, defense 
counsel, whether private or in-house,,would he required to keep 
time records in the same detail as would the pet.itioner. 
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C. Provision Requiring Findings on All Haterial Issues of 
Fact 
This provision is unobjectionable, except insofar as it 
lengthens fee proceedings for which, pursuant to AB 3172, plain-
tiffs' counsel would not be, and defense counsel would be, paid • 
Discovery is already regularly allowed where there are rna-
terial facts in dispute, so that this provision is unnecessary. 
The discovery current allowed is generally not overly burdensome, 
because discovery is limited to relevant lssues, and is thus per-
mitted on customary hourly rates and time spent, and allowed, but 
68/ 
rarely taken, on the other Johnson factors. Should the cost-plus 
system of computation required by AB 3172 be adopted, however, dis-
covery could become unduly burdensome and oppressive, requiring a 
68/ It should be noted that federal courts have frequently used 
the amount paid defense counsel to help determine the "custo-
mary fee for similar work in the community," 488 F.2d 71Lf, 718 (5th 
Cir. 197L;), one of the Johnson factors. See,~·..&·, HcPherson v. 
School Dist. No. 186, Springfield, Ill., 465 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ill. 
1978). For this reason, the courts have permitted a fee applicant 
to take discovery of defense counsel on such information as the num-
ber of hours spent, the rate charged or deemed appropriate, the tot-
al fee, and, in the case of governmental bodies, what rate they pay 
when they hire outside counsel, and the expenses incurred by the 
body and its staff in supporting the work of such private counsel. 
See, ~·£·• Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 F.R.D. 662 
(l.J.D.N.C. 1978), vacated on other grounds, __ F.2d __ (4th Cir. 
1930). The County of Los Angeles should be aware that ,1 provision 
subjecting fee applications to discovery is a two-way street, which 
might rcquirC:' it ttl produce certain ihfotlil<tli.nn it would r;1Lhvr keep 
confidential. St>e Appendix A. 
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detailed account of a firm's entire operation, and making argu-
ably "relevant" much information. In addition, discov-
ery under a cost-plus system would make fee proceedings extremely 
lengthy and complex. 1\ec::mse AB 3172 provides that prevailing 
parties' counsel could not recover fees for time spent pursuing 
fees, any provision which lengthens or complicates the fee proceed-
ings has an adverse impact upon plaintiffs' attorneys. It does 
not have such an adverse t upon defendants' counsel, however, 
as they are paid for time spent opposing fee petitions, including 
time spent on This fact could lead to abusive discov-
ery, the prevention of which, "through protective orders and ob-
69/ 
jections,"- would not be compensated either. 
IV IS OF PROPOSED 
.i\B 3172 attemp 
applicable in fee 
substitute for the <l~tors tradit:ion-
0 
ion the following: 
"[I]n determining the app of the a-
ward or its size, [the court] shall consider the 
good faith and cooperation of the party t 
whom it is awarded the relief granted, the de-
gree of success of the respective parties, the 
extent to which attorneys' fees can be paid from 
the recovery, if any, the public or private fund-
ing of the person or organization to whom fees 
are awarded, and whether the award will ultimately 
be by pub lie funds." 
~/ Backbround and Analysis, at 5. 
2Q/ See note 12, for a list of the traditional factors. 
211 AB 3172, lines 26-34. 
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Host of these proposed factors have been considered and found in-
applicable under the 1976 Act. Those which have been applied have 
generally been found pertinent only to conputation of fees, and 
not to appropriateness. In combining appropriateness and computa-
tion, AB 3172 misapplies even those factors which might otherwise 
]J:_/ 
be proper. 
A. Proviston Requiring A Court to Consider the Good Faith and 
Cooperation of the Party Against Whom a Fee is Awarded 
(1) Entitlement 
The good faith of the party against whom a fee is to be 
awarded has never been considered relevant in establishing entitle-
Ill 
nent to attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit is alone in permit-
721 The rclcv;mcc of these factors to computation is also dimin-
ished \vhcn fee awards are based on cost, rather than value. 
fll The first public interest attorneys' fee case to reach the 
Supreme Court was Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 
390 U.S. 400 (1968), in which the Court found that fees should be 
awarded absent "special circumstances," and that defendants' good 
faith did not constitute a "special circumstance" meriting the de-
nial of fees. The Court has consistently reiterated this holding. 
Its most recent holding on this topic was in Supreme Court of Vir-
g1nl.a v. Consumers Union, l18 U.S.L.\-1. 4620 (1980). There, a three-
judge court had denied fees against the State Bar of Virginia be-
cause that body had no power to alter its disciplinary rules, but 
. had urged those who did h:we' that power to act. The Supreme Court 
stated: 
"\.Je nt:'' twl convi11ced that it would be unfair to 
award fees against the State B~r, which by stat-
ute is designated as an administrative a)',L'ncy to 
help enforce the State Bar Co,de. Fee <1w;1rds n-
gainst enforcement officials are run-of-the-mill 
occurrences, even though, on occasion, had a state 
[Footnote Continued] 
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76/ 
seek judicial relief .• "- The plaintiff who, for example, 
forces the Los Angeles County schools to desegregate, has accomp-
lished through suit what Los Angeles County should itself have ac-
complished. Such a plaintiff is an agent of the public, in much 
the same way as the members and officials of the Los Angeles County 
School Board are agents of the public, and attorneys' fee provisions 
give hira the tools, at public expense, which the County Board al-
ready enjoys at public expense. 
This being the case, fees are permissible, even in rapidly 
changing areas of the law, where defendants find it difficult 
"to know what is required of them, making it dif-
ficult to avoid such litigation and awards of fees 
:1gainst thct,t, even though they make good f:lith and 
diligent efforts to try and stay current on the 
law and do all the law requires of them."]_]_/ 
In fact, fees :1re often deemed more, not less, necessary in such 
cases: 
"If the law is unsettled, the need for court ac-
tion to clarify the law and to protect the inter-
ests of the plaintiff may be greater, not less, 
than when the rights and duties of the parties 
are clear. The purpose of the Act is to ensure 
the enforcement of plaintiffs' rights, not to pun-
ish recalcitrant defendants. This purpose is serv-
ed if fees are awarded to successful litigants in 
litigation which defines or redefines the law." J.!./ 
12_/ 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Accord t-:ndeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 
275, 280 (lst Cir. 1978): "The key issue is the provocative role 
of the plaintiff's lawsuit, not the motivations of the defendant." 
ZZI Background and Analysis, at 2. 
]J}_/ ACORN v. Arkausas State Board of Optometry, 468 F. Supp. 1254, 
[Footnote Continued] 
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Congressional instructions, have ruled that where it can be shown 
that a lawsuit was a form of catalyst, for defencant officials 
81/ 
to act in a lawful manner, fees are required. This consistent 
holding is simply another reflection of the fact that fees are not 
punitive, but a means of enforcing the law • 
Such attorneys' fee awards certainly do not, however, in-
struct defendant officials that good faith and cooperation gain them 
nothing. A defendant official's compliance with the law as soon as 
it is made clear does reduce, often substantially, the number of 
hours spent by pl;lintiffs' counsel, and therefore the ;.:mounl of the 
82/ 
fee to be assessed. By the same token, should defendant officials 
behave as Los Angeles County suggests they might, and litigate ev-
83/ 
ery issue in order to avoid a fee assessment, their bad faith 
81/ See,~·~·, robinson v. Kimbrough, 620 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Criterion Club of Albany v. Bd. of Commissioners of Dougherty 
County, 594 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1979); Nadeau v. IIelgemoe, 581 F.2d 
275 (1st Cir. 1978); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), 
aff'd, 48 U.S.L.H. 4891 (1980); Ross v. Horn, 594 F.2d 1312 (3d 
Cir. 1979); International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. An-
derson, 569 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1978); Westfall v. Bd. of Cornr:lis-
sioners of Clayton , 477 F. . 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Lackey 
v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1979); H.C.I. Concord Ad-
visory Board v. Jlall, 457 F. Supp. 911 (D. Nass. 1978); NMCP v. 
Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other gounds sub. 
nom. NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (1980); Hartmann v. Gaffney, 446 F. Supp. 
809 (D. Hinn. 1977). 
~/ ACORN v. Arkansas State Bd. of Optometry, 468 F. Supp. 1254 
(E.D. Ark. 1979)(three-judge court). 
83/ Background and Ana.Iy_5>_~~. at 11. , 
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to officials only in their individual capacities; there is no good 
!}]_/ 
faith immunity for officials in their official capacities. Thus 
attorneys' fees, which are generally awarded against an official 
acting in his official capacity, are comparable to damages: an of~ 
ficial cannot avoid either in his official capacity on the basis 
of good faith. Attorneys' fees pursuant to the 1976 Act are asses-
sed against officials in their individual capacities only where 
88/ 
the official has exhibited bad faith. \~here an official exhib-
its bad faith adequate to subject hL~ to attorneys' fees in his 
individual capad ty, he is likewise str i ppcd of good faith immuni-
ty, and is liable for damages in his individual capacity. 
(2) Computation 
ed irrelev~at. 1 ~tLorneys' fees, it is 
§2_/ 
generally not considered one of the factors in computing fees. 
§II Owen v. City of Independence, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1980). 
88/ Senate Report, at 5, n.7. 
!}11 The Lawyers' Committee has found but one. case which might re-
motely support the idea that good faith on the part of defend-
ants might affect plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rates under the 1976 
Act. In Criterion Club of Albany v. Commissioners Court of Dough-
erty County, 594 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1979), the Fifth Circuit stated 
that the fact a suit was mooted by defendants' actions shortly af-
ter it had been instituted had relevance only as to the amounts to 
be awarded, not as to plaintiffs' entitlement. Without further 
clarification, this statement tends tp support the good faith/few-
er hours argument more than an argument that defendants' good faith 
should reduce plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rate, particularly in 
view of other Fifth Clrcu:lt opinions. See, ~·.&· • Brown v. Culpep-
per, 559 F.2d 271, (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Hississippi, 606 F.2d 
635 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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him as a results in "the enforcement of 
an important the public interest"; and which has 
"con£ erred on the or a large class of persons" a 
"significant benefit, '"'hether pecuniary or nonpecuniary. 11 Addi-
tionally, if a monetary recovery is part of the relief grant-
93/ 
ed, the court must determine that, "in the interest of justice,"-
the fee should not be taken from the recovery rather than from 
21.1 
it is understood that 
eral "prevailing 
However, great care must 
language be taken to 
the current wordin~ of Section 
"prevailing" party. So long as 
indicates an adoption of the fed-
standard such a change is unobjectionable. 
be taken les·t the change in statutory 
a more stringent standard. Under cur-
and "successful" are interchangeable rent case law, 
terms. 
Similarly, AB 3172 inserts the word "reasonable" to qualify 
the type of fee to be allowed. This merely conforms the California 
provision to the of similar federal provisions, and is 
thus unobjectionable so long as care is taken to point out that 
the change is not intended to imply more stringent standards of 
reasonableness. 
221 Section 1021.5, as written, permits the denial of 
fees altogether where fees should, "in the interest of justice 
be paid out of the recovery if any." The 1976 Act permits no such 
denial: 
"Of course, it should be noted that the mere re-
covery of should not preclude the awarding 
of counsel fees. Under the antitrust laws, for ex-
ample, a plaintiff may recover treble damages and 
still the court is required to award attorney fees. 
The same principle should apply here as civil rights 
plaintiffs should not be singled out for different 
and less favorable treatment." House Report, at 8-9. 
AB 3172 changes this component of 1021.5 by deleting the phrase "in 
the interest of justice," and by requiring a court to consider "the 
extent to which" fees be paid out of a recovery. By removing 
[Footnote Continued] 
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21_/ 
not a significant, but an inconsequential, benefit; or the suit 
was private in nature, and may have resulted in an award of dam-
~/ 
ages adequate to pay counsel. These four reasons are the only 
relevant ones, and the California fee provision already requires 
an examination of them before a decision on entitlement. The "re-
lief granted" factor is thus redundant on questions of entitlement. 
(2) Computation 
This is not to say, however, that the relief granted is ir-
relevant in the computation of attorneys' fees. "Results obtained" 
is one of the twelve factors mentionecl in ~CJ_hns(m v. Georgia High-
99/ 
way Express 2 supra, and is therefore one of the computation fac-
tors approved by Congress under the 1976 Act. The vagueness of this 
factor makes it of little use, however, except where the results of 
a lawsuit are either remarkably good or remarkably bad. Hhere a 
plaintiff has received results adequate to establish him as a "pre-
vailing party," most courts have simply listed one or two benefits 
of the litigation, and treated the factor as essentially neutral. 
22.1 See, e.g., Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 433 F. Supp. 1369 (N. 
D.N.Y. 1977); Huntley v. Community School Board of Brooklyn, 
New York, District No. 14, 579 F.2d 733 (2cl Cir. 1978). 
98/ ~. ~·.8..·• Zarcone v. Perry, 433 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), 
aff'd, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978); Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 
1182 (9th Cir. 1979). But see Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13 (7th 
Cir. 1979); Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 
1979); Fox v. Parker, __ F.2d __ (4th Cir. 1980); International 
Oceanic Enterprises, Inc. v. Menton, 614 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1980). 
99/ See note 12, supra. 
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103/ 
awarded fees which exceeded the damages a.varded. 
Where damages are not sought, Congress has instructed that 
fees "not be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuni-
104/ 
ary in nature."-- The federal courts have by and large complied. 
In those cases which do not result in a pecuniary recovery, the 
"relief granted" factor, when considered at all, has generally re-
105/ 
sulted in an upward, rather than a downward, fee adjustment. 
Again, those few federal courts which have reduced a fee 
award to account for the nature of the relief granted have done so 
.for reasons which, pursuant to California Code Section 1021.5, must 
be decided in plaintiff's favor before a fee in any amount can be 
106/ 
awarded. This being the case, the inclusion of a "relief grant-
ed" computation factor is unobjectionable, and, in fact, desirable: 
it will increase the anounts awarded successful private attorneys 
general under Section 1021.5, and further the purposes of the pro-
vision. 
103/ See, ~·£·• Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551 F.2d 672 (5th 
Cir. 1977); Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 455 F. Supp. 
676 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem., 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1979); Donald-
son v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp •. 311 (N.D. Fla. 1978); Peeler v. Long-
v'iew Ind. School Dist., 485 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Tex. 1979); Phillips 
v. •~ore, 441 F. Supp. 833 (W.D.N.c. 1977); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. 
Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1979). 
104/ Senate Report, at 6. 
105/ See,~·~·· Atcherson v. Seibenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Iowa 
1978); Imprisoned Citizens Unio~ v. Shapp, 473 F. Supp. 1017 
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Vecchione v. \lohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776 (E.n. Pa. 
1979). 
106/ Courts have reduced fee allowances to reflect the fact that suit 
-121- [Footnote Continued] 
.. 
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vailing parties for time spent on all nonfrivolous issues -- even 
108/ 
those which were eventually unsuccessful 
109/ 
the federal courts 
are split on this question. Those courts which have denied 
fees for time spent on unsuccessful claims have done so largely 
110/ 
without explanation, but those which have allowed such fees have, 
in addition to examining the 1976 Act 1 s legislative history, relied 
on conttnonsense principles which make such a result not only logic-
al, but almost mandatory. 
First, both those courts which have disallowed fees for un-
successful claims and those which have allowed them have recogniz-
ed that separation of a unified lawsuit into successful claims and 
108/ "In computing the fee, counsel for prevailing parties 
should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys com-
nensated by a fee-naving client, 'for all time reason-
au __ y c:.-: .. :t .-.. ~.__ . ..._, .,.,_,__ .__ 
' 
:Ja::..lv v. 
-197 4) , II 
?, )~: ~~~~~~~5 
Sendr.t-: 
,..__..,,;' 
__ ..,_~--·--· --«·----
).t~ .. ~-· 63G, ar 6G4 
at 6. 
In Davis, the court compensated time spent on unsuccessful claims be-
cause an attorney in a private case would have billed for that time. 
In Stanford Dailv, the court allowed fees for time spent on an unsuc-
cessful motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that "courts 
should not require attorneys (often working in new or changing areas 
of the law) to divine the exact parameters of the courts' willingness 
to grant relief." 64 F.R.D 680, 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
109/ Compare, ..':.·£.·, Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City 
Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S. 
1.\v. 3803 (1980), Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978), 
and Barham v. Welch, 478 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Ark. 1979), with Nadeau 
v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978) and Hughes v. Repko, 578 
F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978). 
110/ See, e.g., Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); Ross 
v=--iiorn-; 598 F. 2d lJ12 (3d Cir. 1979); Familias Unidas v. 
Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980)~ 
-123-
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unsuccessful claims is difficult at best, where, as 
is most often the case, work on successful issues also contributes 
to unsuccessful issues. A percentage reduction has been found 
inappropriate, because the same emount of time is not spent on all 
113/ 
claims, and all claims are not of equal in the litiga-
114/ 
tion. Furthermore, do not generally time records 
which permit a division into successful and unsuccessful claims, 
115/ 
nor should they be forced to. 
An additional with an which denies fees 
for time spent on unsuccessful claims is that it is an attorney's 
111/ See, ~·.&.·, Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Hemphis City Schools, 
611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 
(1980); Brownv. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978); Allen v. Term-
inal Transport Co., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1195 .D. Ga. 1980); Gary vJ. 
v. State of Louisiana, 429 F. Supp. 711 .D. La. 1977) aff'd, 622 
F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980 ler v. Gatter, .--so2(E.D. 
Pa. 1978); HcPherson v. School District No. 186, Spr ield, Illi-
nois. 465 F. 749 .D. Ill. 1978). See also Parker v. Hatthews, 
411 F. Supp. 1049 .D.C. 1976). 1 d nom. Parker v. Califano, 
561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 19 , v. , 10 E.P.D. ~ 
10,499 (D.D.C. (suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964). 
112/ All courts have found that time spent on unsuccessful issues 
is compensable if it also contributes to successful issues. 
See,~·.&·, v. , 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); Hardy v. 
Porter, 613 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1980). 
v. , 578 F.2d 433 3d Cir. 1978). 
114/ ~·&·• Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979). 
115/ has mandated that a 
torney should be compensated 
attorneys compensated by a f 
all time reasonab 
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duty to challenge as many actions or procedures as have injured his 
116/ 
client, and to seek the broadest relief possible. The denial 
of fees for unsuccessful claims prevents examination and clarifi-
117 I 
cation of the law, and the pursuit of novel theories. It 
urges an attorney to bring the narrowest case imaginable • 
The County of Los Angeles argues that all claims in a single 
case could be raised individually, in separate suits, and gives this 
118/ 
as a reason for denying fees on unsuccessful claims. But courts 
have always urged, and the rules often require, the joinder of as 
many claims as possible arising from a single fact situation, to 
[Footnote Continued] 
of no 'traditional' method of billing whereby an 
attorney offers a discount based upon his or her 
failure to prevail on 'issues or parts of issues.'" 
Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Hemphis City 
Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980). --
See also, ~·£·• Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 
1195 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
116/ Stanford Daily v. Zurcher,,64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), 
aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 
436 U.S. 547 (1978); Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City 
Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (65th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 
3803 (1980); Allen v. Terminal Transport Co •• Inc., 486 F. Supp. 
1195 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Busche v. Burkee, 483 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. 
Wis. 1980). 
117/ Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 
624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980). 
118/ Background and Analysis, at 10. Defendants have, at other 
tiues, also argued that two sep..arate suits should not result 
in fees where all claims could have been disposed of in one action. 
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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121/ 
prior "private attorney general" fee cases so specified. No 
court faced with this question pursuant to the 1976 Act has found 
122/ 
otherwise. The California Supreme Court'has, as Los Angeles 
County itself notes, held that "the fact of public or foundation-
al support should not have any relevance to the question of eligi-
123/ 
bility for an award."--
(2) Computation 
While sor.<e courts, including the California Supreme Court, 
121/ "[A] prevailing party is entitled to counsel fees 
even if represented by an org.anization or if the 
party is itself an organization. Incarcerated 
Men of Allen County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th 
Cir. 1974); Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976); 
Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 59D (5th Cir. 1974)." 
House Report, at 8, n.7. 
122/ See,..'::.·£·, Pe::-E:z v. Bou, 575 F.2d Zl (lst Cir. 1978); 
Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 63S (2d Cir. 1979); Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 
573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978); Bills v. Hodges, F.2d (4th 
Cir. 1980); Northcross . Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City Schools, 
611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3803 (1980); 
Brown v. Stanton, 617 F.2d 122l; (7th Cir. 1980); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 
617 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1980); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th 
Cir. 1980); Love v. Mayor, City of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235 (lOth Cir. 
1980); NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.\~. 3820 (1980). 
123/ Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, at n.24 (1977), quoted in 
Background and Analysis, at 12. Accord New York Gaslight 
Club v. Carey, 48 U.S.L.W. 4645 (1980)(Supreme Court holding that 
salaried employees of public interest groups are entitled to fees 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
124/ "While ••• the fact of public or foundational 
support should not have any relevance to the ques-
tion of eligibility for an award, we believe that 
[Footnote Continued] 
-127 
have cons 
the great 
fact, two 
sulted in reduced 
and 
public interest 
tiffs' couneels' 
be awarded 
v. 
Supp. 942 
Neill, 
(3d Cir. 
Donaldson 
v. 
2 
a fee, 
ice In 
1976 Act have re-
counsels' public fund-
funded 
source of plain-
the amount to 
(hold-
from defend-
1980); Beck-
rcy, '•81 
57 3 F. 2d 130 1 
. D. Ill. 1980); 
78); Johnson 
Continued] 
- 49 -
Defendants in most of these cases have sought, like the 
County of Los Angeles, 
"a recosnition that the public has already taken 
steps to fund and encourage the particular organi-
zation to bring lit ion of the type the fee 
award is sought in. In such cases, the purposes 
of the act have already been accomplished." 127/ 
Where representation is offered by funded public interest 
groups, however, the public's "steps" to assure representation are 
tax advantages shared by public defendants and, to a certain degree, 
commercial defendants. Even a group which operates wholly or largely 
[yootnote Continued] 
476 F. Supp. 1111 {N.D. Ill. 1979); Meisel v. Kremens, 80 F.R.D. 419 
(E.D. Pa. 1978); Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 465 
F. Supp. 261 (S.D.tl.Y. 1978); Mdlanama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38 
(W.D. Va. 1978), aff'd, 616 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1980); Sharrock v. 
Harris, 489 F. Supp-:-913 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Urbina v. Quern, 482 F. 
C:upp. '0"3 ~~'.n T11. lCfRO)~ Vanguard Jl!st cc Society, Inc. v. 
Hughes, 41.~.. L' • ..:,c.,, 
127/ c:;.ted 
approval in the ____ ......_ __ 
the Southern District of s 
counsel because an award would "be channeled into the cof-
fers of the Ford Foundation which enjoys its own reward at public 
expense by its tax exemption status. 11 Civ. A. No. 2205 (S.D. Miss. 
Feb. 20, 1973). The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating: 
"This Court has indicated on several occasions that 
allowable fees and expenses may not be reduced be-
cause appellants' attorney was employed or funded 
by a civil rights organization and/or tax exempt 
foundation or because the attorney does not exact a 
fee. • • • 
"Whether the attorney charges a fee or has an a-
greement that the organization that employs him will 
receive any awarded attorneys' fees are not bases on 
which to deny or limit attorneys' fees or expenses." 
493 F.2d 598, 606, 607 (5th Cir. 1974). 
-129-
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on the same basis as an award to a private counsel. The courts 
have also noted that a system which reduced fees to employees of 
[Footnote Continued) 
fees to privately and publicly funded organizational counsel, ~ 
note 121, supra, only one, Incarcerated Nen of Allen County v. Fair, 
507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 19711), dealt with entitlement alone. Anoth-
er, Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974), ~note 
127, supra, dealt with both entitlement and computation. The third, 
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976), dealt with computation 
alone. In Torres, the district court awarded salari2d public inter-
est counsel fees of $75 and $50 per hour, which it found to be the 
"going rate" in Hew York at the time for counsel with similar ex-
perience. The defendants appealed, contesting not the award to a 
publicly funded group, but the amount awarded, urging the court to 
reduce the amounts to reflect public support of plaintiffs' couns-
el. The Second Circuit, however, affirmed the a1nounts, stating: 
"Application of the provision to furnish full 
recompense for the value of services in success-
ful litigation helps assure the continued avail-
ability of the services to those most in need of 
assistance in translating the promise of the 
[Voting Rights) Act into actually functioning 
voting rights •.••• " 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 
1976)(emphasis added). 
In none of the three cases cited by Congress was 'the fee to a sala-
ried attorney reduced, and Congress' reliance on Torres, which dealt 
not with entitlement at all, but with computation alone, indicates a 
a Congressional desire that fees to salaried public interest counsel 
be computed on the same basis as fees to private counsel. 
131/ ~. ~·...S·, Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F. 
2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568 
(1979); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Fla. 1978); 
Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Palmigiano 
v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732 (D.R.I. 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st 
Cir. 1930); Custom v. Quern, 482 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1980); 
Lund v. Affleck, 442 F. Supp. 1109 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d 
75 (1st Cir. 1978); Meisel v. Kremens, 80 F.R.D. 419 (E.D. Pa. 1978); 
Unemployed Workers Organizing Committee v. Batterton, 477 F. Supp. 
509 (D. Md. 1979); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 19fl0); 
Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1980). 
-131-
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public interest groups 
tlement negotiations 
of escaping a full assessment of fees upon the identity 
of plaintiffs' counsel. 
An award of fees to interest group employees 
furthers the substnntive purposes of nt I ornf'ys 1 feE• lation by 
inc n·:t:: I ng ! !11· r<·sou lluble to pr v tv attorneys 
while a reductinn of fees to such attorneys law enforce-
mont by rcduclng thl· cJLtrces available ior public intvrest liti-
the full consequences of the violation. No rational reason justi-
fies such a result. 
E. 
This is another factor which not considered relevant to 
questions of entitlement. Should the fact that the taxpayers would 
ult.imatcly pay a fcc preclude the assessment, Section 1021.5 cer-
tinaly would not have been written to permit an assessment against 
v. , 468 F. • 399 (S.D. Iowa 1979). 
133/ v. Affleck 442 F. Supp. 1109 (D.R.I. 1977), 
5 Cir. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 
466 F. .. I. , aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 
1980); Dennis v. 
Ehrlich, 617 .2d 163 
, 611 F. 2d 130~ (9th Cir. ; Oldham v. 
Cir. 
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public entities, nor would the 1976 Act have included 42 U.S.C. § 
134/ 
1983 within the statutes covered. 
In fact, when public entities are the defendants in pub-
lie interest litigation, it is more, not less, vital that fees be 
granted. First, when litigation is against a public entity, most 
often the only "public" counsel who could bring suit to remedy the 
situation is representing the defendant, so that in these cases 
135/ 
"only private citizens can be expected to 'guard the guardians."'--
Second, "the ability of a private individual to enforce the civil 
136/ 
rights statutes is impaired by the opposing resources of the State,,--
or of any public entity. Even if defendant governmental units are 
impoverished or underfunded, the plaintiff is moreso, and less 
137/ 
able to pursue litigation. Congress was well aware of this 
134/ Although the 1976 Act permits fees in suits against private 
parties as well, more than 92 percent of the reported fees 
have been assessed against governmental bodies. 
135/ La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 9ll (N.D. Cnl. 1972). 
136/ Johnson v. Summer, MH3 F. Supp. 83, Bl (N.ll. Hiss. 1980). 
" [T]he private citizen's inability to vin-
dicate his rights adequately calls for a broad ex-
ercise of this court's ••• powers in effectuating 
the purposes of § 1988. This is particularly true 
where, as in this action, the individual is faced 
with opposition from a State, with the entire re-
sources of the State government supporting the liti-
gation." ld. 
"As the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress in-
tended defendant state governmental bo(lies, rather 
than prevailing parties, to bear the burden of civ-
il rights litigation, even when budgets are small. 
If indeed the defendants have modest means, they 
[Footnote Continued] 
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of a defendant to reduce a fee award below that wh.i ch would pro-
vide an incentive to bring public interest lawsuits, lest the pur-
141/ 
pose of the 1976 Act be frustrated. 
Public interest attorneys' fees are, after all, awarded to 
those who have managed to see that the law is properly enforced. 
The result ·of the litigation is of benefit to the taxpayer, and 
thus it is the taxpayer who pays. If the cost of public interest 
litigation must be reduced, there would be greater equity in lower-
ing the salaries of those found guilty of violating the law than 
in reducing the fees paid those who have proved the violations, as 
the taxpayer pays both amounts. lllhile the taxpayers themselves 
have not been found guilty of violating the law when a public in-
.terest fee is assessed, those whose salad es they pay have been. 
It ill behooves the County of Los Angelcr;, which paid 
$1,023,292.50 of the taxpayers' money to outside counsel in an at-
tempt to avoid desegregating its schools, and $167,067.00 to those 
. 142/ 
attorneys who successfully sued to integrate those schools, to 
argue that public interest attorneys are bilking the public. 
141/ See, !:.·.8.·• Sharrock v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980); McPherson v. School District No. 136, Springfield, 
Illinois, 465 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ill. 1978); Sargeant v. Sharp, 
579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978); Battle v. Anderson, 614 F.2d 251 
(lOth Cir. 1980); Custom v. Quern, L182 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ill. 
1980). 
142/ See Appendix A. 
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and the effectiveness of those While the desire of the 
County of Los Angeles to reduce the amount of money it must spend 
in litigation is understandable, that desire should in no way be 
permitted to result in legislation cutt back on the promise of 
California Civil Code Section 1021.5 -- the enforcement of import-
ant human rights. 
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EXHIBIT F 
ic Interest 
ature in 
Jl.ugust 8, 
s , to 
award success 
The purpose 
it f 
for amend 
C.C.P. 
the 
the 
and 
sent 
does awards, 
courts same well-
established procedures used in making attorneys' fee awards 
pursuant to other statutes and equitable doctrines. The 
method now universally used by all federal courts and the 
California Supreme Court, and expressly endorsed and approved 
by Congress, is the "weighted hourly computation," or "lodestar" 
method. Under this approach, a court computes a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, first, by multiplying the number of hours 
worked by a reasonable hourly rate based on the going rate 
for similar services in that area to reach a "lodestar" 
amount. Second, the court may either increase or decrease 
the "lodestar," depending on the presence of a number of 
additional pertinent factors such as the quality of attorneys' 
work and results obtained and the contingencies of success. 
All of this is designed to obtain a figure as the reasonable 
fee which approximates the reasonable market value of the 
legal services provided in successfully litigating the case. 
AB 3172 would replace this system of fee computation 
with a system focusing on tre costs of providing the legal 
services, rather than on the value of the services. This 
system would require that attorneys' fee awards under C.C.P. 
§ 1021.5 "be based upon the reasonable cost of providing the 
legal services, including, where appropriate, a reasonable 
and controllable margin for profit." Such a costs-based 
system has not been adopted by any federal or state court, 
has been rejected by virtually every state and federal court 
considering the matter, and has recently been resoundingly 
rejected again in a lengthy en bane decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
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• 
of having been sued by a public interest law firm, rather 
than a traditional law firm with higher overhead and higher 
salaries. 
Moreover, such a system requires an intrusive 
and complex preliminary step of determining exactly what 
an attorney's costs were. The financial investigation 
necessary for this system to operate is a powerful disincentive 
for private attorneys to take on public interest litigation, 
knowing that their finances are thereby'placed under the 
scrutiny of their opposing counsel and on the public record. 
Additionally, the "costs-plus" system, unless it 
took into account the costs of litigating cases where no fee 
award was obtained, would not provide adequate compensation 
for litigating public interest cases. This is because not 
all such cases will be won. Success on the merits and 
success in obtaining a fee are highly contingent. If no 
overhead factor for the lost cases is included as a part of 
an attorney's "costs," his or her firm will rapidly be 
running at a deficit. The firm will either stop taking on 
such cases or will ultimately go out of business. This 
obviously would undercut the purpose of C.C.P. § 1021.5'by 
failing to provide an incentive for private parties to bring 
suits in the public interest. Conversely, however, if the 
"costs" were to take lost cases into account as a portion of 
the firm's overall overhead, then the amount of compensation 
an attorney would receive would vary in inverse proportion 
to that attorney's success record, again an anomalous result. 
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Finally, the illogic of AB 3172's "costs-plus" 
system is shown the fact that the factors 
AB 3172 directs the court to consider (e.g., the relief 
granted, the ree o son the merits, etc.) have 
nothing to do with the costs of the services at 
all, but actually reflect if anything, the value of the 
services provided. 
(b) Other AB 3172 sions are also il al. 
AB 3172 would also prohibit courts the discretion 
to award any fees for lit ing the issues of entjtlement 
to and ion of the fee. Ye such issues take time 
just as lit ting the merits of the case does. (Indeed, if 
the "costs-plus" mode of calculat fee awards proposed by 
AB 3172 were to becor.e law, is safe to say that the time 
these s s 11 escalate.) 
for fees for that necessarily 
spent li 
Precluding any 
lowers the ef rate of compensat received by an 
attorney, thus further him or her sufficient compen-
sation to rejmburse the fu 1 costs of 1 a publ 
interest case. Simil 
to courts to 
mean that on 
issues on eve 
adequate fee awards 
spent liti 
, the grant of authority 
between adverse parties would 
who prevailed on 100% of the 
rest case would be able to obtain 
or her for all time 
rest cases. 
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AB 3172 would require a court to consider five 
factors in determining the a~propriateness and size of the 
award. These factors are: (1) the faith 2na cooperation 
of the party against whom a fee is awardee; (2) the relief 
granted; (3) the extent to which a party has prevailed; 
(4) the public or private funding of the person or organization 
to whom fees are awarded; and (5) whether an award will 
ultimately be paid by public funds. 
The first factor, the good faith of the losing 
party, is relevant only insofar as it lowers the fee by 
decreasing the number of hours the prevailing party hcd to 
spend litigating the case. Since it was the los party's 
violation of the law that precipitated the need for the lawsuit 
in the first place, the prevailing party should not be 
penalized for the loser's subsequent cooperation. Only the 
third factor, extent to which a party has prevailed, has 
any relevance in determining whether a party is entitled to a 
fee award under C.C.P. § 1021.5. The last four factors would, 
to varying extents, have a bearing on the size of a fee 
award, but it makes no sense to consider them in the contest 
of the "costs-plus" method of fee computation. Under that 
method, the attorney for the prevailing party would already 
be receiving less than adequate compensation to act as an 
incentive to bring public interest litigation. To the extent 
that consideration of any of these factors would further 
lower fee awards, the purposes of C.C.P. § 1021.5 would be 
vitiated and private parties could not afford to bring public 
-6-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
AB 3172 proposes a number of changes in the procedures 
for calculating and awarding attorneys' fees to 
C.C.P. § 1021.5. These comments submitted to the Assembly 
Committee on the Judiciary by the Center for Law in the 
Public Interest!/ will address each of the provisions of AB 
3172 in turn. 
Before analyzing the proposed amendments, it is 
important to note that C.C.P. § 1021.5 has operated extremely 
effectively over the nearly three years since it was codified. 
It has provided a significant incentive to private parties 
to bring suit to enforce important rights by allowing courts 
to award them a reasonable amount of compensation when they 
prevail in their claims. As with other statutes and equitable 
doctrines authorizing court-awarded attorneys' fees 
public interest cases, such as the federal Civil Rights 
Attorney's Fee Awards 
1/ The Center for Law in the Public Interest is a non-
profit corporation which provides legal services without 
charge to individuals and citizens groups the Southern 
California area. When the Center first began full-time legal 
operations in December, 1971, its chief funding source was 
the Ford Foundation. 
Since its Ford Foundation support terminated in 1978, the Center 
has been funded primarily by court-awarded attorneys' fees, with 
the remainder of its funding coming from relatively small local 
foundations, donations, direct mail solicitations, and other 
miscellaneous sources. The Center has litigated a wide variety 
of precedent-setting cases in a variety of substantive areas, 
including employment discrimination, environmental protection, 
land use and criminal justice reform. 
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Act of 1976, the amount f fee under C C.P. § 1021.5 has 
not been excessive. , the amoun o the awards has been 
tailored clos ly to s rendered and the 
benefits in the 1 
The s s AB 3 2 would des the courts 
ability to base fee awards on their s t of the value of 
the prevail tvork, them to set the 
fee on the arbi of the cost the a 
vo1ved. AB 3172 would further undercut purpose of C.C.P. 
§ 1021.5 by prec poss 1 fee award for 
litigat necessary tabli to and amount 
of a fee award. Addi f AB 3172 would serve 
further to vitiate this s which has until now 
operated fair , effect and to of all the 
citizens of i 
II. ADOPTION OF CALCULATION 
AB 72 propose method calcul ng 
the amount of a s . p. 
§ 1021.5. It would that based upon the 
reasonable cos o 1 , \vhere 
appropr 
' 
a sonable con for profit." 
Such a "cos fee recent over-
whe ected bane dec sion the u.s. 
2/ 
Court of ls the r f t, has 
----------~---------
f._ I v. Harshall cite] . 
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been uniformly rejected by Congress, all eleven federal circuit 
courts, and the California Court. The many compelling 
reasons for rejection of the "cost-plus" meth6d of fee computa-
tion in favor of the traditional "lodestar" approach are set 
forth belm;. 
A. or "Lodestar" Fee tion l1ethod. 
Court-awarded attorneys' fees are allowed under a wide 
variety of federal and state laws as well as various equitable 
3/ 4/ 
fee award doctrines.- Over 120 federal statutes- authorize 
~I 
such fee awards, as do numerous California statutes, including 
C~C.P. § 1021.5. 
3/ The equitable doctrines authorizing court-awarded attorneys' 
fees include (1) the "coffil'lon fund" doctrine whereby the suit filed 
by a party acting on behalf of others in a similar position 
results in the creation of a "cornr.1on fund" out of ch an 
attorneys' fee awzrd can be rnade; (2) the "substantial benefit" 
doctrine whereby a party acting in a representative capacity 
bestows a substantial benefit of a pecuniary or nonpecuniary 
nature on menbers of an ascertainable class and a fee award will 
spread costs proportionately among those benefitted by the litiga-
tion; (3} the "private attorney general" doctrine (codified in 
C.C.P. § 1021.5) whereby the litigation has resulted in the 
vindication of an important public policy, a substantial number 
of people will benefit frow the decision, and the costs of 
securing the decision transcend the individual plaintiffs' 
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization; and 
{4) the "bad faith" or "obdurate behavior" doctrine whereby a 
party has wilfully disobeved a court order or acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, or-for oppressive reasons. 
4/ For a complete listing of the statutes, see Federal Attorney 
Fee Awards Reporter, October 1979, Vol. 2, No-::---6, pp. 2, 28. 
5/ Appendix A attached hereto, listing 41 such statutes, is a 
partial listing of them. 
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Historically, when the basis for court-awarded 
fees was the "common fund" doctrine, the courts typically 
determined the amount of the fee by a somewhat arbitrary stand-
ard: simply computing a of the overall fund which 
would constitute the fee award. (~, Fox v. Hale and Norcross, 
108 Cal. 369 (1895) (fee set at 25% of recovery totalling over 
53 Cal.App.2d 740 (1942) 
(20% of first $2 mill recovery; 15% of next $2 million; 10% of 
remainder, for fee tota11 over $1.1 million).) This per-
centage could be varied up or down, but where the fund established 
by the litigation was very large use of even a relatively low 
percentage could result an extremely fee. The resulting 
fee often bore little relationship to the nature and aMount of 
the attorneys' efforts, the skill demonstrated, and the overall 
value of the services rendered. 
In order to greater li to lor the size 
of the fee award to the individual circumstances of the case and 
to avoid large "windfall" fee awards, the courts began to develop 
new techniques for determining the amount of a 
reasonable fee award. These efforts were accelerated by adoption 
of the newer equitable bases for fee awards where calculation of 
the pecuniary benefits achieved the litigation was far more 
diff cult, if not 
The newer 
ssib1e. 
to ca1cul 
attorneys' fee now used universal 
alike, is as follows: As a first s 
-ll-
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the amount of the 
federal and state courts 
the court examines the 
number of hours spent by the attorneys, and develops a figure for 
hours which qualify for a fee award. The court may (and often 
does) discount hours not productively spent (e.g., in legal and 
6/ 
factual issues where the opposing party prevailed),- hours 
spent on relatively mundane matters (e.g., preparing written 
7/ 
interrogatories),- hours where there may have been duplication 
of effort {e.g., where t\-10 attorneys from one side attended a 
8/ 
deposition),- hours where there was a "learning curve" which 
should not be paid for by the opposing side (e.g., library 
research on a basic procedural issue), or hours which the court 
9/ 
just finds excessive.-
~/ See, e.g., Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978); 
Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3rd Cir. 1978}; Barrett v. 
Kal~nowski, 458 F.Supp. 689 (H.D. Pa. 1978) (requested fees of 
$49,364.06 reduced to $6,820 on basis of time spent on unsuccess-
ful claims and other factors). 
7/ See, e.g., Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc., 484 
F.Supp:-76~72 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
8/ See, e.g., Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc., supra, 
at,77~one-third reduct~on ~n fees awarded because of dupl~ca­
tion of time and effort and limited public benefits); In re 
Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ga. 
1979) (number of hours disallowed because of duplication); 
Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., [1979] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 97,136 (S.D. N.Y.) (one-third reduction in 
hours because of duplication). 
9/ See, e.g., Rose Pass Hines, Inc. v. Howard, 615 F.2d 1088 
(5th Cir. 1980) (court found excessive hours spent preparing fee 
application); Crowe v. Lucas, 479 F.Supp. 1258 (N.D. Miss. 1979) 
(court found only 200 hours reasonable where attorneys spent over 
300 hours on case); McCormick v. Edwards, 479 F.Supp. 295 (N.D. 
La. 1979) (court found only 300 hours reasonable where attorneys 
sought compensation for nearly 600 hours); Hughes v. Repko, 
supra (court found only 36.4 hours reasonable where attorney 
spent 65.2 hours on case); Brown v. Stackler, 460 F.Supp. 446 
(N.D. Ill. E.D. 1978} (finding the 834.25 hours claimed to be 
"grossly excessive," court denied fees altogether). 
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Second, the court determines an appropriate hourly rate 
for each attorney in the case depending on the experience and 
expertise of the individual attorney, and the general level· of 
fees charged by lawyers in the local community who have a similar 
level of experience and expertise. 
Third, the court arrives at a basic "lodestar" amount 
by multiplying the number of hours allowed by the appropriate 
hourly rate for each attorney. 
Finally, the court adjusts the "lodestar" amount up or 
down, depending on a host of criteria tailored to the facts of 
the individual case, such as the importance of the litigation, 
the extent of the victory and the benefits bestowed, the skill of 
the attorneys and the efficiency (or inefficiency) demonstrated, 
the contingent nature of success on the merits and of the fee 
award, and other relevant considerations. 
The final amount chosen is largely within the trial 
court's discretion, and, on appeal, will not be reconsidered or 
recalculated in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 
This method of calculating fees is now utilized in 
every federal circuit (Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st 
Cir. 1977): City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2nd 
Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Sanitary Corp., 487 
F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1974); Walston v. School Board of Suffolk, 566 
F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Georgia Hwy. Exp., Inc:, 
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 
508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974); Waters v. \lise. Steel Works, 502 
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F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th 
Cir. 1977); Kerr v. Screen Actors ld, 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 
1975); Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778 (lOth r. 1979); Evans v. 
Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C . 1974)). It was 
expressly approved by the California Supreme Court for the 
California courts in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 {1977). 
Indeed, the "lodestar" approach has been applied to all kinds of 
litigation ranging from antitrust cases to shareholder derivative 
suits to employment discrimination cases. Further when the 
United States Congress recently enacted the Civil Rights 
Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988), it expressly 
approved this mode of fee calculation for all civil rights 
"public interest" cases where fees were awarded under that 
statute. (S. Rep. No. 94-1011 and H. Rep. No. 94-1558.) And, 
exactly the same factors considered in this approach are set out 
in the American Bar Association canons of ethics and disciplinary 
rules as the factors which must be utilized by all attorneys in 
determining what is a reasonable and appropriate fee (ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility, Canon 2 and DR-2-160(3)). 
The obvious advantage to this universal approach is 
that it allows the trial court judge, who is in the best position 
to determine the quali and nature of the attorneys' efforts, to 
appraise the value of his services on a case-by-case basis, 
considering all of the individual and unique elements which 
inevitably arise in any litigation. It utilizes a sensible 
starting point (the compensation the attorneys would have 
-14-
-151-
received if they had paying clients) and usts that figure up 
or down depending on the value of the services rendered by the 
particular attorneys the particular facts of each case. 
awarding fees in these cases is generally to encourage their 
being litigated and resolved in the courts, historically, the 
amount of the fees awarded has hardly been designed to do that. 
To the contrary, the amounts have tended to be so low as to 
discourage such cases from being litigated. Lawyers bringing 
successful public interest cases have not obtained "windfalls" at 
taxpayer or corporate expenses -- if , the amounts have 
been so low that frequently even the attorneys' "overhead" costs 
have not been reimbursed. 
In fact, a recent survey of 140 federal district court 
fee awards showed that there has been a tendency by most courts 
to devalue "public t" cases. , Court Awarded 
What Is Reasonable?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281, 310 
(1977}.) This survey showed the following mean hourly rates: 
antitrust suits ........ . 
all commerc 1 cases 
employment discrimination cases 
all c 1 s cases . . . . 
• $ 181 
93 
40 
38 
The experience the Cal forn courts is comparable. For 
example, in 
California Court, in a matter of original jurisdiction, 
awarded fees to the 
(California Rural Assistance at the rate of only $15 per 
hour. In No ton v. Davis No. L.A. 30731 (19 __ ), aff'd, 
-15-
-152-
23 Cal. 3d 955 (1979), the trial court awarded fees to the Hestern 
Center on Law and at the rate of $40 per hour. 
B. AB 3172's "Cost-Plus" Hethod of Fee Computation. 
There are many good reasons that Congress and the 
courts have not adopted the "cost-plus" method of computing fees. 
I~st fundamentally, under this method, the amount of fee awards 
would bear no relation to the value of the services rendered, as 
indicated by the quality and importance of the results obtained 
in the lawsuit, the expertise of the attorneys involved, and the 
other factors which are usually considered in setting fees. 
amount would, instead, depend primarily upon such irrelevant and 
wholly arbitrary factors as the extravagance of the lawyer's 
accommodations and the size of the law firm (smaller firms and 
sole practitioners tend to have higher costs). Indeed, this 
system would compensate attorneys in reverse proportion to need 
and efficiency. The more economical and proficient the attorney, 
the less he or she would be awarded. There would be an obvious 
incentive to increase operating costs and overhead unnecessarily 
and extravagantly to raise the amount of court-awarded fees. 
Second, the "cost-plus" approach would be extremely 
difficult to apply because it would require a detailed and 
complex inquiry into the financial affairs of the law firms 
involved. The court would have to ascertain not only what the 
costs were and which ones are allowable, a difficult enough 
process, but it would have to evaluate what a reasonable level of 
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costs should have been. Horeover, the fact that internal 
financial information would almost certainly become a matter of 
public record would be a powerful s for 
attorneys to take on 
c.c.P. s 1021.5. 
reali 
interest 1 
would, 
(both 
tion ect to 
the 
te and ic 
where fees are upon success on the merits, discourage 
all public interest litigation, thereby undermining the intent 
of the legislature passing c.c.P. § 1021.5 In all law 
practices upon contingent , the successful cases 
where fees are awarded must pay for all the law firm's expenses, 
including expenses attributable to time spent on unsuccessful 
cases. Because the "cost-plus" method fails to take such costs 
into account, it fails to provide adequate compensation or 
incentive for public interest litigation of the that C.C.P. 
§ 1021.5 was meant to encourage. Even if costs were to lude 
the costs of lost cases, the method would still make no sense 
because a firm's costs would vary in 
success in li the more cases 
to its 
lost, the higher its 
costs would be. In fact, the costs might well 
of the services rendered. 
the value 
Finally it would be extremely difficult to 
which cases would 
reasonable va 
established doctr 
an actual 
There are 
that have 
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sts rule rather than a 
statutes and court-
the basis for court fee 
ties for many years. 
Yet, fee awards pursuant these sta are all 
calculated under the tional It would 
make no sense to calculate fees t cases in one 
manner, and for all other cases in a fferent manner. And, if 
a fee were appropriate under both C.C.P § 1021.5 and another 
statute, which method would be used? 
III. PRECLUSION OF FEES FOR LITIGATING ISSUES OF ENTITLEMENT 
TO AND COHPUTATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AB 3172 would courts the di on to award 
attorneys' fees for the litiga the issues of 
entitlement to and computation of a reasonable attorneys' fee 
award. This proposal also has been ected consistently, and 
courts have found that the prevail is tled to fees 
for the time preparing the fee application where fee awards 
10/ 
are based on a statutory sion such as C .. P. § 1021.5-- or 
its federal counterpart the 1 
11/ 
Act of 1976.-- To fees for 
an attorney's effec 
's Fee Awards 
s time decreasing 
rate for all hours expended 
on the case, contradict the purpose of the 1 slature in passing 
C.C.P. § 1021.5, that is, encouragement of attorneys to act as 
10/ See Rich v. Citv of Benicia, 99 Cal.App.3d 536d (1979). 
11/ §_ee, ~, Ga_~ v. Haher, 5 4 F. 2d 336 (2nd Cir. 1979) i 
\Jeisenberger v. IIuecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th r. 1979); Lund v. 
Affleck, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978). 
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private attorneys in vind 
l1oreover, such a provision would encourage lo 
slative policies. 
parties to 
contest and drag out fee matters to 
thereby increasing the 1 par 
themselves. Such tactics would be cer 
st extent pos~ible, 
's costs at no sk to 
n to discourage private 
parties from taking on ic interest li gation. Thus, allow-
ing fees for time on the fee issue bene the public 
because such allowance is essential to ensure that the purposes 
of C.C.P. § 1021.5 will be effectuated. 
IV. APPORTIONHENT AND CONSIDERATION OF 
THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN FEE AWARD AND CDrll.PUTATION 
The provision of AB 3172 a1 a court to apportion 
a fee award "between ies on the same or adverse sides" at 
best adds unnecessary confusion to the method of fee 
computation and, at v1orst the fundamental purposes of 
C.C.P. § 1021.5. Courts already have the 
fees among parties on the same side, and 
parties 
to apportion 
frequently appor-
the fee and the parties tion fees between both 
receiving the fee. For e, in Serrano v. Priest, supra, the 
Supreme Court the of the fee award between 
the two publ interest law firms the prevailing 
parties. And Sundance v. Los Angeles Super. 
Ct. No. CA 000 257 (Order After Re: Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs, January 17, 1979), the court allocated the liability for a 
fee awarded pursuant to C C.P. § 1021. equal between the two 
-19-
-156-
defendants, the 
Allocat 
and County o Los les. 
of fee awards between adverse 
entirely different matter. s s is s 
es is an 
lar to the 
requirement of AB 3172 that a court cons the degree of 
success of the parties de ateness or size 
of a fee award. The presence of these s in AB 3172 
points out the absurdity of the "cost-plus" method of fee compu-
tation proposed in this 11. Under the "lodestar" method of fee 
computation, these sions would be redundant and confusing. 
The degree of success of the is taken to account 
in determining the appropriateness of an award s C.C.P. 
§ 1021.5 only authorizes awards to "successful" parties, that is, 
parties who prevail on the ts of lawsuit The degree of 
success of the parties and the nature of the benefits bestowed on 
the public by the prevailing are also taken into account by 
the court determining the size of the award. are among 
the court's primary considerations in deci to what extent to 
raise or lower the "lodestar" amount to 
the final fee award. 
Under the "cos us" method, however, 
provisions (the requirement that a court take 
parties' degree of success in determining the 
the amount of 
two 
account the 
teness and 
size of a fee award, and the authorization of fee apportionment 
between adverse parties) are a futile attempt to that 
wholly arbitrary system of fee computation some rela to the 
quality of work performed the prevailing par As discussed 
-20-
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above, the proposed "cos " system suffers from two funda-
mental defects: arbitrariness and inadequacy of compensation. 
These provis a to address the first problem of arbi-
trariness at the expense of exacerbating the second problem of 
inadequacy. In fact, the concept of apportionment of fees is 
incompatible with the "cost-plus" cone because it means that 
a party would have to be 100% successful to get reimbursed for 
all of his or her costs of 1 (not even counting the 
costs of litigation ch was not successful enough to result in 
any fee award at all). Such a fee award system would provide no 
incentive whatsoever for private parties to bring litigation in 
the public interest s they would almost never be fully 
compensated for their efforts. 
V. OTHER FACTORS \'JHICH HUST BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN 
In addit to its 
the extent to which a pa has 
other factors that a court must cons 
SIZE OF A FEE A~vARD 
that a court consider 
iled, AB 3172 notes four 
de ng the 
appropriateness or size of a fee award. These factors are 
(1) the good faith and cooperation of the party against whom a 
fee is awar (2 the relief (3) the public or private 
funding of the person or zation to whom fees are awarded; 
and (4) whether an award will u be paid by public funds. 
Some of these factors are irrelevant, o s are appropriate 
cons s within the context of the "lodestar" system, but 
-21-
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none of them make any sense in conjunc with the "cost-plus" 
method of fee tion. 
The second of these factors the relief granted, is 
indeed a relevant factor which is already a consideration 
for courts awarding fees under C.C.P. § 1021.5. A court cannot 
award a fee without considering this factor, as it must determine 
that the action "has resulted in the enforcement of an important 
right affecting the public interest" and that "a si ficant 
benefit ... has conferred on the general public or a large 
class of persons." Moreover, the nature of the relief granted is 
considered by the court in n whether to raise or lower 
the "lodestar" amount. Again, this sion may be an attempt 
to render the "cost-plus" system less arbitrary but to the 
extent that it could be used to lower fees that already fail to 
adequately prevailing party, it would further 
undercut the purpose of C.C.P. § 1021.5. 
The rd and fourth factors listed for the court's 
consideration, the of counsel for the 
are awarded and whether the fee 11 be 
totally irrelevant to the court's dete 
d 
nation of 
to whom fees 
ic funds, are 
tlement to 
an award. No court has found the former relevant to entitlement. 
Indeed, the California Supreme Court specifically noted in 
Serrano v. Priest, supra, that it was an irrelevant considera-
tion. And, with respect to the latter consideration, c.c.P. 
§ 1021.5 as presently in effect specifically contemplates that 
fees will be awarded against public enti es. Though these two 
-22-
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factors may at be found to be relevant considerations in 
the size of fee award, again it would be unreason-
able to make any reductions a fee under the "cost-
plus" method. 
nal , the fa and cooperation of the party 
against whom a fee is awarded is irrelevant to either the appro-
priateness or the s ze of a fee award insofar as it has 
affected the nature of the bene t by the litigation, 
and the necessi and f ial burden of private enforcement of 
rights affec the st. Presumably, if the losing 
party had with the law in the first place, there would 
have been no need for the litigation and no need for the party to 
pay any attorneys' fee at all. And, to the extent that the 
losing realized the mistakes it made and made good faith 
efforts to arrive at a 
party s c , less 
reso 
would have been 
of the prevailing 
red for the 
li and the fee would be to a minimum in any case. 
Any further the amount of the fee awarded would 
constitute an unwarranted pena t the prevailing party. 
PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS 
A. Notice. 
reason for this rement. A motion 
for attorneys' awards should be treated just like any other 
motion; 
insuf 
f court inds that the s 
ient for ny , it may a 
-23-
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notice period is 
appropriate continuances. 
In that manner, ther par will be prejudiced. The prevailing 
pa a s fers rd of performing work with no 
assurance of compensa and not even a possibility of compensa-
tion until after prevailing in the suit. It is unfair to subject 
that party to an addi delay in receiving compensation 
unless a court cause for such delay. 
B. Requirements That Hotion for Attorneys' Fees Be 11ade 
Upon Adequate Time Records, That They Be Subject to 
Di and That Find Be Made on All Material 
Issues of Fact. 
All of these 
merely restate what is al 
sions are unnecessary s 
established law. 
-24-
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they 
APPENDIX A 
Administr 
Alie~ insurer, , Ins 
Annulment of marriage, CC 8 
Attachment, amount of 
Banks, 
Liquidation, F 
Organiz 
Bond led by 
bid, Gov 14350 
Brands, 
Colleges and 
3106 
40 
ities, 
Container brand s t, but 
. 
Contractor's bond 
ations, 
Corre 
Cosme~ology school 
County treasurer's 
bond, Gov 165 
Dance stud 
Dead ies, compe 
s and 
Docw-aents of 
Eminent do:::-.ain,. 
J..banconr.,e 
Railro;J.a 
ng 
i 
7 
1 
re 
Educ 008 
p 438 
07 
, Educ 29007.3 
on al 
9 
, ba e, Com 7601 
'Expunging lis pendens, order, CCP 4093 
Fixtures erroneously affixed to land, removal, CC 10 .5 
Health se~vices, contract~, violations, CC 1812.94 
Improvement Act of 1911, th index 
Improvement Bond Act of 1915, refund g bonds, forec 
reassessment liens Str & H 9354 
Industrial loan companies, collection, defaulting debtor, Fin 18662 
Libel and slander action, CCP 836 
Liens and encumbrances, tr~ble damage action, Bus & P 10246 
Motor vehicles, conditional sales, CC 2983.4 
Real estate securities dealers, 
Actio~ for da~ages, Bus & P 10238.7 
Conservatorship and liquidation proceedings, Bus & P 10239.23 
Restraint of trade, action to recover damages, Bus & P 16750 
Revenue Bond I.aw of 1941, action to enforce, Gov 54356 
San Francisco Bay area transit dis cts, bond action, Pub U 29292 
Security c~ne:s prcte~tion, civil liability, Corp 27200 
Separate maintenance, CC 137.3 
Sewers and sewer systems, 
Delinqucmt payments, col c on, Health & S 5053 
Small claims court, appe I CCP 117j 
Subdivision maps, installation of improvements, rcsciss 
proceedings, Bus & P 11612.5 
Transfer of causes, motions for allowance, CCP 39Gb 
Unfair tr~dc practices, ac on for damages, Bus & P 17082 
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Fourth, A.B. 3172 requires that motions "be made 
upon adequate time " Legal aid interest 
lawyers, who not their clients, are to 
maintain records as ly as private attorneys. When 
~ confronted with less than perfect records or a lack of 
records, courts carefully determine whether the hours esti-
mated were reasonable work done in the case and most 
always lower the amount of fees awarded. This provision, 
however, would require a court to disallow merely 
on the conclus that records were not "adequate," 
whatever that means. 
Effect of the Bill on Amounts Awarded. 
The rare public interest attorney who 
the pitfalls discussed above and receives a 
to survive 
is 
for another unpleasant surprise: the fee award under A.B. 
3172 will be ridiculously low The bill court 
to undertake a complicated cost-accounting formula in determining 
the size of an award, rather , as done presently, 
simply awarding on number of hours times 
the reasonable hourly market rate for those services in the 
legal community. The formula suggested by the bill is based 
on an opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia which has s been vacated that 
same court. No other courts have ever adopted that formula, 
for good reason. The formula sets up an unjus fiable 
triple standard for determining fee payments in civil rights 
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cases. 
At the top of the hierarchy is the private law firm 
which defends civil rights cases. That firm is assured of 
market rate payments, win, lose or draw. 
In the middle is the private firm which agrees to 
prosecute a civil rights case on a pro bono basis. In order 
to receive fees the firm will have to undergo an extensive 
and humiliating examination of its private financial records 
in orGer to compute its fee. Given that prospect and the 
probability that its fee will be much less than its usual 
rate, the firm, given the choice, undoubtedly will choose to 
defend civil rights suits rather than to prosecute them. 
At the bottom of the heap, of course, will be legal aid 
and public interest lawyers. Public interest law firms will 
be penalized for paying lower salaries and having lower 
overhead than private The absurdity of such a 
standard can be seen supposing that a pub c interest 
firm decides one year to triple the salaries of its attorneys 
and move to much costlier offices, whi up the 
deficit by reducing services to its clients. By the "logic'* 
of the cost-accounting approach, the fees that a court may 
award the firm would triple, even though the firm would be 
performing less of a public service. The cost-accounting 
formula thus awards both greed inefficiency. 
The formula particularly perni a time of 
declining government and foundation support for legal services 
and public.interest programs. Not only 11 the formula 
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p'revent those programs from compensating for reduced grants, 
but it will make them suffer because of those grant reductions. 
A program whose grant is reduced may have to lower salaries 
and overhead, which in turn, under A.B. 3172, will lead to 
.. even lower attorneys' fees. 
Two other portions of the bill will lower the amount of 
money awarded. One provision of the bill specifies that no 
part of the fee award can be based on time spent litigating 
the entitlement to fees. This will effectively reduce the. 
amount of the award to every litigant, in direct defiance 
of the purposes behind the original legislation. It will also 
encourage losing governmental defendants to undertake frivolous 
"free" appeals of fee awards in order to forestall payment of 
a fee award and discourage attorneys from taking on public 
interest cases. 
Also, the bill appears to foster conflicts between 
attorneys and clients. Presently, section 1021.5 allows a 
court to determine that a fee award "should not in the interest 
of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any." A.B. 3172 
deletes this portion and directs courts to determine "the 
ext.e:1t t<> which attorneys' fees can be paid from the recovery, 
if any." Apparently, the court is instructed to order a 
civil rights plaintiff winning a damage recovery to pay his 
or her attorney from that recovery, even if it would be 
patentedly u:1just to require the plaintiff to do so. 
A.3. 3172's Penalties for Public Interest Litigation. 
It's bad enough that A.B. 3172 will strip away every 
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incentive in existing legislation for attorneys to take 
important public interest cases. Even worse, the bill attempts 
to discourage the clients themselves from suing. The present 
legislation specifies that fee awards may be made against 
~public entities, but no fees may be awarded to public entities. 
This bill deletes that proviso, allowing public entities to 
recover fees from civil rights plaintiffs. Every attorney 
will have to advise his or her client considering a suit to 
~nforce broad public rights that if the s·~it is unsuccessful 
the client may have to pay the attorneys' fees of the prevail-
ing party. Few indigent or even middle class clients would 
risk litigation under these circumstances. A.B. 3172 would 
keep out of the judicial system the very people Section 1021.5 
was designed to bring in. 
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